

# Between Rejecting and Adventuring: The Evolutionary Phases of Egyptians' Irregular Migration to Europe and the Geographical Analysis of Its Flows

**Dr. Mohamed Ahmed Aly Hassanien**

Lecturer of Human Geography - Department of  
Geography, Faculty of Arts, Cairo University  
Egypt

Associate Professor of Human Geography -  
Department of Social Sciences, College of  
Arts and Humanities, Taibah University  
Saudi Arabia

**DOI: 10.21608/qarts.2024.321034.2069**

مجلة كلية الآداب بقنا - جامعة جنوب الوادي - المجلد (٣٣) العدد (٦٥) أكتوبر ٢٠٢٤

ISSN: 1110-614X الترخيم الدولي الموحد للنسخة المطبوعة

ISSN: 1110-709X الترخيم الدولي الموحد للنسخة الإلكترونية

<https://qarts.journals.ekb.eg>

موقع المجلة الإلكتروني:

## **Between Rejecting and Adventuring: The Evolutionary Phases of Egyptians' Irregular Migration to Europe and the Geographical Analysis of Its Flows**

### **ABSTRACT**

This study examines the evolutionary phases of Egyptians' irregular migration to Europe and analyses its flows geographically. Although this paper employs a single case study methodology, it is comparative in its approach, because it focusses on Egypt's case and compares each evolutionary phase of Egyptians' irregular migration to Europe with the next, or Egypt's case with North Africa. Additionally, both historical and behavioural methodologies were used to analyse the phenomenon. It builds on various data sources to cover all phases and types of Egyptians' irregular migration to Europe. In addition to the government statistics, it builds on the author's fieldwork that applied the snowball technique and in-depth interviews. Both chi-square tests and trendline equations were employed in the analysis. The findings show that the real beginnings of the crisis of Egyptians' irregular migration to Europe were initiated in 1979; imposing new obstacles and heightening old ones in Europe in the 1990s did not stop this migration; although phase four (2002-2014) was marked by adventure and dangers, it represented a flourishing phase and comprised multiple flows; there was significant evidence of an association between the destination countries and the origin areas. The study concluded that the greater the deterioration of economic conditions in the origin country of irregular migrants, the greater the insistence of the migrants to overcome intervening obstacles.

**Keywords:** Irregular migration, emigration, migrant flows, Egypt, Europe.

## **Introduction**

The beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century witnessed a significant increase in irregular migrants from less developed to more developed countries. Irregular migration, therefore, became a considerable concern owing to its negative consequences on countries of origin and destination. Certainly, it is ubiquitous and pervasive because attempts to barricade borders may not have been the dominant factor in limiting the expansion of international migration (Lucas, 2008). The International Organisation for Migration [IOM] estimates that approximately 4,000,000 people are smuggled annually across borders (Adamson, 2007). Furthermore, various observers estimate that Europe has between 5-10 million irregular migrants (Lucas, 2008). According to the Pew Research Centre (2019), there were 2.9-3.8 million irregular migrants in Europe in 2017. With emigrant flows from the North Africa region to Europe increasing in the 2010s through regular or irregular routes, this region became a striking locality for exporting migrants to Europe (Kassar et al., 2014). In recent decades, Egypt has become a substantial country for exporting international migrants, as IOM estimated the number of Egyptians living abroad at 3.57 million in 2020 (3.4% of Egypt's population) (Mcauliffe & Triandafyllidou, 2021). According to the Egyptian Passports, Emigration, and Nationality Administration [PENA] (2013), between 2002 and 2013, 25,000 Egyptians were deported from Europe and transit countries to Europe because of their irregular migration.

## **Study Relevance**

The shift in socioeconomic and political conditions over the past decades in Egypt and Europe has led to a noteworthy evolution

in Egyptians' irregular migration to Europe [EIME] and a variation in the volume of its flows. Academically, the geographical library requires an analytical study of EIME's evolution and flows. Additionally, such a study can help decision-makers and officials build strategies and methods to restrict EIME in the future.

### **Objectives and Questions of the Study**

EIME has gone through certain phases throughout the last seventy years. Therefore, this paper aims to examine the evolution of EIME, highlight the causes behind this migration pattern, and ultimately explore migration flows. The study questions include the following:

- 1- How did Egyptians modify their views on emigration?
- 2- Why did Egyptians risk their lives to enter Europe illegally?
- 3- What are the geographical features of EIME flows, and how have their volumes evolved?
- 4- What characteristics shaped each phase of EIME?

### **Study Problem**

Until the mid-1950s, Egyptians demonstrated no particular interest in emigration; essentially, they chose their homeland and rejected emigration. However, their interest changed gradually over the next few decades, from rejection to desiring, and then adventuring. According to the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics [CAPMAS] (2017), the number of Egyptians living abroad had risen to 9.5 million by 2017. Meanwhile, the IOM stated that Egypt had the largest number of

people living abroad in Africa in 2019 (approximately 3.5 million), followed by Morocco, South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan, and Algeria (IOM, 2019). The striking shift in Egyptian emigration occurred at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century when Egyptians started to risk their lives to enter Europe, with images of overloaded boats carrying Egyptian emigrants becoming common across the media from 2005 to 2015. Moreover, Egypt became a substantial country for exporting irregular migrants to Europe.

### **Literature Review**

A vast body of literature has been written regarding Egyptian emigration, focusing on most aspects of its regular pattern (Birks & Sinclair, 1979; Dessouki, 1982; Taylor, 1984; Hassanien, 2002; Zohry & Harrell-Bond, 2003; De Bel-Air, 2016; Muller-Funk, 2017). Conversely, only a small body of literature has been written concerning EIME.

Predominantly, researchers became interested in EIME in the early 2000s, after an increase in migrants who were drowned at sea or deported from abroad. The Ministry of Manpower and Migration (2006) revealed that the primary factors behind this migration were economic, such as a lack of employment opportunities in Egypt, low wages and salaries, and the subsequent wealth of successful migrants; this migration was dominated by males who were less educated and suffered poverty and unemployment; and the choice of destination was closely related to migration networks.

Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (2008) argued that most migrants came from Lower Egypt, particularly El-Gharbiya, E-Dakahlia, E-Sharkia, and El-Menofia; the participants of irregular migration used the dream of escaping poverty to attract migrants. Talani (2010) indicated that typical Egyptian migrants to

Europe were young men who were more likely to take the risk of being smuggled by organised crime and accept low standards of living and jobs below their skills and education.

Hassanien (2017) found that there was somewhat of a balance between the push and pull forces in EIME; economic factors were highly significant in migration decisions; and friendship and kinship ties were leading social factors, alongside the high unemployment rate among those with intermediate and university qualifications. Despite the importance of analysing the evolution of EIME, it has not received sufficient focus. Therefore, this paper is original as it studies EIME by exploring its emergence, evolutionary phases, and flows.

