



Political Conflicts and Their Impact on the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan During the Mamluk Era

Ahmad Magdy Salem

Tourism Guidance Department, Faculty of Tourism and Hotels, Suez Canal University, Egypt.

ahmad_salem@tourism.suez.edu.eg

ARTICLE INFO	Abstract
<p>Keywords: <i>Political Conflicts, Maydān al-Rumayla, Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan, Mamluk era.</i></p> <p>(IJTHS), O6U</p> <p>Vol.9, No.2, October 2025, pp. 78-110</p> <p>Received: 16/7/2025 Accepted: 1/9/2025 Published: 7/9/2025</p>	<p>The Mamluk era was marked by intense political conflicts over power which frequently gave rise to protests and uprisings. Al-Rumayla Square (<i>Maydān al-Rumayla</i>) served as a central arena for these tumultuous events. Owing to the strategic location of the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan – overlooking al-Rumayla Square and directly facing the citadel of the Mountain (<i>Qal'at al-Jabal</i>) – it played a significant political and military role during these conflicts. The objective of this research is to examine the political conflicts that leveraged the strategic location of the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan during the Mamluk era, and to clarify the direct impact of these conflicts on the madrasa's function, its architectural units, and its architectural elements. This study adopts a historical methodology to investigate the political conflicts that influenced the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa. The research relies on historical narratives drawn from both primary and secondary sources, within the framework of an analytical study. This study investigated seven political conflicts that adversely affected the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan during the Mamluk period. These conflicts led to the intermittent suspension of the madrasa's educational and religious functions, the partial destruction of various architectural components, and the looting of valuable elements such as doors, windows, marble cladding, and other fixtures. The research further examined the efforts undertaken by certain mamluk Sultans – notably Sultan Barsabāy and Sultan Ṭūmān Bāy – who sought to mitigate the consequences of the madrasa's politicization. Their initiatives included a series of restoration and conservation measures intended to reinstate the madrasa's original functions and to restore its architectural and symbolic stature, which had been compromised by its involvement in political strife.</p>

Introduction:

The Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan (built 757–764 /1356–1363) occupies a strategically significant location directly opposite the citadel of the Mountain (*Qal'at al-Jabal*) and overlooking al-Rumayla Square (*Maydān al-Rumayla*) to the east. This positioning was far from incidental; al-Rumayla Square had long functioned as a focal point for political demonstrations and revolts, particularly following its reconstruction by Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn. The square became a regular site for gatherings of dissenters opposing the ruling authority of the citadel.¹ The location of the madrasa rendered it vulnerable

¹ In 692 AH / 1293 CE, a significant rebellion was launched against Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn under the leadership of emir Kitbughā. The uprising originated in Maydān al-Rumayla, and the insurgents succeeded in besieging the citadel, effectively severing its water supply in an effort to compel the ruling authority

to repeated military and political appropriation during episodes of internal strife and power struggles among the senior emirs and the ruling elite. Owing to its proximity to the citadel, it was on occasion transformed into a fortified position from which threats could be directed at the seat of government. Artillery (*Makāḥil*) was installed on its rooftop to bombard the citadel, while arrows were launched from the balconies of its minarets toward the adjacent palaces of the ruling class. Conversely, the madrasa was also subjected to retaliatory strikes from within the citadel, becoming both a symbolic and physical target during periods of political upheaval in the mamluk era. Such militarization had detrimental effects on the architectural fabric of the structure as well as its intended religious and educational function. The historical accounts concerning the political appropriation of the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan during the Mamluk period are fragmented and often lack coherence. Despite the significance of the site, no in-depth scholarly investigation has been undertaken to systematically explore the nature of these political conflicts or to assess their impact on the madrasa's architectural integrity and functional role. Consequently, this study constitutes the first comprehensive attempt to historically trace these episodes of political contestation and to critically examine their implications for the form and function of the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan. This study adopts a historical methodology to investigate the political conflicts that influenced the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan. The research relies on historical narratives drawn from both primary and secondary sources, within the framework of an analytical study. In addition, a selection of visual materials – including illustrative figures – has been employed to provide a clearer understanding of the spatial context, particularly the condition of the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan and its architectural components, Maydān al-Rumayla and Bāb al-Silsila.

1. The Political Conflict between Emir Baraka and Emir Barqūq and Its Impact on the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan:

After the assassination of Sultan al-Ashraf Sha'bān ibn Ḥusayn ibn al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn, his son 'Alī was installed as sultan by his father's emirs, who granted him the title al-Manṣūr. This act of succession highlights a prevalent cultural practice in the Mamluk period, where, upon the death of a reigning sultan, the emirs and judges would convene to elect a new ruler. Such processes, however, were seldom smooth or devoid of factional tensions, as each emir sought to claim the sultanate for himself, leading to infighting and enmity among the elite. As a result of these tensions, the selection of a new sultan often involved the temporary appointment of a young or even underage son of the deceased ruler. This maneuver allowed the emirs to maintain a degree of control over the state until a stronger, more dominant figure emerged to consolidate power. During this interim phase, the state's governance was typically managed by the most influential of the emirs, awaiting the moment when one could capitalize on the instability and seize the throne. In the case of Sultan al-Manṣūr 'Alī ibn Sha'bān's brief reign, two major figures dominated the political scene: emir Baraka,² who held the prestigious

into submission. Notably, these events occurred prior to the construction of the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan, which constitutes the focus of this study. For further, see: Ibn Iyās (d. 930/ 1524), Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Iyās al-Ḥanafī, *Badā'i' al-Zuhūr fī Waqā'i' al-Duhūr*, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā, 5 vols., 1st ed. (Cairo: General Egyptian Book Organization, 1984), vol. 1, part 1, p. 381.

² Emir Baraka ibn Abdullāh al-Jubāny al-Zayny al-Yīlbaghawī was one of the companions of Sultan al-Zāhir Barqūq. For further, see: Ibn Taghrībirdī (d. 874/1470), Jamāl al-Dīn Abū al-Muḥāsīn Yūsuf Ibn Taghrībirdī al-Atābakī, *al-Dalīl al-Shāfi' 'alā al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi'*, 2 vols, ed. Fahīm Muhammad Shaltout, 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub wa al-Wathā'iq al-Qawmīyah, 1998), vol. 1, p. 189.

position of *Ra's Nawbat al-Niyāba* (Head of the Deputies),³ and emir Barqūq,⁴ the *Atābak al-Askar* (Commander-in-Chief of the Army).⁵

1.1. The Conflict Between Emir Baraka and Emir Barqūq:

Both emir Baraka and emir Barqūq independently assumed control over the administration of the Mamluk state during the reign of Sultan al-Malik al-Manṣūr 'Alī ibn Sha'bān. Each of them sought to monopolize power and rule exclusively, which had a detrimental impact on their relationship. Hostility and mutual distrust grew between them, eventually culminating in open contention. This tension became especially apparent on the 19th of Ṣafar 782/16 December 1380, when emir Baraka acted preemptively against emir Barqūq. He armed himself, outfitted his mamluks for combat, and had them remain on high alert overnight in the stables of the citadel of the Mountain (*Qal'at al-Jabal*) as a precautionary measure against a possible attack by Barqūq. The following morning, which was a Friday, the senior emir Barqūq summoned the judges (*qāḍīs*) and religious scholars to mediate between him and Baraka. A reconciliation was arranged, though Barqūq's intentions were far from sincere; his move was calculated and driven by political cunning. The judges and scholars continued to shuttle between the two parties several times until a fragile truce was reached (*hudna 'alā dakhan*).⁶ Both emirs swore oaths to one another and disarmed. Emir Baraka agreed to refrain from interfering in state affairs, allowing emir Barqūq to act as the sole decision-maker in all matters of governance. The royal court dispersed on the basis of this agreement, although the hearts of those involved remained filled with resentment and bitterness.⁷

On the fifth of Rabi' al-Awwal 782/ eighth of June 1380, a male child was born to the senior emir Barqūq. In celebration of this significant event, Barqūq held a grand ceremonial banquet (*simaṭ al-muhim*) to mark the birth of his son, Muhammad. During the occasion, emir Ṣarāy al-Ṭawīl al-Rajabī⁸ came to him privately and, according to reports, informed him that emir Baraka had conspired with his allies to assassinate him during Friday prayer.

³ The title *Ra's Nawbat al-Nuwāb* referred to the official responsible for overseeing the sultan's mamluks, maintaining their discipline, and enforcing the sovereign's commands among them. The holder of this position occupied the highest rank within the court hierarchy and was occasionally referred to as the Grand Eminence (*al-Janāb al-Kabīr*). He functioned as an intermediary or envoy between the mamluks and the sultan. For further, see: al-Qalqashandī (d. 821/ 1418), al-Shaykh Abū al-'Abbās Aḥmad al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-A'shā fī Ṣinā'at al-Inshā'*, 14 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub wa-al-Wathā'iq al-Qawmiyyah, 1922), vol. 4, p. 18; vol. 5, p. 455; Muḥammad Qandīl al-Baqlī, *al-Ta'rīf bi-Muṣṭalahāt Ṣubḥ al-A'shā* (Cairo: al-Hay'ah al-Miṣriyyah al-'Āmmah li-l-Kitāb, 1983), p. 155.

⁴ Barqūq ibn Anas al-'Uthmānī al-Yalbughāwī ruled the Circassian Mamluk Sultanate during two separate reigns. For further, see: Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Dalīl al-Shāfi'*, vol. 1, p. 187–188.

⁵ The office of *Atābak al-Askar* was considered the highest-ranking in mamluk military offices. The term literally means “the father of the army,” reflecting his authority over both the troops and the emirs under his command. For further, see: al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-A'shā*, vol. 4, p. 18; Muḥammad Qandīl al-Baqlī, *al-Ta'rīf bi-Muṣṭalahāt Ṣubḥ al-A'shā*, p. 14.

⁶ The term *dakhan* (الدخان) denotes malice, ill will, or a corrupt disposition. The expression *hudna 'alā dakhan* refers to a truce marred by underlying hostility: an outward calm masking deeper conflict. For further, see: al-Fayrūzābādī (d. 817/1414), Majd al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ya'qūb al-Fayrūzābādī, *al-Qāmūs al-Muḥīṭ*, ed. Abū al-Wafā Naṣr al-Hūrīnī (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2008), p. 531.

⁷ al-Maqrīzī (d. 845/1442), Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn 'Alī ibn 'Abd al-Qādir al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk li-Ma'rifat Duwal al-Mulūk*, 12 vols, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Ziyāda and Sa'īd 'Abd al-Fattāḥ 'Āshūr (Cairo: Maṭba'at Dār al-Kutub wa al-Wathā'iq al-Qawmiyya, 1997), vol. 3, part 1, p. 379–381.

⁸ Ṣarāy al-Ṭawīl al-Rajabī was one of Emir Baraka's brothers. Although an attempt was made to identify him, no biographical entry could be found for him in the available sources.

Subsequently, emir Aytamush⁹ and other emirs arrived to attend the banquet, yet emir Baraka himself was notably absent. Instead, he sent his brothers as his representatives: emir Qurā Demirdāsh al-Aḥmadī,¹⁰ emir Ṭubj al-Muḥammadī,¹¹ and emir Aqtamur al-Dawādār.¹² These emissaries offered their congratulations to emir Barqūq on the birth of his son, sat at the banquet, and partook in the food. After the banquet concluded, emir Barqūq signaled to emir Jarkas al-Khalīlī¹³ and emir Yūnus al-Nawrūzī,¹⁴ who proceeded to arrest emir Baraka's brothers. Barqūq then immediately ordered his mamluks to arm themselves in preparation for a potential confrontation with his opponent, Baraka. At this juncture, the role of the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan became evident in the political struggle between Barqūq and Baraka.¹⁵

1.2. The Strategic Utilization of the Sultan Ḥasan's Madrasa as a Military Barracks by Barqūq During His Confrontation with Baraka:

Emir Barqūq seized the opportunity presented by the banquet held in celebration of the birth of his son, Muhammad, to reveal his true intentions toward emir Baraka. At the conclusion of the banquet, he ordered the arrest of Baraka's brothers, thereby signaling the beginning of a fierce confrontation between the two rivals. Barqūq then commanded his mamluks to don their weapons in preparation for battle and made strategic use of the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan. He promptly dispatched emir Bazlār al-Nāṣirī¹⁶ along with a group of mamluks to the madrasa, where they secured control of the building, ascended to its roof, and took command of its minaret. From this vantage point, they launched arrows (*Nishāb*) at the residence of emir Baraka, which stood adjacent to the madrasa. The dual minarets of the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan played a pivotal role in the assault, as both overlooked and dominated Baraka's house. Whoever occupied these minarets effectively gained full military control over the area and was able to completely surveil and target the residence of emir Baraka.¹⁷

Upon receiving news of the arrest of his brothers by emir Barqūq, emir Baraka hastily donned his military attire and ordered his mamluks to arm themselves in preparation for confrontation. In response, Barqūq incited the populace against Baraka, openly calling upon

⁹ Emir Sayf al-Dīn Aytamush ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Asandamarī al-Bajāsi al-Jarjā'ī was the *Atābak al-'Askar* (Commander-in-Chief) in Egypt and a prominent figure of the Zāhirī state. For further, see: Ibn Taghrī Birdī (d. 874/1470), Jamal al-Dīn Abū al-Muḥāsīn Yūsuf ibn Taghrī Birdī al-Atābakī, *al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi wa al-Mustawfā ba'd al-Wāfi*, 12 vols, ed. Nabīl Muḥammad 'Abd al-'Azīz and Muḥammad Muḥammad Amīn (Cairo: Center for Editing Islamic Heritage, 1984–2006), vol. 3, p. 143–151.

¹⁰ Emir Sayf al-Dīn Qurā Demirdāsh ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Aḥmadī served as *Atābak al-'Askar* (Commander-in-Chief) in the early years of Sultan al-Zāhir Barqūq's reign. For further, see: Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi*, vol. 6, p. 371; and *al-Dalīl al-Shāfi*, vol. 9, p. 45–47.

¹¹ Emir Sayf al-Dīn Ṭubj ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Muḥammadī was one of the *muqaddamū al-alf* (commanders of a thousand) in Egypt. For further, see: Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi*, vol. 6, p. 371; and *al-Dalīl al-Shāfi*, vol. 1, p. 359.

¹² Emir Aqtamur al-Dawādār was one of Baraka's brothers; despite efforts to identify him, no biographical entry for him could be located in the available sources

¹³ Emir Jarkas ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Khalīlī al-Yalbughawī played a prominent role in supporting Barqūq until the latter ascended to the sultanate. For further, see: Sāmia 'Alī Miṣlīhī, "Al-Emir Jarkas al-Khalīlī Emir Ākhūr Kabīr (d. 791/1389)," *Majallat Qitā' al-Dirāsāt al-Insāniyya*, no. 7 (2010), pp. 431–480.

¹⁴ Emir Sayf al-Dīn Yūnus ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Nawrūzī held the office of the *dawādār* (executive secretary) of Sultan al-Zāhir Barqūq and one of the leading figures of his reign. For further, see: Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi*, vol. 12, pp. 263–265.

¹⁵ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, edition of Dār al-Kutub wa'l-Wathā'iq al-Qawmiyya, vol. 3, part 1, p. 381.

¹⁶ Emir Bazalār ibn 'Abd Allāh al-'Umarī al-Nāṣirī was one of the commanders of Barqūq. For further, see: Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi*, vol. 3, pp. 361–363.

¹⁷ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, edition of Dār al-Kutub wa'l-Wathā'iq al-Qawmiyya, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 381–382.

them to plunder his residence. A large crowd heeded the call and advanced upon Baraka's house, located on the side of al-Rumayla Square facing Bāb al-Silsila which had been closed at the time. They set the residence ablaze until it was consumed by fire, then proceeded to storm it, looting its timber and marble and demolishing several sections. What remained were only the standing walls, rendering the residence effectively a ruin. It appears that Baraka had anticipated such an eventuality and had taken precautionary measures. He had previously removed valuables and women from the residence in preparation for a possible assault. Despite his efforts to defend the property, he was unable to withstand the chaos unleashed by the masses, especially as projectiles rained down upon him from the two minarets of the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa. Realizing the futility of resistance, he fled with his retinue through a concealed door (*Bāb al-Ssir*) in his residence. He successfully exited through Bāb Zūwayla, proceeded to Bāb al-Futūh, and ultimately reached the Qubbat al-Naṣr. Baraka attempted to regroup and resist Barqūq's ascendancy, and a series of confrontations ensued between the two, characterized by intermittent skirmishes. Eventually, Baraka was captured, shackled, and sent to the citadel prison in Alexandria, where he remained incarcerated until Barqūq ordered his execution. With Baraka eliminated, Barqūq seized complete control of the sultanate, becoming its sole administrator. He proceeded in a grand ceremonial procession, one of unprecedented magnificence for an emir, marking the first definitive step in his consolidation of sovereign authority.¹⁸

The Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan appears to have played a critical role in the power struggle between Sultan Barqūq and Baraka. Its strategic location – overlooking and situated in close proximity to Baraka's residence – rendered it a key asset in the eventual defeat of Baraka. The considerable height of the madrasa, and particularly that of its two minarets, allowed for effective surveillance of the interior of Baraka's residence and facilitated the monitoring of his movements as well as those of his mamluks. Sultan Barqūq demonstrated a clear awareness of the madrasa's strategic potential; immediately upon capturing Baraka's brothers, he ordered his forces to ascend the roof and minarets of the Sultan Ḥasan's Madrasa in order to launch projectiles at Baraka's residence. This marked the first recorded instance of the madrasa being utilized for political and military purposes. In doing so, Barqūq established a precedent for the use of the madrasa in similar political conflicts by his successors. This shift in function had a significant impact on the architectural and spatial usage of the madrasa, an impact that this study seeks to trace and elucidate.

2. The Political Struggle Between Emir Yalbugha al-Nāṣirī and Emir Mintāsh and Its Relation to the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan:

Al-Zāhir Barqūq ascended to the Mamluk sultanate following the deposition of Sultan al-Ṣāliḥ Ḥajjī¹⁹ on Wednesday, the 19th of Ramaḍān 784/25 November 1382. Barqūq's rule

¹⁸ Al-Maqrīzī, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 381–396.

¹⁹ Hajji was the son of al-Malik al-Ashraf Sha'ban ibn al-Amjad Ḥusayn ibn al-Malik al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn. For further see: Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Dalīl al-Shāfi*, vol. 1, p. 257; Ibn Taghrībirdī (d. 874/1470), Jamal al-Dīn Abū al-Maḥāsīn Yūsuf ibn Taghrībirdī al-Atābakī, *Mawrid al-Laṭāfa fī man Waliya al-Saltana wa al-Khilāfa*, 2 vols., ed. Nabil Muḥammad 'Abd al-'Azīz (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub wa al-Wathā'iq al-Qawmiyya, 1997), vol. 2, pp. 107–108; al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), al-Ḥāfiẓ Jalāl al-Dīn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Suyūṭī, *Ḥusn al-Muḥāḍara fī Tārīkh Miṣr wa al-Qāhira*, ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, 2 vols., 1st ed. (Cairo: Dār Iḥyā' al-Kutub al-'Arabiyya, 1968), vol. 2, p. 120.

lasted until he was challenged by emirs Yalbugha al-Nāṣirī²⁰ and Mintāsh²¹ who, after a series of confrontations and clashes, forced him to abdicate the throne. Following his deposition, Barqūq withdrew from the political scene, retreating to an undisclosed location. His reign, which lasted approximately six years, eight months and seventeen days, came to an abrupt end, marking the dissolution of his rule.²² In the aftermath, the position of sultan became vacant, providing an opportunity for emirs Yalbugha al-Nāṣirī and Mintāsh to reassert their dominance over the political scene. They reinstated Sultan al-Ṣāliḥ Ḥājjī, who was reenthroned under the title *al-Malik al-Manṣūr*.²³ However, the actual governance of the state was firmly in the hands of Yalbugha, who effectively became the de facto ruler, with Sultan Ḥājjī reduced to a nominal figurehead. Despite holding the title of sultan, Ḥājjī's authority was virtually non-existent, as Yalbugha controlled both the military and the administration of the state.²⁴ The public, disillusioned by Yalbugha's concentration of power, criticized his policies of control and dominance. A popular saying emerged, reflecting the sentiment of the common people: "*Al-Zāhir*²⁵ and his gazelles are gone, and *al-Nāṣirī*²⁶ and his crows have come" a phrase that encapsulated the perceived loss of a ruler who was seen as more active and the rise of one whose leadership was associated with oppressive control.²⁷



Fig.1: Bāb al-Silsila, which has been replaced by Bāb al-‘Azb, overlooked al-Rumayla Square. © Robert Hay.