## **Methods and Materials**

Whilst this paper focusses on a single case study methodology, it is nonetheless comparative in its approach (Bloemraad, 2013), because a single case study may be comparative and analytically stretch or modify an existing theory (Burawoy, 1998). Therefore, the present paper examines the evolutionary phases and flows of EIME using comparative analysis by comparing the historical periods of the phenomenon. This compares the characteristics of each phase with the following one to monitor the changes. Additionally, it puts Egypt's case in perspective with the North African countries found in the literature. Certainly, the historical methodology was used to investigate the evolution of EIME. Moreover, the study employed the behavioural methodology that focusses on migration decisions, residential location search, and choice process (Golledge & Stimson, 1997). Furthermore, the chi-square test was employed to determine whether the EIME destination countries are independent of the origin areas.


Data on irregular migration – including numbers, demographics, and socioeconomic profiles, are scarce, often unreliable, and usually incomparable between states and over increasing time (Koser, 2005). Nonetheless, there are three direct approaches through which to enumerate its scale: Files from government administrative bodies and data from police checks and apprehensions or labour inspections; special surveys, which are often based only on small and not necessarily representative samples; and, finally, regularisation programmes (IOM, 2010a). International migration surveys can usually stand alone, and their results are more meaningful when combined with other data - such as censuses, border crossing statistics (Fawcett & Arnold, 1987), and the statistics of deportees owing to irregular migration. Furthermore, Tapinos identified six categories of different entry, residence, and employment circumstances of migrants (Tapinos, 1999). Egyptian cases involve three forms of irregular migration - irregular border crossing, visa overstayers, and irregular workers. Therefore, this paper builds on multiple data sources to cover the lengthy history of EIME and its various forms. These sources comprise two primary categories: the author's fieldwork and government statistics or surveys. The author conducted fieldwork from June to September 2015, collecting data using sample surveys and in-depth interviews. The sample survey presents great difficulties owing to the illegal status of the respondents (Edmonston & Michalowski, 2004). Consequently, the author's sample was drawn using the snowball technique, which is a chain referral sampling and a more formal methodology for making inferences about a population of individuals who are difficult to approximate using descending techniques (Snijders, 1992). Moreover, snowball sampling was utilised by the Mexican migration project to sample permanent Mexican migrants in the

USA (Massey & Singer, 1995). Unsurprisingly, it is unlikely that one would find perfect lists of irregular migrants in a specific geographic region. Alternatively, if the researcher successfully identifies one migrant or more, he may discover that those migrants know others, as the necessary condition for the successful application of snowball sampling is that members of a rare population know each other (Kalton & Anderson, 1986). Researchers often use sympathetic community contacts, snowball samples of irregular migrants referred by friends or acquaintances, and/or samples of apprehended irregular migrants (Fawcett & Arnold, 1987). Given this, the author was able to identify some migrants from each origin area through friends and government personnel. Subsequently, using the chain referral method, he successfully identified and interviewed many returning irregular migrants and relatives of the current migrants at the time of the survey. The survey sampled 341 migrants, 113 of them were current migrants, leaving 228 returning migrants.

Figure 1 shows the locations of the selected origin areas for the sample, which include (Mit-Badr Halawa, Mit-Habib, and Mit-Yazid villages) (El-Gharbiya governorate), with 25,473, 24,969, and 25,116 people residing there in 2017 and forty-seven, forty-four, and forty-nine respondents, respectively; (Mit-Khamis village) (E-Dakahlia governorate), with 13,036 people in 2017 and sixty respondents; (El-Burj town) and (E-Sheikh Mubarak village) (Kafr E-Sheikh governorate), with 54,839 and 11,937 people there in 2017 with forty-nine and twenty-one respondents, respectively; and finally the (Tatun and Shidmuh villages) (Fayoum governorate), with 47,457 and 16,946 people there in 2017 with fifty-one and fourteen respondents, respectively (CAPMAS, 2017). (Tatun and Shidmuh areas) are in Upper Egypt, while the remainder are in Lower Egypt, where this migration is concentrated.



Furthermore, (El-Burj and E-Sheikh Mubarak) offer unique geographical locations since their coasts have several gathering and departure sites for irregular migrants.



**Figure 1:** Locations of the main selected areas of origin for the fieldwork of Egyptians' irregular migration to Europe (2015) (source: CAPMAS, 2015).

The reasons behind selecting these areas include the reputation of (Mit-Badr Halawa, Mit-Khamis, Mit-Yazid, and El-Burj) in sending irregular migrants by sea or air to Europe; the proximity of the other areas to those previously mentioned; the author's keenness to the geographical diversity of these areas (coastal, river, and inland); the author's keenness to cover various types of irregular migration; and finally, the author has friends in some of these areas who enabled interviewed with returning migrants and current migrants' relatives. The difference in sample size between these areas was due to the concentration of emigrants and the response rates.

The methodology also relies on in-depth interviews, which were applied to conduct intensive individual interviews with some return migrants. A total of thirty-two migrants were interviewed in depth in the selected areas. Additionally, the author interviewed two people responsible for the irregular migration file in the Egyptian Interior Ministry - the chief of criminal investigations and the director of the Department of Anti-counterfeiting Crimes and Forgery, to explore the evolution of EIME, its channels, routes, and origin areas. Moreover, the analysis relies on three government data sources. The first is the survey of attitudes of Egyptian youth towards irregular migration to Europe (2006) carried out by the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Emigration from October 2005 until March 2006. It aimed to identify the push factors of migration and collect data on potential migrants' awareness of irregular migration and migrant smuggling. It randomly sampled 1,552 youth respondents aged 18-40 from eight governorates. The second is the annual bulletin of Egyptians who have obtained permission to migrate abroad and Egyptians with other citizenship, which CAPMAS has issued regularly since 1968. It contains statistics of Egyptians who left Egypt without a licence before

acquiring immigrant status; thus, it provides the statistics of Egyptians' visa overstayers in Europe [EVOE]. The third is data collected by PENA in the Interior Ministry on Egyptian deportees from abroad because of irregular migration from 2002 to 2013. When the authorities in Europe arrest Egyptian irregular migrants as they cross international boundaries, they detain them until their deportation to Cairo. Upon their arrival in Egypt, PENA takes over both their identification and their channels of migration without official documents, or with bogus ones such as counterfeit or altered documents and forged unissued passports (Interview with Colonel Moamen Alaa, the Interior Ministry, dated 24 April 2013). However, the Department of Anti-Counterfeiting, Crimes and Forgery takes over the interrogation of the deportees to identify their smugglers (Interview with Brigadier-General Asem E-Dahesh, the Interior Ministry, dated 26 May 2013).