The political situation eventually stabilized for al-Nāṣirī, who consolidated his control over all matters of the kingdom. Emir Mintāsh, now one of his senior emirs, found this dominance intolerable and began to harbor hostile intentions toward al-Nāṣirī.²⁸ As tensions mounted, animosity between the two emirs intensified, with both becoming increasingly distrustful of one another. This growing rivalry culminated on the 12th of Sha‘bān, 791/5 August 1389, when the conflict between them was brought into the open. In a bold and swift

²⁰ Emir Sayf al-Dīn Yalbugha ibn ‘Abd Allāh al-Nāṣirī al-Atābakī al-Yalbughāwī was a prominent political figure, known for his close association with Mintāsh and his significant political rivalry with Sultan Barqūq. For further, see: Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi*, vol. 12, pp. 162–171.

²¹ Emir Tamrbugha al-Afdālī al-Ashrafī Sha‘bān, widely known as Mintāsh, was likewise a key player in the political dynamics of the period. For further, see: Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Dalīl al-Shāfi*, vol. 1, p. 223.

²² Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi*, vol. 3, p. 308; Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Mawrid al-Laṭāfa*, vol. 2, p. 109–113.

²³ During his first reign, Sultan Ḥājjī bore the title *al-Ṣāliḥ* (The Righteous), whereas in his second tenure on the throne, his title was changed to *al-Manṣūr* (The Victorious).

²⁴ Al-Ṣayrafī (d. 900/1495), al-Khaṭīb al-Jawharī ‘Alā’ ibn Dāwūd, *Nuzhat al-Nufūs wa al-Abdān fī Tawārīkh al-Zamān*, ed. Ḥasan Ḥubbashī, 3 vols. (Cairo: Maṭba‘at Dār al-Kutub, 1970), vol. 1, p. 216–220, 233.

²⁵ The term *al-Zāhir* refers to emir Barqūq.

²⁶ The term *al-Nāṣirī* refers to emir Yalbugha al-Nāṣirī

²⁷ Al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzhat al-Nufūs*, vol. 1, p. 221.

²⁸ Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Mawrid al-Laṭāfa*, vol. 2, p. 114.

maneuver, Mintāsh launched an assault on the royal stables and sought to enter through the Bāb al-Silsila gate (Fig.1), attempting to capture Yalbugha al-Nāṣirī by surprise. Mintāsh's goal was to eliminate al-Nāṣirī and assert sole control over the sultanate. This confrontation not only marked a pivotal moment in the struggle for power but also highlighted the strategic importance of the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan in the unfolding political conflict. The madrasa's location, combined with its towering minarets, provided a crucial vantage point for surveillance and military action. Both parties recognized the architectural and strategic value of the madrasa, which played a significant role in the conflict. Its functions extended beyond religious and educational purposes, demonstrating how monumental structures could be mobilized for political and military objectives during periods of political instability.²⁹

2.1. The Role of the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan in the Conflict Between Yalbugha al-Nāṣirī and Mintāsh:

Emir Yalbugha al-Nāṣirī initially confronted the assault by emir Mintāsh with resilience, defending the citadel by launching arrows from its high walls at Mintāsh and his mamluks. This forced Mintāsh to retreat to his residence, located in close proximity to the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan. Recognizing the strategic potential of the madrasa, Mintāsh sought to leverage its position to shift the balance of the conflict in his favor. He swiftly took control of the madrasa, positioning his mamluks atop its courtyard. From this elevated vantage point, Mintāsh returned fire at the citadel, targeting Yalbugha's forces by launching projectiles from the roof of the madrasa. The madrasa's strategic significance was further underscored as Mintāsh's forces occupied the dome of the madrasa and ascended its minarets. From these elevated positions, they launched arrows and stones at Yalbugha's soldiers, who were stationed in the vicinity of al-Rumayla Square. Yalbugha's forces, however, retaliated with missile fire from the citadel. The conflict between the two factions escalated rapidly, as both sides exchanged projectiles in an increasingly intense battle. The tide of the conflict began to shift in favor of Mintāsh, who capitalized on growing popular discontent with Yalbugha's rule. The common people, many of whom had previously been alienated by Yalbugha's authoritarian policies, rallied to Mintāsh's side. The crowds in al-Rumayla Square collected stones and arrows and carried them to the roof of the madrasa, further augmenting Mintāsh's supply of projectiles. Positioned at the madrasa's entrance, Mintāsh encouraged the masses to persevere in their resistance. As the exchange of missile fire from the citadel intensified, more emirs and mamluks defected to Mintāsh's cause, ultimately converging at the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan to support his efforts. Meanwhile, Yalbugha's position deteriorated, with clear signs of defeat and humiliation manifesting as his forces faltered (Fig.2).³⁰

Emir Yalbugha al-Nāṣirī attempted to encircle emir Mintāsh by tunneling into his residence, which was situated adjacent to the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan, with the aim of trapping Mintāsh and compelling him to descend from the madrasa, thereby resolving the conflict in his favor. However, this strategy proved unsuccessful. Despite this failure, Yalbugha did not capitulate to the pressure exerted by Mintāsh and his mamluks. In response, Yalbugha organized a contingent of archers stationed at the *ṭablahkhānah* (drum house) to launch a counteroffensive against the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan, arming them with cannons,

²⁹ Al-Ṣayrafi, *Nuzhat al-Nufūs*, vol. 1, p. 234.

³⁰ Al-Maqrīzī (d. 845/1442), Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn 'Alī ibn 'Abd al-Qādir al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk li-Ma'rifat Duwal al-Mulūk*, 8 vols, ed. Muḥammad 'Abd al-Qādir 'Aṭṭā, 1st ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, 1997), vol. 5, p. 245; al-Ṣayrafi, *Nuzhat al-Nufūs*, vol. 1, p. 236.

muskets, and other artillery. However, they were unable to withstand Mintāsh's retaliatory strikes, which decisively broke their ranks. In the face of mounting adversity, Yalbugha sought to mediate the conflict and initiate a reconciliation with Mintāsh, hoping to avert a catastrophic defeat. However, Mintāsh refused any mediation and continued his bombardment of the citadel. The prolonged bombardment resulted in a fire that engulfed the area where Yalbugha and his forces were stationed, forcing him to flee the site. Along with Sultan Ḥājī and the caliph, Yalbugha retreated, marking a critical shift in the conflict as Mintāsh emerged victorious and asserted his dominance. Mintāsh then successfully breached the citadel and advanced to the stables, where he encountered Sultan Ḥājī. Displacing Yalbugha, Mintāsh assumed control of the sultanate, effectively becoming the new *de facto* ruler. On the 19th of Sha'bān 791/12 August 1389, he captured Yalbugha al-Nāṣirī, imprisoning him in the *qā'at al-Fiḍḍa* (Hall of Silver) within the citadel, thereby bringing an end to Yalbugha's political influence.³¹

As the political climate gradually stabilized, emir Mintāsh gained confidence, and the situation in the country calmed. In this period of relative tranquility, Mintāsh removed his armor and war gear, as well as instructing his troops to do the same. Throughout the duration of the conflict with Yalbugha, Mintāsh had been fully equipped for battle, accompanied by his military forces. However, with the cessation of hostilities and the consolidation of his power, he adopted a more authoritative role. By this point, Mintāsh had become the uncontested leader, exercising unchallenged control over the affairs of the state. On the 7th of Shawwāl 791/28th of September 1389, Sultan Ḥājī officially delegated the administration of the kingdom to Mintāsh, entrusting him with the governance of the state. The sultan further enhanced Mintāsh's position by conferring upon him the title of *atābakī* (chief military commander). This elevation significantly bolstered Mintāsh's power, allowing him to exercise comprehensive control over both military and political matters. Mintāsh effectively became the *de facto* ruler of the sultanate, holding authority over the kingdom's governance, with only the formal title of sultan remaining absent from his grasp.³²



Fig.2: Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan, al-Rumayla Square and the gatherings of military forces between the madrasa and Bāb al-Silsila (currently known as Bāb al-‘Azab). © Robert Hay.

³¹ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya edition, vol. 5, p. 246–247; al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzhat al-Nufūs*, vol. 1, p. 236–240.

³² Al-Maqrīzī, *op.cit*, vol. 5, p. 255; al-Ṣayrafī, *op.cit*, vol. 1, p. 253.

3. The Political Conflict between Emir Mintāsh and Sultan al-Zāhir Barqūq and Its Impact on the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan:

Emir Mintāsh's brief consolidation of power during the reign of al-Manṣūr Ḥājī was abruptly disrupted by a pivotal event: the unexpected release of Sultan al-Zāhir Barqūq from imprisonment in the fortress of *al-Karak*.³³ On 21 Ramaḍān 791/ 12 September 1389, Barqūq not only regained his freedom but succeeded in seizing control of *al-Karak*, with the cooperation of its governor, emir Ḥusām al-Dīn Ḥasan al-Kujuknī. His return to political life was further strengthened by the allegiance of a significant number of supporters, who rallied to his cause. The news of Barqūq's release had a profound and destabilizing impact on Mintāsh, as it signaled the collapse of his ambitions to rule unchallenged. His concern was intensified by the fact that he had previously dispatched agents with explicit orders to assassinate Barqūq during his confinement, a move intended to permanently eliminate a key rival and secure his own ascension to supreme authority. The failure of this plan not only preserved Barqūq's life but also paved the way for his eventual return to power. This reversal marked a turning point in the political dynamics of the Mamluk state, ultimately undermining Mintāsh's authority and reshaping the balance of power within the sultanate.³⁴

Barqūq's influence in *al-Karak* continued to expand as he attracted increasing numbers of loyal Mamluks, thereby consolidating his position. In contrast, the authority of Mintāsh began to deteriorate significantly. In an effort to counter Barqūq's growing power, Mintāsh convened a high-level assembly on 25 Dhū al-Qa'da 791/ 14 November 1389, which was attended by Sultan al-Manṣūr Ḥājī, the caliph, senior emirs, and prominent figures within the political elite. During this council, Mintāsh publicly declared his intention to engage Barqūq militarily. Sultan al-Manṣūr Ḥājī subsequently marched alongside Mintāsh to confront Barqūq in what would become a decisive military engagement in the outskirts of *Shaqhab*, located in southern Syria. The battle resulted in a clear victory for Barqūq and a decisive defeat for Mintāsh, who fled and dispersed across various regions of Levant. Sultan Ḥājī was taken into custody by Barqūq but was treated with caution and respect. Shortly thereafter, Ḥājī formally abdicated the throne, thereby paving the way for Barqūq to ascend officially to the sultanate. Barqūq entered Cairo triumphantly on Tuesday, 14 Ṣafar 792/ 31 January 1390, reinstated as sultan and firmly in control of the Mamluk state.³⁵

Following the release of Sultan al-Zāhir Barqūq from *al-Karak*, Mintāsh imprisoned several prominent emirs and mamluks loyal to Barqūq within the *Khizānat al-Khāṣṣ* (the private treasury)³⁶ of the citadel, sealing its entrance to prevent their escape. However, on 2

³³ Following the discovery of his whereabouts, Sultan al-Zāhir Barqūq was apprehended and placed under arrest by emir Yalbughā al-Nāṣirī. Barqūq was subsequently sent to the fortress of *al-Karak*, where he was held in confinement. However, in anticipation of possible political retaliation from emir Mintāsh, Yalbughā al-Nāṣirī issued precautionary instructions to the deputy of *al-Karak*. He advised that should Mintāsh initiate hostile actions against him, Barqūq was to be immediately released. This directive illustrates the degree of uncertainty and strategic calculation that characterized Mamluk political maneuvering during this period. Yalbughā's conditional safeguard reveals both the volatility of the power structure and the persistent threat posed by rival emirs to one another's authority. For further, see: al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzhat al-Nufūs*, vol. 1, p. 222–226.

³⁴ Al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzhat al-Nufūs*, vol. 1, p. 249–251.

³⁵ Ibn Taghribirdī, *Al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi*, vol. 3, p. 315; al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzhat al-Nufūs*, vol. 1, p. 266–289.

³⁶ The *Khizānat al-Khāṣṣ* (private Treasury) was instituted during the reign of Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn, following the abolition of the vizierate. It was overseen by a designated official (*nāzir*), who was responsible for managing affairs pertaining specifically to the Sultan's personal domain. For further, see: al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-A'shā*, vol. 4, p. 30; vol. 11, p. 329.

Şafar 792/19 January 1390, these prisoners successfully escaped and regrouped under the leadership of emir Buṭā al-Ṭulūtmurī.³⁷ They mounted an assault on the citadel with the objective of liberating their fellow Zāhirīyah members. In the ensuing clashes, Mintāsh's supporters, known as the Mintāshīyah, were decisively defeated. Subsequently, the defeated Mintāshīyah retreated to the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan, where they sought refuge. Emir Buṭā and his forces pursued them, laying siege to the residence of Qaṭlūbghā al-Ḥājib³⁸ before capturing it and penetrating the Madrasa itself. The besieging forces employed small siege engines (*makkāhil*) and arrows to compel those loyal to Mintāsh within the Madrasa to surrender. Ultimately, the Zāhirīyah faction succeeded in gaining control over both the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan and the citadel. This sequence of events unfolded against the backdrop of Mintāsh's declining fortunes in Levant, concurrent with Sultan al-Zāhir Barqūq's approach to Cairo via Gaza. The proclamation of security and prayers for Barqūq's reign resonated throughout Egypt, inspiring widespread popular rejoicing over the collapse of Mintāsh's regime and the restoration of Barqūq's authority.³⁹

3.1. The Consequences of the Conflict between Mintāsh and Barqūq on the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa

The political and military conflict between emir Mintāsh and Sultan al-Zāhir Barqūq had a profoundly negative impact on the architectural integrity of the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan. The structure suffered significant deterioration due to its strategic use in opposition to the citadel. Notably, the dome of the madrasa was pierced and partially collapsed as a result of being struck by a projectile from one of the cannons positioned atop the citadel during the hostilities (Fig.3).⁴⁰ Additionally, the stairs of the main entrance and the platform leading to the principal door were destroyed. The main entrance itself was sealed from the inside, and an alternative entryway was opened through one of the windows of the dome overlooking the Rumayla Square (*Maydān al-Rumayla*). Furthermore, the paths leading to the roof of the madrasa were blocked, and the staircases of the minarets were demolished. Consequently, the call to prayer (*adhān*) was suspended within the madrasa premises and was instead proclaimed from the newly opened doorway overlooking the square. All of these actions were carried out by official decree from Sultan Barqūq on the 8th of Şafar 793/ 14 January 1391, as a preventive measure to ensure that the madrasa would not be reused in any future attempt to challenge his authority. The historian al-Maqrīzī notes this event in his account, stating: "On Sunday, the 8th of Şafar, the staircases of the entrance to the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa were demolished, as were the stairs leading to the rooftop and the two minarets. A new entrance was opened through a window overlooking the Rumayla Square, facing Bāb al-Silsila, and access to the madrasa was thereafter made through it. The *Mu'adhhins* would stand at this entrance to deliver the call to prayer, and this arrangement remained in place thereafter".⁴¹

³⁷ Buṭā ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Ṭulūtmurī al-Zāhirī, known as the *dawādār* (executive secretary), was one of the mamluks purchased by Sultan al-Zāhir Barqūq and among his most prominent supporters, particularly during the Sultan's second reign and his efforts to reclaim authority. For further, see: Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-şāfi*, vol. 3, p. 375–385.

³⁸ Emir Sayf al-Dīn Qaṭlūbghā ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Kawkāyī, was likewise a notable member of the Mamluk elite. For further, see: Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-şāfi*, vol. 9, p. 80–81.

³⁹ Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-Şāfi*, vol. 3, 315–317; al-Şayrafi, *Nuzhat al-Nufūs*, vol. 1, 288–290.

⁴⁰ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, edition of Dār al-Kutub wa'l-Wathā'iq al-Qawmiyya, vol. 5, p. 246–247; al-Şayrafi, *Nuzhat al-Nufūs*, vol. 1, p. 238–23

⁴¹ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, edition of Dār al-Kutub wa'l-Wathā'iq al-Qawmiyya, vol. 3, part 2, p. 733



Fig.3: one of the cannons positioned atop the citadel towards the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan. © the author.

The historian al-Ṣayrafī affirmed al-Maqrīzī's account concerning Sultan Barqūq's intervention in the architectural configuration of the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa. He reports that: "Sultan Barqūq issued a noble decree for the demolition of the staircase of the Ḥusaynīya⁴² Madrasa and the sealing of its entrance, and that a new door be opened through one of the windows overlooking al-Rumayla, opposite the Bāb al-Silsila".⁴³

The historian Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī provides a detailed account of the acts of demolition and damage inflicted upon the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa by order of Sultan Barqūq, interpreting these actions as a response to the political conflict between the Sultan and Mintāsh. He narrates: "On the eighth of Ṣafar, the Sultan ordered the demolition of the staircase at the gateway of the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa, along with the platform in front of the entrance. The gate was sealed and closed off from the inside. He further ordered the opening of a window opposite the stable gate, which was converted into an entrance to the madrasa. As a result, people began to use it as a thoroughfare. One of the teaching halls was repurposed, and access to the roofs and minarets was blocked. The call to prayer was discontinued from both minarets, and a guard was posted at the newly opened door. All of these measures were taken in reaction to the actions of Mintāsh and his successors, who had used the aforementioned madrasa as a base when besieging the citadel. These changes remained in effect for an extended period, until Sultan al-Ashraf Barsabāy, sometime before the year 830 AH, ordered the reopening of the main gate and the reconstruction of the staircase and platform, whereupon the original state was restored".⁴⁴

4- The Political Conflict between Emir Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī and Sultan al-Nāṣir Faraj ibn Barqūq and Its Impact on the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa:

The conflict between emir Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī and Sultan al-Nāṣir Faraj ibn Barqūq reached a critical intensity, particularly after the latter ordered the arrest of Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī in 810 AH/1407 CE. The emir was subsequently imprisoned in the Khazānat al-Shamā'il,⁴⁵

⁴² Husaynīya means the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan

⁴³ Al-Ṣayrafī, *Nuzhat al-Nufūs*, vol. 1, 322.

⁴⁴ Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1448), al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥāfiẓ Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad, known as Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *Inbāʾ al-Ghumr bi-Abnāʾ al-ʿUmr*, ed. Ḥasan Ḥabashī, 4 vols. (Cairo: Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, 2011), vol. 1, p. 414–415.

⁴⁵ The Khazānat al-Shamā'il, located adjacent to Bāb Zuwaila on the left side of the gate's passageway, was notorious as one of the most dreadful and unsightly prisons of its time. It was primarily reserved for criminal

where he endured considerable hardship over several nights. Eventually, however, he managed to escape and fled to Syria, seeking refuge from the potential treachery of Sultan al-Nāṣir Faraj. In the Levant, Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī found a renewed sense of freedom and began plotting against the Sultan, biding his time and awaiting a favorable opportunity to bring about his downfall.⁴⁶

While residing in the Levant, emir Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī formally declared his rebellion against Sultan al-Nāṣir Faraj ibn Barqūq and renounced his allegiance to the Mamluk sovereign. He was soon joined by a number of influential emirs, most notably emir Nawrūz.⁴⁷ The conflict between Sultan Faraj and the rebellious emirs intensified rapidly, culminating in open hostilities. In response, the Sultan marched to Syria in an effort to confront his adversaries militarily. Seizing the opportunity created by the Sultan's absence from the capital, Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī and Nawrūz advanced toward Cairo in a strategic bid to seize power, targeting the political and administrative heart of the sultanate. On Sunday, the 8th of Ramaḍān 813/3 January 1411, the rebel emirs successfully entered Cairo, marking a pivotal moment in their campaign to depose Sultan Faraj. At this critical juncture, the role of the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa emerged as a key element in the unfolding political confrontation.⁴⁸

4.1. The Role of the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa in the Conflict between Emir Shaykh and the Emirs Residing in the Citadel of the Mountain (*Qal'at al-Jabal*):

Upon receiving news of the imminent arrival of emir Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī and emir Nawrūz in Cairo, emir Sayf al-Dīn Arghūn,⁴⁹ *nā'ib al-qal'a* (Commander of the Citadel), acted swiftly to fortify the citadel. Recognizing the strategic significance of the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa – due to its proximity to the citadel and its commanding position – Arghūn seized control of the complex and stationed military forces within it to bolster the citadel's defenses. He likewise fortified the Madrasa of al-Ashraf⁵⁰ as part of a broader tactical preparation for the anticipated confrontation with Shaykh and Nawrūz. These actions underscore the dual religious and

inmates who were condemned to death, as well as for highwaymen and bandits. Today, the site is occupied by the Mosque of al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh. For further, see: al-Maqrīzī (d. 845/1442), Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn 'Alī ibn 'Abd al-Qādir al-Maqrīzī, *al-Mawā'iz wa al-I'tibār fī Dhikr al-Khuṭaṭ wa al-Āthār*, 6 vols., ed. Ayman Fu'ād Sayyid (London: al-Furqān Foundation, 1995–2003), vol. 3, p. 600; al-'Aynī (d. 855/1451), Badr al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-'Aynī, *al-Sayf al-Muḥannad fī Sīrat al-Malik al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī*, ed. Fahīm Muḥammad Shaltūt, 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub wa al-Wathā'iq al-Qawmiyya, 1998), p. 46.