### **Results and Discussion**

Egyptian emigration is often seen as a relatively recent phenomenon, as Egypt has historically been a land of immigrants rather than emigrants. According to Cleland (1936), Egyptians have a reputation for favouring their soil and rarely leave unless to study or travel, after which they always return. It has been difficult to get fellahs to migrate to newly developed areas within Egypt; they are extremely conservative in outlook and quite clearly prefer the known to the unknown (James, 1947). In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Muhammad Ali Pasha sent an Egyptian mission to study printing arts in Italy in 1813, and another to France in 1818 to study military and marine sciences (Zohry, 2006). Therefore, a communication channel existed between Egypt and Europe. In the 1920s, Egypt sent schoolteachers to Arab countries, with the first educational missions sent to Sudan and then extended to other Arab countries

(Choucri, 1983) – such as Kuwait and Bahrain – in the late 1920s (Seccombe & Lawless, 1986). Until the early 1950s, Egyptian emigration, whether regular or irregular, had no significant importance since there were so few migrants. Indeed, Egyptians did not tend to emigrate voluntarily; their migrations were confined to sending students to Europe and schoolteachers to Arab countries. However, the phenomenon grew gradually after 1952, with Egyptians becoming increasingly willing to emigrate regularly or irregularly. From the early-1950s to 2020, EIME passed through five phases. The shift from one phase to another accompanies changes in some characteristics; for example, transformations of interior conditions and the labour market in Egypt and Europe, the shift in migration policy in Egypt and Europe, estimates of irregular migrants, the level of adventure, and the risks of migration. These phases are as follows:

### ***1. Emergence phase (1952-1973)***

This phase saw the emergence of Egyptian regular migration accompanied by irregular migration. Some Egyptians migrated to Europe on short-term tourist or student visas, but after their expiry, they stayed and became visa overstayers before acquiring immigrant status in Europe. The Ministry of Interior of Egypt estimated that 22,675 Egyptians departed Egypt to Europe, the USA, Canada, and Australia without a licence and then acquired permanent immigrant status between 1962-1972 (CAPMAS, 1968-2019). The low number of irregular migrants during this phase was due to the socioeconomic conditions in Egypt being better until 1967, low unemployment rates (less than 2.5% from 1961 to 1973) (CAPMAS, 1961-2013), the fact that most Egyptians still preferred their homeland, and because Egypt's migration policy was

characterised by its prohibitive nature from the mid-fifties to around 1967 (Dessouki, 1982). Similarly, the conscription laws have imposed major obstacles to emigration. They covered highly educated persons (engineers, doctors, nurses, medical technicians, and university teaching assistants), who could not resign or have the right to emigrate. Moreover, this prohibitive policy accompanied Egypt's industrialisation efforts and was dictated by the need for particular categories of professionals. Therefore, some of the qualified Egyptians in Europe refused to return. Furthermore, this phase was marked by political instability and declining economic growth rates, particularly after 1967. Consequently, many graduate students were tempted to live abroad to escape economic hardship after the 1967 war (Zohry & Harrell-Bond, 2003). However, there was high European demand for foreign labour during the 1950s and 1960s since some countries lost most of their human resources during the Second World War, especially France, the UK, Germany, and Italy. Moreover, European countries did not impose laws that criminalized irregular immigration during this phase. Overall, EIME demonstrated no significant importance during this phase, especially on the media level, owing to the low number of migrants, the safe migration channels, and the absence of hazards to migrants' lives.

## ***2. Increase phase (1974-1991)***

This phase was marked by gradual increases in the number of irregular migrants, diversity in the geographical directions of migrants, and temporary or permanent patterns. These new trends resulted from Egyptian socioeconomic and political transformations, particularly during the period (1967-1973). For example, unemployment rates increased from 2.2% in 1974 to 8.8%

in 1991 (CAPMAS, 1961-2013) compared to less than 2.5% during 1961-1973. Consequently, Egyptians began to desire migration either regular or irregular. Egypt's migration policy also shifted, from restrictive in the 1950s and 1960s to encouraging in the 1970s. Specifically, Egypt began encouraging emigration after it adopted the liberalisation policy in 1973. Furthermore, Law No. 29 in 1974 limited the conscription of doctors, pharmacists, dentists, medical technicians, and nurses to four years, and Law No. 54 in 1976 limited engineers' conscription to six years (Dessouki, 1982). Moreover, the government passed Law No. 111 in 1983 which gave Egyptians the right to emigrate – whether individuals or groups, permanently or temporarily. Consequently, this new policy was an indirect factor for the relative increase in the number of irregular migrants, with thousands of Egyptians who failed to migrate to Arab countries through legal channels turning to illegal ones.

Indeed, this phase witnessed a significant increase in the demand for Egyptian labour particularly from Arab oil-exporting countries owing to the 1973 oil boom that raised oil prices sharply. By March 1974, oil prices had stabilised at around \$12 a barrel, roughly four times the pre-crisis price. As a result, oil revenues in the Arab oil-exporting countries surged significantly, allowing them to undertake large-scale construction projects but, also, requiring them to import labour from other Arab countries, particularly Egypt. Notably, some evidence confirms the increase in irregular migration to Arab countries, with Egyptian irregular migration to the Arab region accounting for 54% of all Egyptian labour migrants in the mid-1970s (Birks & Sinclair, 1979). Meanwhile, another study of 100 household heads who migrated from El-Qubabat village (seventy km south of Cairo) to Saudi Arabia in the late 1970s revealed that 75% of them entered to complete Hajj or Umrah, before working irregularly (Khafagi,

1983). Therefore, the late 1970s can be considered the beginning of the Egyptian irregular migration crisis, whether to Arab countries or Europe. Moreover, following the 1973 oil crisis, Libya – and to a certain extent Algeria – witnessed an increasing number of migrants crossing the border from neighbouring countries searching for work in the oil fields (Kassar & Dourgnon, 2014). This was unlike the closure of the Egyptian-Libyan border in 1978, which halted Egyptians' irregular migration to Libya and primarily affected peasants and unskilled workers. Likewise, the government seconded migration declined in the years immediately following the Camp David agreement (Taylor, 1984). Nevertheless, this situation did not last long, and the number of regular and irregular migrants increased again. The author's sample revealed that irregular migrants to Europe between 1974-1991 numbered 14 (4.1% of the total migrants), with their migration beginning in 1979 and increasing gradually during the late-1980s. All migrants migrated from (Mit-Badr Halawa) to Paris by air on short-term tourist or visitation visas. In this phase, there was a drop in total Egyptian visa overstayers compared to the previous phase, as they accounted for 4,725 persons from 1975-1991, compared to 23,000 persons from 1962-1972. Between 1975 and 1991, there were 141 EVOE (3% of the total) and all were residing in France (CAPMAS, 1968-2019). This decline was due to the decrease in European and American demand for labour. Therefore, many Egyptians who intended to emigrate preferred Arab countries rather than Europe as they believed that migration to the former was easier than the latter.

### ***3. Restrictions and flows forming phase (1992-2001)***

This phase was marked by restrictions as the EU adopted tightened immigration policies, particularly after the Schengen

Agreement in 1990 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1991, including strict border surveillance, requiring a visa, and imposing a selective ceiling for work permits. Nevertheless, the number of irregular migrants and their networks grew particularly from Morocco to Spain, from Tunisia and Libya to the nearby Italian coasts and islands across the Mediterranean (Zohry, 2005), and from Egypt to Italy and Greece across the Mediterranean and Libya. As a result, between 1997 and 2007, 460,000 Egyptian irregular migrants lived in Europe, with 90,000 residing in Italy (Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, 2008). Moreover, the increase in the number of migrants reflects how most measures had merely been decisions or recommendations; that is to say, they were nonbinding. However, few took the form of common actions, and their legal status was somewhat ambiguous. Consequently, it was slightly easy to enter Europe, which encouraged young people from North Africa to migrate to Europe irregularly. Moreover, the Schengen agreement, which gave EU residents and visitors the right to move freely between member states, encouraged Egyptians to migrate to Europe regularly or irregularly, believing they would profit from the agreement's advantages. Similarly, Arab Gulf countries imposed the following restrictions against Arab labour immigration: reducing their size owing to sharp reductions in oil prices; dispensing with many of those workers and replacing them with national or Asian workers; and reducing wages and benefits, alongside not renewing their contracts. Unsurprisingly, therefore, many Egyptians turned their attention to Europe. Additionally, political instability in the Middle East following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Second Gulf War was another reason for Egyptians turning their destination intentions to Europe. After the end of the Iranian-Iraqi War, approximately half of the 1.8 million Egyptians in Iraq returned. Equally, approximately half a million




Egyptians deserted Kuwait and Iraq following the Gulf War in 1990-1991 (UN, 1998). Because most returnees could not reach Europe regularly, they turned to irregular routes instead. Furthermore, Egyptian economic conditions had worsened compared to the former periods, resulting in rare job opportunities, which pushed many unemployed youths to emigrate to Europe irregularly, as unemployment rates ranged from 8% to 11% (1992-2001) compared to less than 8% in most years of the previous phase (CAPMAS, 1961-2013).