⁴⁶ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, edition of Dār al-Kutub wa al-Wathā'iq al-Qawmiyya, vol. 4, part 1, pp. 99–103, 138–184

⁴⁷ Emir Sayf al-Dīn Nawrūz ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Zāhirī, then serving as the *nā'ib* (viceroy) of Syria, played a pivotal role in the political and military events of the period, particularly in his confrontation with Sultan al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh. For further, See: Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi*, vol. 12, pp. 34–39

⁴⁸ Al-'Aynī (d. 855/1451), Badr al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-'Aynī, *Iqd al-Jumān fī Tārīkh Ahl al-Zamān: Hawāḍith wa Tarājīm (807–814 AH / 1404–1411 CE)*, ed. Muḥammad Jamāl al-Shurūbajī (Cairo: The Egyptian General Book Organization, 2021), p. 196–199.

⁴⁹ He is Emīr Sayf al-Dīn Arghūn ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Bashbughāwī al-Zāhirī. For further, See: Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi*, vol. 3, p. 309.

⁵⁰ The institution referred to here is the Madrasa of al-Ashraf Sha'bān ibn Ḥusayn, located directly opposite the citadel of al-Jabal. Due to its strategic location and architectural form, it came to be perceived – much like the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa – as a potential threat to the security of the citadel and its *ṭabkhāna* (drum tower). For further, See: al-Maqrīzī, *al-Khiṭaṭ*, vol. 4, p. 666; *al-Sulūk*, edition of Dār al-Kutub wa al-Wathā'iq al-Qawmiyya, vol. 4, part 1, p. 183; Muḥammad 'Abd al-Sattār 'Uthmān, *Wathīqat Waqf Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf al-Ustādār: Dirāsah Tārīkhīyyah Athariyyah Wathā'iqīyyah* (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1983), p. 86.

military role that major architectural institutions could assume during moments of acute political crisis in the Mamluk period.⁵¹

When emir Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī, emir Nawrūz, and their accompanying forces arrived in Cairo,⁵² they took immediate precautions to consolidate their position. They were soon joined by numerous tribesmen from eastern Egypt (*'Arab al-Sharqiyya*).⁵³ Upon learning of the fortifications erected by emir Sayf al-Dīn Arghūn, the *nā'ib al-qal'a* (Deputy of the Citadel), which included the citadel itself, the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa, and the Madrasa of al-Ashraf, Shaykh advanced with his forces from al-Maṭriyya toward Būlaq, then to al-Maydān al-Kabīr (the Great Square), followed by Ṣalība of the Ibn Ṭūlūn Mosque, before finally moving to al-Rumayla beneath the citadel from the direction of the Suwayqat Mun'im. There, a fierce battle ensued. The Mamluks loyal to the Sultan deployed artillery and archers from the elevated positions of the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa and the citadel. Among the defenders was also emir Aynāl al-Ṣiṣlānī,⁵⁴ the *Hājib*, who stationed himself near Bāb al-Silsila, successfully repelling the rebel forces from the Citadel. Consequently, Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī and Nawrūz were defeated and forced to retreat to Nawrūz's residence in al-Rumayla, where they regrouped. There, their ranks swelled with numerous commoners and disorderly elements attracted by their cause. Shaykh appointed a governor over Cairo and proclaimed a general amnesty and assurances of safety, promising the removal of grievances. This garnered significant popular support, enabling him to strengthen his position against the emirs and mamluks loyal to Sultan al-Nāṣir Faraj. Cognizant of the crucial role the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa played in determining the outcome of power struggles, Shaykh marched to the madrasa on the 9th of Ramaḍān 813/4 January 1411, besieging it and engaging in fierce combat with the Sultan's mamluks stationed therein. The battle continued throughout the day, culminating in Shaykh's decisive victory, which forced the defenders to descend from the rooftop and abandon the madrasa. The complex thus fell under Shaykh's control, who installed his followers there. From the rooftop, Shaykh's forces launched attacks on the citadel and the royal stables (*al-'aṣṭabl*), solidifying their dominance. The conflict was effectively decided with control over the madrasa, leading to the defeat of the deputy of the absence (*nā'ib al-ghayba*) and the Sultan's mamluks. Subsequently, Shaykh took control of Bāb al-Silsila and the stables, overseeing the deposition of Sultan al-Nāṣir Faraj and his replacement by his son, Faraj.⁵⁵ This fulfilled Shaykh's ambitions to remove al-Nāṣir Faraj from power. However, Shaykh's triumph was short-lived as news arrived of the arrival of Sultan al-Nāṣir Faraj's army from Syria, intent on confronting Shaykh and Nawrūz

⁵¹ al-Maqrīzī, *al-Khiṭaṭ*, vol. 3, p. 271

⁵² Among those accompanying emir Shaykh and emir Nawrūz were emir Yashbak ibn Azdamr, emir Qanbāy, emir Bardī Bāq, emir Sūdūn Baqjah, emir Sūdūn al-Muḥammadī, emir Yashbak al-'Uthmānī, emir Qumsh, and their respective followers. For further, see: al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya edition, vol. 6, p. 271; Al-'Aynī, *Iqd al-Jumān*, p. 197.

⁵³ The *'Arab al-Sharqiyya* (Eastern Arabs) who allied with them primarily consisted of the *'Arab al-Zuhūr* and Banū Wa'il tribes, as well as the deposed Emir Sa'īd Kāshif al-Sharqiyya. For further, see: Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya edition, vol. 6, p. 271.

⁵⁴ He is Emir Sayf al-Dīn Aynāl ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Ṣiṣlānī al-Zāhirī. For further, see: Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi*, vol. 3, p. 194–196; al-Sakhāwī (d. 902/1497), Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Sakhāwī, *al-Daw' al-Lāmi' li-Ahl al-Qarn al-Tāsi'*, 12 vols., 1st edn (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1992), vol. 2, p. 327–328.

⁵⁵ Faraj refers to the son of Sultan al-Nāṣir Faraj ibn Barqūq. For further, see: Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya edition, vol. 6, pp. 272–273.

in Cairo. Facing superior forces, Shaykh and his supporters fled Cairo, returning once again to the Levant.⁵⁶

4.2. The Impact of the Conflict between Shaykh and al-Nāṣir Faraj on the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa:

The transformation of the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa into a military stronghold – alternately occupied by the mamluks loyal to Sultan al-Nāṣir Faraj and the forces of Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī – had significant adverse effects on its original function as a religious and educational institution. This militarization resulted in the suspension of its core activities: communal prayers ceased, and scholarly instruction was disrupted. The madrasa also endured substantial neglect during the reign of Sultan al-Zāhir Barqūq, who ordered the demolition of its staircases and the closure of its main entrance. The deterioration was further exacerbated under his son, al-Nāṣir Faraj, who decreed the removal of the remaining staircases leading to the minarets, effectively preventing access to them.⁵⁷

After Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī succeeded in eliminating his rival and consolidating his authority – culminating in the removal of Sultan al-Nāṣir Faraj and his own accession to the throne under the title al-Mu'ayyad – he did not prioritize the restoration of the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa or the rehabilitation of its deteriorating structure. Instead, he appropriated parts of its architectural elements for his own purposes. Among these were the door and bronze chandelier (*tanūr*) from the sultan Ḥasan's madrasa and reinstalled at the entrance of his newly constructed mosque adjacent to Bāb Zūwayla,⁵⁸ (Fig.4). Al-Mu'ayyad justified this act on the grounds that the portal had been rendered inaccessible since its closure by order of Sultan al-Zāhir Barqūq. The door and bronze chandelier (*tanūr*) that had originally hung in the madrasa (Fig.5), were acquired through what was described as a formal purchase, for the sum of 500 dinars.⁵⁹ Moreover, al-Mu'ayyad endowed the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa with the revenues from the village of Qahā⁶⁰ in the province of al-Qalyūbiyya.⁶¹

The endowment of the village of Qahā to the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa by al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh is widely interpreted as an attempt to rehabilitate his image among contemporary jurists and the general populace, in light of his deliberate actions that damaged the madrasa. The sum he paid to acquire the door and bronze chandelier (*tanūr*) is notably modest when juxtaposed with their actual value. Furthermore, al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh possessed both the financial resources and access to skilled artisans capable of producing door and chandelier of superior quality than those appropriated from the madrasa. This conduct arguably reflects a deficiency

⁵⁶ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya edition, vol. 6, pp. 272–273; Al-ʿAynī, *ʿIqd al-Jumān*, p. 196–199.

⁵⁷ Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbāʾ al-Ghumr*, vol. 3, p. 276.

⁵⁸ Al-Ishāqī (d. 1060/1650), Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Muʿī ibn Abī al-Faṭḥ ibn Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Mughnī ibn ʿAlī al-Ishāqī al-Manūfī, *Akhbār al-Awwal fīman Taṣarrafa fī Miṣr min Arbāb al-Duwal* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Multazimiyya, n.d.) p. 121.

⁵⁹ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Khiṭaṭ*, vol. 4, p. 281, 342; al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya edition, vol. 3, part 2, p. 733; Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr*, vol. 2, p. 20.

⁶⁰ Qahā village is located within the administrative jurisdiction of al-Qalyūbiyya. For further, see: Muḥammad Ramzī, *al-Qāmūs al-Jughrāfī li-l-Bilād al-Miṣriyyah min ʿAhd al-Qudamāʾ ilā Sanat 1945*, 5 vols. (Cairo: al-Hayʾah al-Miṣriyyah al-ʿĀmmah li-l-Kitāb, 1994) vol. 1, part 2, p. 47

⁶¹ Ḥasan ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, *Tārīkh al-Masājid al-Athariyyah*, 2 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyyah, 1945), vol. 1, p. 208; Suʿād Māhir Muḥammad, *Masājid Miṣr wa-Awliyāʾuhā al-Ṣāliḥūn*, 5 vols. (Cairo: al-Majlis al-ʿAlā li-l-Shuʿūn al-Islāmiyyah, 2012), vol. 4, p. 99

in his sense of honor. Rather than restoring the madrasa's former prestige, grandeur, and aesthetic appeal – qualities it enjoyed prior to its utilization as a military arsenal against the citadel – he contributed significantly to its degradation. The historian Ibn Taghrībirdī censured al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh's conduct, particularly his seizure of the door and chandelier, remarking that: "King al-Mu'ayyad could have crafted better replacements, had his ambition been greater; this incident reflects a lack of honor and improper conduct on multiple levels".⁶²




Fig.4: The door transferred by al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh to his own mosque. © the author.

The critique leveled by the historian Ibn Taghrībirdī against al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh's appropriation of architectural elements from the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa appears to have generated considerable resonance, extending even to the upper echelons of the Mamluk elite associated with al-Mu'ayyad himself. The matter drew commentary from among the Sultan's own emirs, one of whom responded directly to the historian's disapproval. This prominent figure personally assured Ibn Taghrībirdī that, should he attain sufficient power and authority, he would undertake the fabrication of a new door and chandelier for the al-Mu'ayyad Mosque – superior in quality to those previously taken – and would return the original components to their rightful place within the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa. Ibn Taghrībirdī records this episode in his chronicle, offering the following account: "One of the eminent mamluks of al-Mu'ayyad promised me that, if he ever came into a position of sufficient control, he would have a door and chandelier (*tanūr*) made for the aforementioned al-Mu'ayyad Mosque that surpassed those taken, and would restore the originals to their place in the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa. However, God took him before he was able to fulfill this promise. May God have mercy upon him".⁶³

The death of the individual who had pledged to restore the door and chandelier (*tanūr*) to the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa precluded the fulfillment of his promise, leaving the architectural

⁶² Ibn Taghrībirdī (d. 874/1470), Jamal al-Dīn Abū al-Mahāsīn Yūsuf ibn Taghrībirdī al-Atābakī, *al-Nujūm al-Zāhira fī Mulūk Miṣr wa al-Qāhira*, 16 vols., ed. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Shams al-Dīn, 1st ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1992), vol. 14, p. 43.

⁶³ Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Nujūm*, vol. 14, p. 44

elements in continued use at the al-Mu'ayyad Mosque. Consequently, the madrasa remained deprived of these integral components and continued to endure extensive damage, neglect, and structural deterioration. No significant restorative measures were undertaken until the reign of Sultan Barsabāy, whose intervention marked a critical moment in the institution's recovery. On the 9th of Ramaḍān 825/26 August 1422, Sultan Barsabāy ordered the removal of the stone barrier erected by Sultan Barqūq, which had sealed the madrasa's main entrance. In its place, a new door was installed to replace the original one confiscated by al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh. Barsabāy also commissioned the restoration and repair of the staircases leading to the rooftop as well as those of the twin minarets. Upon completion of these renovations, he issued a directive for the resumption of the call to prayer (*adhān*) from both minarets, a practice that had been suspended for over three decades. Through these efforts, Sultan Barsabāy played a pivotal role in the revival of the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa, reinstating its architectural integrity, religious function, and symbolic prestige.⁶⁴



Fig.5: The chandelier (*tanūr*) transferred by al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh to his own mosque. © the author.

5. The Political Conflict Between Emir Qarāqmās and Sultan Jaqmaq and Its Relationship to the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa:

During the reign of Sultan al-'Azīz,⁶⁵ the political scene was effectively dominated by two senior emirs: Qarāqmās⁶⁶ and Jaqmaq.⁶⁷ While Jaqmaq held a high-ranking position as one of the principal military commanders (*Emir Kabīr*),⁶⁸ Qarāqmās occupied the influential post of

⁶⁴ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya edition, vol. 7, p. 63-64; Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbā' al-Ghumr*, vol. 4, p. 96.

⁶⁵ Al-Malik al-'Azīz, whose full name was Jamāl al-Dīn Abū al-Maḥāsin Yūsuf ibn al-Sultān al-Ashraf Barsbāy, succeeded his father to the throne on 13 Dhū al-Ḥijjah 841 AH (6 June 1438 CE) and assumed the royal title *al-Malik al-'Azīz*. At the time of his accession, he was approximately fourteen years old. His reign was brief, lasting around ninety-five days, after which he was deposed and succeeded by Jaqmaq. For further, see: Ibn Taghrībirdī, *Mawrid al-Laṭāfa*, vol. 2, p. 156-157.

⁶⁶ Emīr Sayf al-Dīn Qarāqmās ibn 'Abd Allāh al-Sha'bānī al-Zāhirī, later al-Nāṣirī, was commonly known as Qarāqmās Ahrām Dāgh, a title meaning "Mount of the Pyramids," a reference to his arrogance and self-aggrandizement. For further, see: Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi*, vol. 9, p. 57-63.

⁶⁷ Jaqmaq ibn 'Abd Allāh al-'Alā'ī al-Zāhirī deposed Sultan al-'Azīz and assumed the sultanate, adopting the royal title *al-Malik al-Zāhir Abū Sa'id*. For further, see: Ibn Taghrībirdī, *al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi*, vol. 1, p. 275-312.

⁶⁸ This title was conferred upon senior emirs and ranked immediately below the *Atābak al-'Askar* in the Mamluk military-administrative hierarchy. For further, see: al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-A'shā*, vol. 1, p. 117, 208; Muḥammad Qandīl al-Buqlī, *al-Ta'rīf bi-Muṣṭalahāt Ṣubḥ al-A'shā*, p. 49.

commander of the Armory (*Emir al-Silāh*).⁶⁹ Together, they wielded actual authority over the administration of the state, rendering Sultan al-‘Azīz a figurehead with little more than nominal sovereignty. Both emirs harbored ambitions for the sultanate and actively maneuvered to depose al-‘Azīz in order to ascend the throne themselves. Qarāqmās was characterized by impulsiveness, haste, and political recklessness, whereas Jaqmaq was widely recognized for his prudence, strategic patience, and political sagacity. These contrasting qualities proved decisive; Jaqmaq ultimately prevailed and succeeded in deposing al-‘Azīz, officially ascending the throne on 9 Rabi‘ al-Awwal 842/August 1438. Demonstrating a calculated approach to power consolidation, Sultan Jaqmaq chose not to eliminate Qarāqmās, but instead to placate and co-opt him. He conferred upon him the prestigious title of *Atābak al-‘Askar* (Commander-in-Chief of the Army), granted him substantial *iqṭā‘āt* (land fiefs), and appointed him to the influential post of governor of the Ṭablkhāna⁷⁰ in Damascus. Through these strategic concessions, Jaqmaq sought to neutralize a potential rival while reinforcing the stability of his newly established rule.⁷¹

Emir Qarāqmās initially administered the affairs of the state alongside Sultan Jaqmaq with notable competence and diplomacy. However, on the 3rd of Rabi‘ al-Ākhar 842/September 1438, a faction of the *Qarānsha* mamluks⁷² revolted against Sultan Jaqmaq, assembling beneath the citadel to demand an increase in their monthly stipends. In an attempt to defuse the situation, emir Qarāqmās descended from the citadel, engaged directly with the dissidents, listened to their demands, and pledged to convey their grievances to the Sultan. Despite these assurances, the insurgent mamluks refused to permit Qarāqmās to return to the citadel. Instead, they sought to enlist his support in openly confronting the Sultan. Escorted in masse to his residence, Qarāqmās was soon joined by further supporters, and – despite his initial hesitation – eventually acceded to their demands under considerable pressure. Although initially reluctant, Qarāqmās soon perceived the rebellion as an opportunity to advance his own political ambitions. The potential to depose Sultan Jaqmaq and assume the throne independently presented itself, and Qarāqmās proved willing to capitalize on the moment. He thus turned a moment of crisis into a strategic opening for personal advancement.⁷³

The rebellious *Qarānsha* mamluks armed themselves, and emir Qarāqmās likewise donned his battle attire in preparation for direct confrontation with Sultan Jaqmaq. Qarāqmās, now at the height of his influence, was surrounded by a substantial number of mamluks, particularly

⁶⁹ The title *Emir al-Silāh* (Commander of the Armory) referred to the official responsible for overseeing the sultan’s weaponry and supervising the operations of the *Silāhkhāna* (arsenal). For further, see: al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-A‘shā*, vol. 5, p. 456; ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Mājid, *Nuḥum Dawlat Salāṭīn al-Mamālīk wa Rusūmuhum fī Miṣr: Dirāsa Shāmila lil-Nuḥum al-Siyāsiyya*, 2 vols., 2nd ed (Cairo: Maktabat al-Anglū al-Miṣriyya, 1979), vol. 2, pp. 22–27.

⁷⁰ One of the primary functions associated with this office was the beating of drums and the playing of other musical instruments during official processions and significant state events. The *umarā’ al-Ṭablkhāna* (commanders of the royal band) operated under the authority of the *umarā’ al-‘ulūf* (commanders of thousands). For further, see: al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-A‘shā*, vol. 3, p. 480; Muḥammad Qandīl al-Buqlī, *al-Ta‘rīf bi-Muṣṭalahāt Ṣubḥ al-A‘shā*, p. 43.

⁷¹ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk li-Ma‘rifat Duwal al-Mulūk*, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya edition, vol. 7, pp. 381–383.