Broadly, many Egyptians decided to migrate to Europe irregularly during this phase through safe or unsafe routes; consequently, their numbers and proportions increased compared to the former periods. According to the author's fieldwork, migrants in this phase numbered 74 (22% of the total), compared to 4.1% for the previous phase. Furthermore, two primary flows of almost similar volume were formed, as well as two secondary flows (see **Table 1** and **Fig. 2**).

**Table 1.** Destination countries for Egyptians' irregular migration to Europe (1992-2001).

<b>Destination Country</b>	<b>Number of Migrants</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Italy</b>	38	51.4
<b>France</b>	32	43.2
<b>Netherland</b>	2	2.7
<b>Romania</b>	2	2.7
<b>Total</b>	74	100

*Source: Author's fieldwork from June to September 2015.*



**Figure 2:** Flows of Egyptians’ irregular migration to Europe (1992-2001) (source: Author’s fieldwork from June to September 2015).

Table 1 and Figure 2 demonstrate that between 1992 and 2001, the two primary flows accounted for 95% of all migrants, of which the first destination was Italy (51.4%), especially Milano, its origin areas being (Tatun, El-Burj, Mit-Khamis, Shidmuh, and Mit-Yazid). Nearly all the migrants in this flow used unsafe routes through the Mediterranean via small and old boats, commonly from the northern coasts of Egypt or Libya. The destination of the second primary flow was France (43.2%), especially Paris, with origin areas in (Mit-Badr Halawa and Mit-Habib). However, most migrants in this flow used the air route. Similarly, most migrants

from Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria migrated to France. At first, however, Tunisian workers in France travelled with a tourist visa and asked for a long-term residence permit (Jaulin, 2016). With secondary flows to the Netherlands and Romania, ethnographic fieldwork with Egyptian men who migrated to Amsterdam in the 1990s revealed that they had migrated unauthorised or on short-term student or tourist visas; they entered a life of illegality in Amsterdam, working as cooks, construction workers, and/or cleaners (Pettit & Ruijtenberg, 2019). Equally, the author's fieldwork revealed that these occupations were common among most Egyptian irregular migrants in all European countries during the 1990s and the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Likewise, there was an increase in EVOE compared to the previous period, as they amounted to 1,053 persons – 23.1% of the total – from 1992-2001, compared to 141 persons (3%) from 1975-1991. Furthermore, Italy emerged as a primary country in hosting those people in the 1990s and has occupied the first rank since 1996, with 942 persons (20.6% of the total) from 1992-2001 (CAPMAS, 1968-2019).

#### ***4. Adventuring and multiple flows phase (2002-2014)***

This phase was marked by adventuring and risks, as crossing European boundaries irregularly - particularly after the September 11 attacks in 2001 - involved intensive adventuring and hazards, alongside European policymakers increasingly linking migration policy and national security. Moreover, the September 11 attacks and the subsequent bombings in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 raised the spectre of international migration flows as being a conduit for international terrorism (Adamson, 2007). Given this, many Egyptian irregular migrants lost their lives in the Mediterranean during their journeys to Europe, with others arrested

and deported. Broadly, Europe sought to reduce Arabian regular immigration and stop irregular immigration altogether. Therefore, they adopted some unusual procedures such as establishing detention centres for arrested irregular immigrants along the coasts; the EU states agreeing in 2018 to detain the irregular immigrants for up to eighteen months and face a five-year reentry ban; and thirdly European countries seeking to cooperate with the Southern Mediterranean countries to stop irregular immigration. The EU restrictions could not succeed in minimising the number of Egyptians who became visa overstayers, with the number of EVOE increasing during the 2000s compared to the 1990s, as they increased from 1,053 persons (23.1% of the total) between 1992 and 2001 to 1,174 persons (32.8%) between 2002 and 2014, with all residing in Italy (CAPMAS, 1968-2019). Likewise, the EU's unusual procedures did not halt Egyptians' infiltration via European borders, as their numbers and flows increased significantly. The insistence of Egyptians to emigrate irregularly to Europe during this phase - despite the restrictions - reflects the poor Egyptian socioeconomic conditions, such as high unemployment rates, low per capita GDP, and a low standard of living. For example, the unemployment rate rose to 13% in 2013 and 2014 (CAPMAS, 1961-2013). Furthermore, GDP per capita was much lower than the world average and significantly less than its counterpart in the two primary receiving countries (Italy and France). This ranged from \$9000-11000\$ in Egypt (2008-2014) compared to \$12000-15000 globally, \$34500-36500 in Italy, and \$34500-40000 in France (The World Bank, 2020a). Evidently, economic factors such as rare job opportunities, low wages, a high cost of living, and the desire to improve income were significant in the decisions of Egyptians to migrate irregularly to Europe in 2014 (Hassanien, 2017). Additionally, building luxurious houses in rural Egypt, marriages,

and the consumerist behaviours of the returnees were significant factors in attracting young men to emigrate. Generally, when young people weigh the hazards of irregular migration against the expected returns, they take the risk of an expected better life (The Ministry of Manpower and Migration, 2006). Moreover, Maghrebians' migration to Europe was initially the direct result of colonisation; however, it has since been regarded as an economic factor regulating the labour market in both the Maghreb and Europe (Kassar et al., 2014).

In this phase, the adventures and risks resulted from the shift from using safe to unsafe routes in emigration. According to a survey by the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Migration (2005), most respondents were aware of irregular migration risks (90%) (The Ministry of Manpower and Migration, 2006). Overall, Egyptians didn't care about irregular migration hazards or losing their lives in the Mediterranean. Consequently, total irregular migrants increased and reached approximately 2000 annually (2000-2007), according to the Egyptian Interior Ministry (Jomaa, 2010). Furthermore, the ministry became aware of EIME across the Mediterranean using open or damaged fishing boats in 2002; Nonetheless, the prevailing pattern before that was migration by air with forged documents (Interview with Brigadier-General Asem E-Dahesh, the Interior Ministry, dated 26 May 2013). For example, Crete was the destination for the first journey of EIME across the Mediterranean in 2002, in which islanders initially welcomed migrants, before deporting them after the Egyptian consul discovered what was happening; Subsequently, the Egyptian authorities realised that there was irregular migration occurring across the Mediterranean (Interview with Colonel Moamen Alaa, the Interior Ministry, dated 24 April 2013). Since 2002, EIME has gained significant importance, especially in the media, owing to


young people who disappeared or lost their lives in the many boat accidents.