⁷² The *Qarānsha* mamluks were the former mamluks of earlier sultans. They did not constitute a unified military corps, as each group was affiliated with the particular sultan who had manumitted them. Individually, a member of this group typically held the rank of *Emir Khamsa* (commander of five). For further, see: al-Sayyid Muḥammad ‘Aṭā, *Iqlīm al-Gharbiyya fī ‘Aṣr al-Ayyūbiyyīn wa al-Mamālīk: Dirāsa Tārīkhiyya wa Ḥaqāriyya* (Cairo: al-Hay’a al-Miṣriyya al-‘Āmma li-l-Kitāb, 2002), p. 51, n. 160.

⁷³ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya edition, vol. 7, pp. 385; Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbā’ al-Ghumr*, vol. 4, p. 96.

after many of the *Ashrafiyya* mamluks⁷⁴ rallied to his side. With this considerable force, he marched toward citadel of the Mountain (*Qal'at al-Jabal*) and halted at al-Rumayla, near Bāb al-Silsila (the Chain Gate). There, his forces were further reinforced by the urban rabble and street fighters (*Zu'r*),⁷⁵ swelling his ranks to the extent that many believed Qarāqmās would ultimately prevail. At this critical juncture, Sultan Jaqmaq descended from the palace to the loggia adjacent to Bāb al-Silsila, carrying with him large sums of money intended to fund the mamluks and secure their loyalty. He dispatched a contingent of the *Sulṭāniyya* mamluks to engage Qarāqmās militarily. Hostilities erupted between the two factions, and initially, the tide appeared to favor Qarāqmās and his forces. However, the momentum shifted when several emirs defected from Qarāqmās, ascending from Bāb al-Silsila to join the Sultan, who welcomed them warmly. Soon after, a number of other emirs approached from the Ṣalība quarter, feigning support for Qarāqmās. But they soon turned against him, redirecting their cavalry and followers into Bāb al-Silsila to join Jaqmaq's side. Strengthened by these reinforcements and bolstered by his lavish financial rewards, Sultan Jaqmaq attracted even more mamluks to his camp. Gradually, soldiers began to defect from Qarāqmās and pledge allegiance to the Sultan, even as fighting intensified and arrows rained down from the Citadel upon Qarāqmās and the *Ashrafiyya* mamluks stationed at al-Rumayla. During this period of escalating conflict, the *Madrasa of sultan Ḥasan* was drawn into the events, as Qarāqmās and his allies sought to exploit its strategic position in their effort to tilt the balance of power in their favor.⁷⁶

5.1. The Strategic Role of the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa in the Conflict between Qarāqmās and Sultan Jaqmaq:

The Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan played a significant role during the final stages of the conflict between Qarāqmās and Sultan Jaqmaq, particularly after the majority of Qarāqmās's mamluks defected and large numbers rallied to Jaqmaq's side, strengthening his position. Remaining loyal to Qarāqmās were only the *Ashrafiyya* mamluks, who, in a final act of defiance, set fire to the main entrance of the madrasa, forcing their way through into the courtyard and then ascending the stairways leading to the rooftop. From this elevated vantage point, they attempted to launch projectiles towards the Citadel in a desperate bid to alter the outcome of the battle. However, their efforts proved to be belated and futile: Qarāqmās was wounded and fled, many of the *Ashrafiyya* were killed, and a considerable number were injured. The confrontation ultimately concluded in favor of Sultan Jaqmaq. The *Ashrafiyya* were decisively defeated, some were captured and imprisoned in the citadel's tower (*Burj*), others were exiled, and Qarāqmās himself was apprehended, incarcerated in the prison of Alexandria, and later executed while in captivity.⁷⁷

5.2. The Impact of Political Conflict between Qarāqmās and Jaqmaq on the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan:

The political struggle between emir Qarāqmās and Sultan Jaqmaq had a detrimental effect on the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan. The most immediate damage occurred during the armed

⁷⁴ They were a faction of mamluks affiliated with Sultan al-Ashraf Barsbāy.

⁷⁵ The *Zu'r* were individuals characterized by sparse hair and aggressive temperaments. For further, see: al-Jawharī (d. 398/1008), Abū Naṣr Ismā'īl ibn Ḥammād *al-Ṣiḥāh: Tāj al-Lughā wa-Ṣiḥāh al-'Arabiyya*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥammad Tāmir et al. (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2009), p. 491.

⁷⁶ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya edition, vol. 7, pp. 386; Ibn Ḥajar, *Inbā' al-Ghumr*, vol. 4, p. 97.

⁷⁷ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya edition, vol. 7, p. 387-394

confrontation, when the madrasa's main entrance was set ablaze, resulting in its complete destruction. In addition, the staircases leading to the rooftop and the two minarets – previously restored under Sultan Barsabāy – were severely damaged. Remarkably, the demolition of these structural elements was not carried out by direct royal decree, as was customary in similar instances. Instead, it was enacted through a legal ruling, an unusual intervention by the judiciary.⁷⁸ On the 5th of Rabī' al-Ākhar 842/September 1438, a council of judges, convened in the citadel Mosque upon the recommendation of Sultan Jaqmaq, issued a ruling through the Chief Judge, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Baṣāṭī al-Mālikī,⁷⁹ mandating the demolition of the staircases to the minarets and rooftop of the madrasa. The appointed administrator (*nāẓir*) was legally bound by this decision and proceeded to oversee the destruction in person. As a result of this ruling and the subsequent damage, ritual prayers at the madrasa were suspended, and scholarly activities – including instructional circles and lectures – were brought to a halt.⁸⁰

6. The Political Conflict Between Emir Aqburdī and Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy and Its Impact on the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa:

During the first reign of Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy,⁸¹ the Mamluk court witnessed intense political rivalries among the emirs, each of whom sought to depose the young sultan and claim the throne for himself. Among these contenders was emir Qānṣūh Khamsamā'a (*Qānṣūh Five-Hundred*),⁸² who successfully overthrew the sultan and assumed power. However, his rule lasted only three days before he was deposed,⁸³ and Sultan Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy was restored to the throne. At the time of these events, emir Aqburdī al-Dawādār⁸⁴ was stationed in the Syrian provinces, safely distant from the intrigues and hostility of his rivals, particularly Qānṣūh Khamsamā'a and other politically ambitious emirs.

⁷⁸ It appears that Sultan Jaqmaq strategically sought to foreground the role of the judiciary in the demolition decision, thereby presenting it as a legal rather than political directive. This approach likely served to insulate the Sultan from the public disapproval that might have arisen, particularly among the common people, jurists, and religious scholars, had the demolition of the staircases been perceived as a direct order issued by the Sultan himself.

⁷⁹ Chief Judge Shams al-Dīn Abū 'Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Ghannām al-Baṣṭī al-Mālikī, a renowned grammarian and jurist, held the office of *Qāḍī al-Quḍāt* (Chief Judge). For further, see: al-Sakhāwī, *al-Daw'*, vol. 7, pp. 5–8; al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), al-Ḥāfiẓ Jalāl al-Dīn 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Suyūṭī, *Bughyat al-Wu'āt fī Ṭabaqāt al-Lughawiyyīn wa al-Nuḥāt*, ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, 2 vols., 1st ed. (Cairo: 'Isā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī Press, 1964), vol. 1, p. 31–33.

⁸⁰ Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk*, Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya edition, vol. 7, pp. 387; Ibn Taghrībirdī *Al-Nujūm*, vol. 15, p. 46.

⁸¹ Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy ascended to the throne following the death of his father, Sultan Qāyṭbāy, in Dhū al-Hijjah 901/July 1496. His initial reign was short-lived, lasting until the end of Jumādā al-Awwal 902/January 1497, when he was deposed by the ruling emirs. In his place, Qānṣūh Khamsamā'a assumed the sultanate, though his tenure extended for only three days—from 28 Jumādā al-Awwal to 1 Jumādā al-Ākhirah 902/January 1497, before the emirs removed him and reinstated al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy in Jumādā al-Ākhirah of the same year. His second tenure continued until Rabī' al-Awwal 904/October 1498, when he was ultimately assassinated by the emirs. For further, see: Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i' al-Zuhūr*, vol. 3, p. 332–403.

⁸² Qānṣūh al-Ashrafī Qāyṭbāy, commonly known as Qānṣūh Khamsamā'ah (Qānṣūh Five-Hundred). For further, see: al-Sakhāwī, *al-Daw'*, vol. 6, p. 199.

⁸³ Qānṣūh Khamsamā'ah reigned for only three days, from the 28th of Jumādā al-Awwal in the year 902AH until the beginning of Jumādā al-Ākhirah of the same year. On the very day of Qānṣūh's deposition, Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy was restored to the throne. For further, see: Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i' al-Zuhūr*, vol. 3, pp. 342–345.

⁸⁴ Aqburdī al-Ashrafī Qāyṭbāy initially served as a *khāṣṣakī* (personal attendant to the sultan), before ascending through the ranks to ultimately hold the position of Grand Dawādār (chief of the chancery). In addition to this role, he was entrusted with the vizierate (*wazārah*), the *ustādāriyya* (stewardship), and other high-ranking administrative posts. For further, see: al-Sakhāwī, *al-Daw'*, vol. 2, p. 315.

Aqburdī's role in the political arena became prominent when he personally killed Qānṣūh Khamsamā'a and entered Cairo on 14 Rajab 902/17 March 1497.⁸⁵ In response, Sultan Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy formally invested him with several key administrative positions: he was reappointed as commander of the Armory (*Emir al-Silāḥ*), Grand Dawādār (chief chancery officer),⁸⁶ vizier,⁸⁷ *ustādār* (master of the household),⁸⁸ and Inspector of the Land Surveyors (*Kashshāf*).⁸⁹ These concentrated appointments elevated Aqburdī's status significantly but also engendered widespread resentment and animosity among rival factions. The increasing hostility – particularly from the *mamlūk jullabān* (newly recruited mamlūks)⁹⁰ – culminated in direct threats to Aqburdī's life. In an attempt to secure his safety, he requested permission from the sultan to assume the deputyship of Damascus and relocate to Syria. However, the sultan denied this request. As threats escalated, Aqburdī withdrew to Upper Egypt, accompanied by a substantial contingent of loyal mamlūks and soldiers. He remained there in relative safety until the sultan, faced with mounting opposition from the *jullabān*, summoned him to return to Cairo. This royal summons marked a critical juncture in Aqburdī's political ascent. By this point, he had consolidated his influence and commanded a significant power base that rivalled – and perhaps exceeded – that of the sultan himself. Aqburdī complied with the summons and arrived at the western bank of the Nile in Giza on 14 Dhū al-Qa'da 902/13 July 1497. Upon hearing of his arrival, the emirs, along with the military forces, went out to greet him except for emir Qānṣūh al-Ashrafī,⁹¹ the sultan's maternal uncle, whose absence was conspicuous and motivated by longstanding animosity toward Aqburdī. This rift signaled deeper divisions within the Mamluk ranks. Consequently, the army fractured into three factions: one supporting Aqburdī, another loyal to Qānṣūh al-Ashrafī (comprising remnants of Qānṣūh Khamsamā'a's

⁸⁵ Aqburdī was responsible for the killing of Emir Qānṣūh Khamsamā'ah (Qānṣūh Five Hundred) in Gaza. Following the assassination, he sent the severed head of Qānṣūh to Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy as a demonstration of loyalty and decisive political action. For further, see: Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i' al-zuhūr*, vol. 3, p. 350–356.