Additionally, the statistics of Egyptians deported from Europe owing to their irregular migration (2002-2013) confirm the significant increase in migrants. They amounted to 25,000, with 14,300 deported from Europe directly (57% of the total), and 10,800 from transit countries to Europe (PENA, 2013). Moreover, the author's sample shows that the migrant population was quite high during this phase (74.2% of the total, compared to 22% for the previous period). Therefore, this phase represents the flourishing phase of EIME as the phenomenon has boomed during it; comparatively, the migration of North African countries to Europe boomed a few years after the end of colonialism (Kassar et al., 2014). Furthermore, the January 25<sup>th</sup> uprising in 2011 in Egypt and the subsequent events played a significant role in increasing EIME, as in the wake of the Arab Spring, tens of thousands of migrants arrived in southern Europe from across the sea, mostly from Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt (Schneider, 2012). Moreover, this phase was characterised by flows' multiplicity and significant increases in the volume of some flows – particularly Italy, France, and Greece's flows (see **Table 2** and **Fig. 3**).

**Table 2.** Destination countries for Egyptians' irregular migration to Europe (2002-2014).

Destination Country	Number of Migrants	%
Italy	152	60.1
France	78	30.8
Greece	17	6.7
Denmark	2	0.8
Turkey	2	0.8
Germany	2	0.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>253</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: Author's fieldwork from June to September 2015.*



**Figure 3:** Flows of Egyptians' irregular migration to Europe (2002-2014) (source: Author's fieldwork from June to September 2015).


Furthermore, Table 2 and Figure 3 reveal two primary flows of EIME that headed to Italy and France, comprised 91% of the total migrants during this phase, and that the four secondary flows headed to Greece (6.7%), Germany (0.8%), Denmark (0.8%), and Turkey (0.8%). The details are outlined below.

- *Italy's flow*

In the past two decades, Italy has been Europe's top destination for regular or irregular Egyptian migrants. The ISMU Foundation estimated the number of Egyptians living irregularly in

Italy was approximately 9,400 on 1<sup>st</sup> July 2005 (1.7% of total irregular immigrants) (Fasani, 2008), with approximately 70,000 Egyptian regular and irregular residents combined in Lombardy in 2008 (IOM, 2010b). Certainly, numerous factors encouraged Egyptians to migrate to Italy irregularly, the leading cause being the amnesties and legalisation programmes for irregular migrants. For example, Italy formally legalised the status of 15,470 Egyptians according to Amnesty International in 2002 (Fasani, 2008). According to the author's fieldwork, the number of migrants has continued to increase since 2002, peaking in 2009; Italy's flow was the largest during this phase (representing 60.1% of all migrants); except for (Mit-Badr Halawa and Mit-Habib), all origin regions contributed to this flow, with only two (Mit-Khamis and Tatum) accounting for slightly more than half of the total; nearly all of the migrants used unsafe routes, such as the Mediterranean, or the Libyan and Egyptian coasts. Furthermore, Figure 4 depicts a plot of the annual number of Egyptian irregular migrants to Italy from 1992 to 2014. It reveals that the migrant flow to Italy began in 1992, with 2005-2011 representing the peak period. According to the regression analysis, the best-fit equation is  $Y = 0.698 X - 1389.089$ . The p-value reveals that the equation is statistically significant (0.001), and the  $R^2$  value indicates that the line explains 43% of the variance in the number of migrants.






**Figure 4:** Plot of the annual number of Egyptian irregular migrants to Italy (1992-2014), according to the author's sample.

- *France's flow*

France had the second-largest flow (31%), with the majority of migrants (86%) coming from three origin areas (Mit-Yazid, Mit-Habib, and Mit-Badr Halawa). Most migrants of this flow were concentrated in Paris, where they worked in the city's central fruit and vegetable market, particularly (Mit-Badr Halawa) migrants. These migrants used safe and unsafe routes; for example, all migrants from (Mit-Badr Halawa) migrated by plane, but most migrants from other areas migrated through the Mediterranean,

according to the author's fieldwork. Moreover, Figure 5 shows a graph of the annual number of Egyptian irregular migrants to France from 1979 to 2014. It reveals that the migrant flow to France is the oldest, dating back to 1979. In addition, it suggests that there has been a significant increase in the number of migrants since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The regression analysis indicates that the best-fit equation is  $Y = 0.214 X - 424.634$ . The p-value reveals that the equation is statistically significant (0.000), and the  $R^2$  value shows that the line explains 41% of the variance in the number of migrants.



**Figure 5:** Plot of the annual number of Egyptian irregular migrants to France (1979-2014), according to the author's sample.

- *Greece's flow*


Greece had the third-largest flow (6.7%), with the majority of migrants coming from (El-Burj and E-Sheikh Mubarak) between 2002 and 2008, and their migration decreased gradually after 2008 and stopped in 2012 owing to the poor economic conditions in Greece (Interview with Brigadier-General Asem E-Dahesh, the Interior Ministry, dated 23 May 2013). Greece's GDP annual growth was negative during the period (2008-2013) and reached its nadir in 2011 (-9.1%) (The World Bank, 2020b).

Table 3 and Figure 6 show the flows of Egyptian deportees from abroad because of their irregular migration (2002-2013), confirming several findings in Table 2 and Figure 3. For deportees from Europe, Italy's flow was the largest (8,984 deportees, representing 36%), Greece's flow came second (3,997, representing 16%), and Malta's flow came third (1,272, representing 5.1%). However, most deportees from Malta were potential migrants to Europe, particularly Italy. In contrast to Table 2 and Figure 3, the deportees from France were relatively few. The justification for this is that French authorities do not usually deport irregular migrants as long as they are working and have not committed criminal offences, according to the author's in-depth interviews. Additionally, few migrants succeeded in acquiring French citizenship by marrying French women. Furthermore, Ukraine and the Netherlands were secondary destination countries.

**Table 3.** Egyptian deportees from abroad because of their irregular migration (2002-2013).

Destination Country	Number of deportees	%	
<b>Deportees from Europe</b>	<b>Italy</b>	8984	35.80
	<b>France</b>	3	0.01
	<b>Greece</b>	3997	15.92
	<b>Malta</b>	1272	5.07
	<b>Ukraine</b>	25	0.10
	<b>Netherland</b>	8	0.03
<b>Deportees from Transit Countries to Europe</b>	<b>Libya</b>	10478	41.75
	<b>Tunisia</b>	61	0.24
	<b>Syria</b>	110	0.44
	<b>Lebanon</b>	161	0.64
<b>Total</b>	<b>25099</b>		

Source: PENA, 2013.



**Figure 6:** Flows of Egyptian deportees from abroad because of their irregular migration (2002-2013) (source: PENA, 2013).

For the deportees from Arab countries, Libya's flow was the largest (10,500, representing 41.7%), and the majority were potential migrants to Europe, particularly Italy. Before the Libyan revolution in 2011, Egyptians entered Libya without passports via frequent buses connecting Alexandria and Tripoli (Talani, 2010). However, Egyptians were smuggled through Libya frequently, ending in capture and deportation and sometimes even drowning at sea (IOM, 2005). In 2003, Libya expelled some 43,000 migrants, of which 38% were Egyptians (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006). There were also secondary flows from Tunisia, Lebanon, and Syria, most of which were potential migrants to Europe.

##### ***5. Security tightening phase (2015-2020)***

This phase was marked by stronger security, with the Egyptian police tightening their control over irregular migration through the borders with Libya and along Egypt's North Coast. Although recent declarations and reports confirmed their success in controlling irregular migration across the sea, hundreds of youths succeeded in migrating to Europe by sea. Some events reflect the security emphasis of this phase, such as crackdowns on irregular migrants having multiplied owing to police violence and even killings that saw thousands captured and detained by the Egyptian police in 2015 (De Bel-Air, 2016). Furthermore, the Egyptian Parliament enacted Law No. 82 in 2016 to combat irregular migration and smuggling. This recognised fines and prison sentences for smugglers, collaborators, people who had committed or mediated in smuggling, and people who had deliberately facilitated or managed a place to gather or transport smuggled migrants. This law does not criminalise migrants and obliges the state to provide them with protection in line with international obligations (The Official Gazette, 2016). Egypt launched the National Strategy on

Combating Irregular Migration (2016-2026) which provides a framework for the government to combat migrant smuggling and to ensure the protection of vulnerable migrants. Consequently, on 18 January 2020, IOM Director General António Vitorino praised this approach and stated that EIME has decreased over the past months to almost zero (Egypt Independent, January 19, 2020). In contrast, the World Migration Report (2020) identified a different factor for the drop in EIME: deteriorating Egyptian socioeconomic conditions, which has forced smugglers to turn increasingly to countries such as Libya (IOM, 2019). Whatever the factor causing this drop, there is in place an agreement to some extent covering this recent decline. Other than the security measures that played an important role, the decrease in the unemployment rate contributed too, decreasing from 12.8% in 2015 to 7.9% in 2019 (CAPMAS, 2015-2019). However, the following features confirm the continuation of EIME by sea or air:

- Attempts at sea migration occurred during this phase; for example, in mid-August 2015, a group of migrants and refugees departed by boat from (Balteem town) on Egypt's north coast in the Kafr E-Sheikh governorate, aiming to arrive in Italy; 183 of the 240 migrants were Egyptians (IOM, 2016). Furthermore, according to IOM (2016), the number of Egyptian irregular migrants arriving in Greece reached approximately 1,000 in 2015, with a total of 1,815 landed in Italy between January and May 2016, making Egypt the tenth-top source of irregular migrants to Italy (Muller-Funk, 2017).
- Secondly there is a continuation of EVOE, with 731 people (56.1% of the total). Italy granted immigrant status to 700 Egyptians (53.7% of the total, about 96% of the total in Europe). Additionally, Italy occupied the first place in granting immigrant status to Egyptians from 2010 to 2019 (CAPMAS, 1968-2019), while the USA came first from 1975 to 1997 (Hassanien, 2002).

- Nothing confirms the stopping of EIME via air, particularly from (Mit-Badr Halawa) to France, because both the exit and entry of migrants are regular. For (Mit-Badr Halawa) which has many migrants in Paris, the presence of friends in Paris is critical in attracting new migrants, a factor that accounted for 24% of the total frequencies of factors influencing irregular migration from this village (Hassanien, 2017).

Further to the above, it is quite likely that EIME's flows remained unchanged, with the primary flows continuing to Italy and France. Nevertheless, security measures have reduced the volume of the flows via sea.

Regarding the two primary flows to Italy and France during all the phases, Table 4 presents the results of the chi-square test designed to reveal whether the variable of the EIME destination country is independent of the variable of origin areas. Since the p-value is less than the significance level ( $\alpha = 0.05$ ), there is significant evidence of an association between destination countries and origin areas ( $\chi^2 = 224.829$ ,  $p < .001$ ). The explanation for this is that Italy received most of the Egyptian irregular migrants from three origin areas, namely: (Tatun, Mit-Khamis, and El-Burj). According to the author's sample, these areas accounted for 27.1%, 25.5%, and 19.7% of all migrants, respectively. Conversely, France received most migrants from the other three origin areas: (Mit-Badr Halawa, Mit-Habib, and Mit-Yazid), which accounted for 38.5%, 34.4%, and 19.7% of all migrants, respectively. Generally, the first three areas have a reputation for sending irregular migrants to Italy, whereas the second three have a reputation for sending irregular migrants to France.

**Table 4.** Results of the chi-square test for the destination countries and origin areas of EIME.

Source	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	224.829 <sup>a</sup>	7	0.000
Likelihood Ratio	289.180	7	0.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.713	1	0.100
N of Valid Cases	310		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have an expected count of less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.51.

### Conclusion

EIME represents a stimulating case study through which to discuss its evolution. This paper highlights that the prevailing attitude of Egyptians towards emigration before the mid-1950s was a rejection. The beginnings of EIME date back to the late 1950s and emerged simultaneously with regular migration, before continuing to grow and reaching its highest rates in the 2000s. This article found that during the first phase (1952-1973), few Egyptians entered Europe on short-term tourist or student visas, and after visa expiries, they became visa overstayers; however, they have often succeeded in legalising their status; the shift from rejecting to desiring emigration had occurred by the beginning of the second phase (1974-1991). Indeed, the origins of EIME may be traced back to the late-1970s when the flow to France began. These changes were caused by lower Egypt’s economic growth rates, the adoption of liberalisation policies, and Law No. 111 which granted emigration rights. Overall, the findings confirm that EIME experienced its third phase between 1992 and 2001 when European and Arab countries implemented immigration restrictions. Nonetheless, its volume has grown, and two primary flows have



formed (France and Italy). Political instability in the Middle East since the beginning of the 1990s, and the return of workers from Gulf countries, contributed to turning destinations of many Egyptians into European countries through safe and unsafe channels. Therefore, imposing new or tightening existing European immigration obstacles did not halt EIME, contradicting Lee's (1966) hypothesis (1966), which claims that migration volume is related to the difficulty of overcoming the intervening obstacles.

The paper also reveals that after the September 11 attacks in 2001, EIME entered its fourth (flourishing) phase from 2002-2014, with migrants exposed to several risks either during their journeys across the Mediterranean or during their irregular crossings via European boundaries. Despite the EU's exponential procedures, the worsening of the Egyptian economy led to a sharp increase in the volume of EIME (The Ministry of Manpower and Migration, 2006; Zohry, 2006) and flows' multiplicity, thereby confirming the strong relationship between economic conditions and international migration (Böhning, 1978). Furthermore, EIME occurred in well-defined flows (de Haas, 2010; Lee, 1966), with three flows (Italy, France, and Greece). The findings also show that following Egyptian security tightening covering irregular migration in 2015, EIME entered its fifth phase (2015-2020); certain events have confirmed the security nature of this phase, for example, crackdowns on irregular migrants by Egyptian police or approval of Law No. 82 in 2016 on combating irregular migration. However, these procedures did not significantly affect EIME. This paper provides significant evidence for a correlation between the destination countries and the origin areas of EIME. Overall, the greater the deterioration of economic conditions in the origin country of irregular migrants, the greater the insistence of the migrants to overcome intervening obstacles.

## References

- Adamson, F. B. (2007). International migration and national security: Maximizing benefits and minimizing risks. *The Atlantic Conference on Migrant and Migrant Integration in the Atlantic Region*, 22-24 March 2007, Seville.
- Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2006). Between a rock and a hard place: North Africa as a region of emigration, immigration & transit migration. *Review of African Political Economy*, 108(33), 311-324. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1080/03056240600843089>
- Birks, J., & Sinclair, C.A. (1979). Egypt: a frustrated labor exporter? *Middle East Journal*, 33(3), 288-303.
- Bloemraad, I. (2013). The promise and pitfalls of comparative research design in the study of migration. *Migration Studies*, 1(1), 27–46. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mns035>
- Böhning, W. R. (1978). *Elements of a Theory of International Migration and Compensation*. ILO Working Papers 991795113402676. Geneva: ILO.
- Burawoy, M. (1998). The extended case method. *Sociological Theory*, 16(1), 4–33. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1111/0735-2751.00040>
- CAPMAS (Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics). (1968-2019). *Annual bulletin of Egyptians who have obtained permission to migrate abroad and Egyptians who have other citizenship*. Cairo: CAPMAS.
- CAPMAS. (1961-2013). *Labor force sample survey*. Cairo: CAPMAS.
- CAPMAS. (2015-2019). *Statistical yearbook*. Cairo: CAPMAS.

- CAPMAS. (2015). *Digital map of Egypt*. GIS Unit. Cairo: CAPMAS
- CAPMAS. (2017). *General census of population, housing, and establishments (2017)*. Cairo: CAPMAS.
- Choucri, N. (1983). *Migration in the Middle East: Transformation, policies, and processes*. Cairo: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cairo University.
- Cleland, W. W. (1936). *The population problem in Egypt: A study of population trends and conditions in modern Egypt*. Lancaster, Pa.
- De Bel-Air, F. (2016). *Egypt: Migration profile*. Migration Policy Centre. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.1399.7206>
- de Haas, H. (2010b). Migration and development: a theoretical perspective. *International Migration Review*, 44(1), 227-264. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2009.00804.x>
- Dessouki, A. (1982). The shift in Egypt's migration policy: 1952-1978. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 18(1), 53-68. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263208208700495>
- Edmonston, B., & Michalowski. M. (2004). *International migration*. In *The methods and materials of demography*, (pp. 455-492. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New York: Elsevier Academic Press.
- Egyptian Organization for Human Rights. (2008). *Egypt's youth migration...fleeing into the unknown*. Cairo: Egyptian Organization for Human Rights.
- Fasani, F. (2008). "Undocumented migration: Counting the uncountable. Data and trends across Europe – Country report Italy". Country Report Prepared for the Research Project CLANDESTINO Undocumented Migration: Counting the Uncountable. Retrieved from [- 35 -](https://migrant-</a></li></ul></div><div data-bbox=)

[integration.ec.europa.eu/library-document/undocumented-migration-counting-uncountable-country-report-italy\\_en](https://integration.ec.europa.eu/library-document/undocumented-migration-counting-uncountable-country-report-italy_en)

- Fawcett, J. T., & Arnold, F. (1987). The role of surveys in the study of international migration: An appraisal. *International Migration Review*, 21(4), 1523-1540. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1177/019791838702100427>
- Golledge, R. G., & Stimson, R. J. (1997). *Spatial behavior: A geographic perspective*. London: The Guilford Press.
- Hassanien, M. A. A. (2002). *Egyptian emigration: A demogeographic study*. Unpublished Master's thesis, Cairo University, Egypt. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.11123.14887>
- Hassanien, M. A. A. (2017). Factors influencing the illegal migration of Egyptians to Europe: A study in human geography. *Annals of the Arts and Social Sciences*, 37(472), 9-168. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.34120/0757-037-472-001>
- Egypt Independent. (2020). *Illegal Migration from Egypt to Europe Down to Almost Zero: IOM Chief*. Retrieved from <https://egyptindependent.com/illegal-immigration-from-egypt-to-europe-down-to-almost-zero-iom-chief/>
- IOM (International Organisation for Migration). (2005). *World migration: Costs and benefits of international migration 2005*. Retrieved from [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr\\_2005\\_3.pdf?language=en](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2005_3.pdf?language=en)
- IOM. (2010a). *World migration report 2010, The future of migration: Building capacities for change*. Geneva: IOM. Retrieved from [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr\\_2010\\_english.pdf](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2010_english.pdf)

- IOM. (2010b). *Egyptian entrepreneurs in Italy through the global crisis, fears, hopes and strategies*. IOM in cooperation with Cooperazione Italiana and the Ministry of Manpower and Migration. Retrieved from <https://egypt.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd11021/files/documents/Egyptian%20Entrepreneurs%20in%20Italy%20through%20the%20Global%20Crisis.pdf>
- IOM. (2016). *Egyptian unaccompanied migrant children: A case study on irregular migration*. Cairo: IOM. Retrieved from <https://publications.iom.int/books/egyptian-unaccompanied-migrant-children-case-study-irregular-migration>
- IOM. (2019). *World migration report 2020*. Geneva: IOM. Retrieved from [https://reliefweb.int/report/world/world-migration-report-2020?gad\\_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQjw\\_sq2BhCUARIsAIVqmQsdLaeUjmrXVEA6xLZhU06O3gfrCwRo\\_YuFKSOEsYpmdKfUG7Qg5yUaAtjlEALw\\_wcB](https://reliefweb.int/report/world/world-migration-report-2020?gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQjw_sq2BhCUARIsAIVqmQsdLaeUjmrXVEA6xLZhU06O3gfrCwRo_YuFKSOEsYpmdKfUG7Qg5yUaAtjlEALw_wcB)
- James, L. (1947). The population problem in Egypt. *Economic Geography*, 23(2), 98-104. Retrieved from <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/141317>
- Jaulin, T. (2016). Geographies of external voting: the Tunisian elections abroad since the 2011 uprising. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 4(14), 1-19. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-016-0034-y>
- Jomaa, N. (2010). *The theoretical framework of the study*. In *Egyptian Youth and Irregular Emigration*, (pp. 1-11). Cairo: National Center for Social and Criminological Research.
- Kalton, G., & Anderson, D. W. (1986). Sampling rare populations. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 149(1), 65-82. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.2307/2981886>

- Kassar, H., & Dourgnon. P. (2014). The big crossing: Illegal boat migrants in the Mediterranean. *European Journal of Public Health*, 24(1), 11-15. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1093/eurpub/cku099>
- Kassar, H., Marzouk, D., Anwar, W. A., Lakhoua, C., Hemminki, K., & Khyatti, M. (2014). Emigration flows from North Africa to Europe. *European journal of public health*, 24 Suppl 1, 2–5. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1093/eurpub/cku105>
- Khafagi, F. (1983). *Socio-economic impact of emigration from a Giza village*. In *Migration, Mechanization and Agricultural Labor Markets in Egypt*, (pp. 135-156). Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press.
- Koser, K. (2005). Irregular migration, state security and human security. A Paper Prepared for the Policy Analysis and Programme of Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM). Geneva: GCIM.
- Lee, E. S. (1966). A theory of migration. *Demography*, 3(1), 47-57. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.2307/2060063>
- Lucas, R. E. B. (2008). International labor migration in a globalizing economy. CARNEGIE PAPERS. Washington: CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT for International Peace.
- Massey, D., & Singer. A. (1995). New estimates of undocumented Mexican migration and the probability of apprehension. *Demography*, 32(2), 203-213. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.2307/2061740>
- Mcauliffe, M., & Triandafyllidou, A. (2021). *World migration report 2022*. IOM, Geneva. Retrieved from <https://publications.iom.int/books/world-migration-report-2022>

- Muller-Funk, L. (2017). Managing distance: Examining Egyptian emigration and diaspora policies. *Égypte/Monde arabe [Online]*, 15, 47-69. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.4000/ema.3656>
- Passports, Emigration, and Nationality Administration (PENA). (2013). *Numbers of Egyptian deportees from abroad because of their Irregular Migration (2002-2013)*. Cairo: PENA.
- Pettit, H., & Ruijtenberg, W. (2019). Migration as hope and depression: Existential im/mobilities in and beyond Egypt. *Mobilities*, 14(5), 730-744. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1080/17450101.2019.1609193>
- Pew Research Centre. (2019). *Appendix C: Unauthorized immigrant population trends without waiting asylum seekers, by country*. Retrieved from <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/11/13/eu-unauthorized-immigrants-appendix-c-unauthorized-immigrant-population-trends-without-waiting-asylum-seekers-by-country/>
- Schneider, J. (2012). *Practical measures for reducing irregular migration*. Working Paper 41, Research Study in the Framework of the European Migration Network (EMN), German National EMN Contact Point and Research Section of the Federal Office, Federal Office for Migration and Refugees in cooperation with EMN.
- Seccombe, I. J., & Lawless, R. I. (1986). Foreign workers dependence in the Gulf and international oil companies: 1910-50. *International Migration Review*, 20(3), 548-574. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.1177/019791838602000301>
- Snijders, T. (1992). Estimation on the basis of snowball samples: How to weight? *Bulletin Methodologie Sociologique*, 36(1), 59-70. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24311215>

- Talani, L. S. (2010). *From Egypt to Europe: Globalization and migration across the Mediterranean*. London: Tauris Academic Studies.
- Tapinos, G. (1999). *Clandestine immigration: Economic and political issues*. In *Trends in International Migration 1999: Continuous Reporting System on Migration*, (pp. 229-251). Paris: OECD Publications.
- Taylor, E. (1984). Egyptian migration and peasant wives. *Women and Labor Migration*, (124), 3-10. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.2307/3011611>
- The Ministry of Manpower and Migration. (2006). *Attitudes of Egyptian youth towards migration to Europe 2006*. The Ministry of Manpower and Migration in cooperation with Italia Cooperation and IOM. Cairo: The Ministry of Manpower and Migration.
- The Official Gazette. (2016). *Law No. 82 for 2016 issuing the law on combating illegal migration & smuggling of migrants*. Number 44 bis (a) of 7 November 2016, Egypt.
- The World Bank. (2020a). *GDP per capita*. Retrieved from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD>
- The World Bank. (2020b). *Popular indicators*. World Development Indicators. Retrieved from <https://databank.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/1ff4a498/Popular-Indicators>
- UN. (1998). *International migration policies*. Department of Economic and Social Affairs ST/ESA/SER.A/161.
- Zohry, A. (2005). *Migration without borders: North Africa as a reserve of cheap labour for Europe*. Draft Article of the Migration Without Borders Series, UNESCO. Retrieved from <https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.995683>



- Zohry, A. (2006). *Egyptian youth and European eldorado: Journeys of hope and despair*. DIIS Working Paper No. 2006/18. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.
- Zohry, A., & Harrell-Bond, B. (2003). *Contemporary Egyptian migration: An overview of voluntary and forced migration*. Working Paper C3. Brighton: Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalization & Poverty.

## بين الرفض والمغامرة: المراحل التطورية لهجرة المصريين غير النظامية إلى أوروبا والتحليل الجغرافي لتياراتها

د/ محمد أحمد علي حسانين<sup>٢،١</sup>

<sup>١</sup>مدرس الجغرافيا البشرية - قسم الجغرافيا، كلية الآداب، جامعة القاهرة، جمهورية  
مصر العربية

<sup>٢</sup>أستاذ مساعد الجغرافيا البشرية - قسم العلوم الاجتماعية، كلية الآداب والعلوم  
الإنسانية، جامعة طيبة، المملكة العربية السعودية

### الملخص:

تتناول هذه الدراسة المراحل التطورية لهجرة المصريين غير النظامية إلى أوروبا، وتُحلل تياراتها تحليلاً جغرافياً. وعلى الرغم من أن هذه الورقة تعتمد على منهجية دراسة الحالة الواحدة، إلا أنها مُقارنة في منهجيتها، لأنها تُركز على حالة مصر، وتُقارن كل مرحلة تطورية من مراحل تطور هجرة المصريين غير النظامية إلى أوروبا مع المرحلة التي تليها، أو تُقارن حالة مصر بحالة شمال أفريقيا. كما استخدمت المنهجيتين التاريخية والسلوكية في تحليل الظاهرة. وتستند هذه الدراسة على مصادر بيانات مُتنوعة لكي تُغطي كل مراحل هجرة المصريين غير النظامية إلى أوروبا وأنواعها. فبالإضافة إلى الإحصاءات الرسمية، تستند الدراسة على الدراسة الميدانية للمؤلف التي طبق فيها تقنية كُرّة الثلج والمقابلات المُتعمقة. واستخدمت الدراسة - في التحليل - كل من اختبار مُربع كاي ومُعادلات خط الاتجاه. وتُشير نتائج الدراسة إلى أن البدايات الحقيقية لأزمة هجرة المصريين غير النظامية إلى أوروبا ترجع إلى عام ١٩٧٩م؛ وأن فرض أوروبا لقيودٍ جديدةٍ على الهجرة الوافدة، وتشديد قيودها القديمة في تسعينيات القرن العشرين، لم يُوقف

هذه الهجرة؛ وأنه على الرغم من أن المرحلة الرابعة (٢٠٠٢-٢٠١٤م) من هجرة المصريين غير النظامية إلى أوروبا اتسمت بالمغامرة والمُخاطرة، إلا أنها مثلت مرحلة ازدهار هذه الهجرة، وضمت العديد من تيارات الهجرة إلى أوروبا؛ وأنه كانت ثمة أدلة مهمة على وجود ارتباطٍ بين الدول الأوروبية المُستقبلة للمُهاجرين المصريين ومناطق الأصل بمصر. وخلصت الدراسة إلى أنه كلما زاد تدهور الأوضاع الاقتصادية في دولة أصل المُهاجرين غير النظاميين، كلما زاد إصرار هؤلاء المُهاجرين على التغلب على العقبات التي تعترض طريق هجرتهم.

**الكلمات المفتاحية:** الهجرة غير النظامية، الهجرة النازحة، تيارات المُهاجرين، مصر، أوروبا.