⁸⁶ The office of the Chief Dawādār (*al-dawādār al-kabīr*) was primarily responsible for conveying official messages on behalf of the sultan and for communicating general matters issued by the ruler. For further, see: al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-a'shā*, vol. 4, p. 19; Muḥammad Qandīl al-Baqlī, *al-Ta'rīf bi-Muṣṭalahāt Ṣubḥ al-a'shā*, p. 139.

⁸⁷ The position of vizier (*wazīr*) occupied the second-highest rank in the Mamluk state hierarchy, following the sultan—particularly in instances where no deputy (*nā'ib al-saltāna*) was appointed. For further, see: 'Abd al-Mun'im Mājid, *Nuzum Dawlat Salāṭīn al-Mamālīk*, vol. 1, pp. 42–48.

⁸⁸ The term *ustādārīyah* refers to the office responsible for overseeing all matters related to the royal household. For further, see: al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-a'shā*, vol. 4, p. 20; Muḥammad Qandīl al-Baqlī, *al-Ta'rīf bi-Muṣṭalahāt Ṣubḥ al-a'shā*, p. 28.

⁸⁹ The Kāshif al-Kushshāf was the chief official overseeing the *kushshāf* (inspectors), who were responsible for supervising agricultural lands, irrigation systems, and the maintenance of embankments and canals. For further, see: al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-a'shā*, vol. 4, p. 25, 65; Muḥammad Qandīl al-Baqlī, *al-Ta'rīf bi-Muṣṭalahāt Ṣubḥ al-a'shā*, p. 283.

⁹⁰ *Al-Jullabān mamluks* were a diverse group of adult slave recruits who entered the territories of the Mamluk state either clandestinely or with official permission from the ruling sultan. Upon their admission, they were incorporated into the military structure of the Mamluk army, forming a distinct faction. For further, see: Fathi Salem Al-Laheebi and Fa'er Ali Al-Hadidi, "Al-Mamalik al-Jalabān wa-Dawruhum fī al-Awḍā' al-Dākhiliyya li-l-Dawla al-Mamlūkiyya 678–922H/1279–1516AD," *Journal of Basic Education College Research*, vol. 8, no. 4 (2009), pp. 265–287.

⁹¹ He was Qānṣūh al-Ashrafī, one of Sultan Qāyṭbāy's purchased mamluks. He was also the brother of Qāyṭbāy's concubine, Aṣḥabāy al-Jarkasiyya, the mother of Qāyṭbāy's son Muḥammad, who later succeeded his father to the throne. For further, see: Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i' al-Zuhur*, vol. 3, p. 404.

faction), and a third composed of *mamlūk jullabān* aligned with Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy.⁹²

A faction of the mamluks associated with Qānṣūh al-Ashrafī quickly armed themselves and marched toward the residence of Aqburdī al-Dawādār, located near Ḥadrat al-Baqar.⁹³ They set his reception hall ablaze and plundered its marble, woodwork, and doors, all of which occurred prior to Aqburdī's arrival in Cairo. At this juncture, Aqburdī perceived a strategic opportunity to seize power. He entered Cairo with a substantial force comprising soldiers, mamluks, and Bedouin tribesmen. Upon reaching Maydān al-Rumayla, he imposed a siege around the Citadel that lasted for approximately thirty-one days. While he claimed that his intention was merely to arrest certain emirs who were his adversaries, rather than to usurp the throne, the magnitude of his mobilization suggested otherwise. In response, Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy prepared for military confrontation. Qānṣūh al-Ashrafī aligned his forces with those of the Sultan stationed within the citadel. Together, they mounted artillery on top of Bāb al-Silsila of the citadel to bombard Aqburdī's forces positioned in al-Rumayla. In turn, Aqburdī occupied the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa, transforming it into a defensive stronghold from which he launched attacks against the citadel using its rooftop and minarets, a customary practice in such military confrontations of the time. Combat between the two factions escalated significantly, with continuous fighting both day and night. The artillery fire directed at Aqburdī's forces entrenched within the Madrasa intensified. In an attempt to alter the tide of battle, Aqburdī commissioned the casting of a large cannon capable of countering the citadel's bombardment. However, the cannon was not completed in time, and the relentless artillery fire from the Citadel resulted in mounting casualties among his supporters. As a consequence, Aqburdī's position weakened steadily, leading ultimately to the triumph of Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy and the defeat of Aqburdī. He was eventually captured, and his followers were scattered.⁹⁴

6.1. The Impact of the Conflict Between Aqburdī and Sultan Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy on the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan:

The conflict between emir Aqburdī and Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy had markedly adverse consequences for the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan. As part of the military confrontation, artillery – specifically, large-scale cannons (*makāḥil*) – was mounted atop Bāb al-Silsila at citadel of the Mountain and directed toward Aqburdī's forces, who had established a fortified position within the madrasa. This bombardment resulted in significant structural damage, including the shattering of windows and other architectural elements.

In the course of the conflict, the *Jullabān* Mamluks launched an aggressive assault on the madrasa, targeting the emirs who had sought refuge within it. They set fire to the main entrance, plundered the *ṭishtkhāna*,⁹⁵ looted carpets, chandeliers, and other valuable furnishings. Moreover, they forcibly removed the metal latticework from the dome's windows and extracted

⁹² Ibn Iyas, *Bada'i al-Zuhur*, vol. 3, P. 360-364.

⁹³ Ḥadrat al-Baqar was one of the historical quarters (*akhtāt*) of Cairo, situated between the citadel of the Mountain (*Qal'at al-Jabal*) and Birkat al-Fīl. For further, see: al-Maqrīzī, *al-Khiṭaṭ*, vol. 4, p. 598.

⁹⁴ Ibn Iyās, *Bada'i al-Zuhūr*, vol. 3, p. 363–387.

⁹⁵ The *ṭishtkhāna* refers to the designated space for placing washbasins (*ṭushūt*) used for washing the Sultan's hands, personal garments, and other items related to his private service. For further, see: Muḥammad Aḥmad Dahmān, *Mu'jam al-Alfāz al-Tārīkhiyya fī al-'Aṣr al-Mamlūkī*, 1st ed. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1990), p. 108.

marble panels from the interior, claiming them as spoils of war.⁹⁶ The damage was not limited to the actions of the military factions. Following the initial assault, street fighters (*Zu'r*) and slaves entered the site and carried out further acts of vandalism. They pillaged the funerary dome, removed the remaining marble surfaces, and stripped the madrasa of its brass doors and windows. These acts of desecration and theft culminated in Dhū al-Ḥijja 902/August 1497. As a result of this sustained violence and looting, the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan experienced a severe decline. Regular religious activities were suspended, communal prayers ceased, and the site was ultimately abandoned.⁹⁷

The Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa found no patron to restore its former splendor in the aftermath of the conflict between emir Aqburdī and Sultan Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy. It remained in a state of disrepair and neglect until the intervention of emir Ṭūmān Bāy, the second *dawādār* (executive officer),⁹⁸ who undertook the task of alleviating its deterioration and restoring its damaged elements. Ṭūmān Bāy initiated a series of repairs in response to the destruction caused during Aqburdī's siege: he rebuilt the main entrance of the madrasa, which had been burned, sealed the windows of the mausoleum, reinstated the marble that had been stripped from its interior, and carried out necessary restorations to other damaged parts of the structure. These efforts were completed during the month of Ramadan in the year 903/May 1498. Undoubtedly, Ṭūmān Bāy's restoration of the madrasa represented a revival of the institution, effectively bringing it back to life. The Friday sermon (*khuṭba*) and the *tarāwīḥ* prayer were once again performed within its precincts after a suspension that had lasted for nearly ten months.⁹⁹

7. The Political Conflict Between Emir Ṭūmān Bāy al-Dawādār al-Thānī and Sultan Jān Blāṭ and Its Impact on the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa:

Following the assassination of Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy at the hands of his father's emirs on 5 Rabī' al-Awwal 904/20 October 1498,¹⁰⁰ the political scene in Cairo became increasingly complex, marked by escalating rivalries among the leading Mamluk emirs. Each sought to position himself for eventual control over the sultanate, and amid this environment of political fragmentation, emir Ṭūmān Bāy al-Dawādār al-Thānī emerged as the most

⁹⁶ Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i' al-Zuhūr*, vol. 3, p. 371.

⁹⁷ Ibid, vol. 3, p. 375

⁹⁸ Ṭūmān Bāy was originally one of the mamluks purchased by Qānṣūh al-Yaḥyāwī, the then-deputy of Syria, who subsequently presented him to Sultan Qāyṭbāy. Ṭūmān Bāy rose progressively through the ranks of the Mamluk administrative and military hierarchy, initially serving as a *khāṣṣakī* (personal attendant to the sultan). During the reign of Qāyṭbāy's son, al-Nāṣir Muḥammad, he was appointed as the second *dawādār* (executive officer), and later ascended to the position of chief *dawādār* during the regency of the sultan's maternal uncle. Ṭūmān Bāy continued his ascent until he ultimately assumed the throne, taking the regnal title of *al-Malik al-ʿAdil* (the Just King). His reign, however, was brief, lasting only three and a half months. For further, see: Ibn Ṭūlūn (d. 953/1546), Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn al-Ṣāliḥī, *Mutʿat al-adhhān min al-tamattuʿ bi-al-aqrān bayna tarājim al-shuyūkh wa-al-aqrān*, ed. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Mawṣilī, 2 vols. (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, n.d.), p. 388–389.

⁹⁹ Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i' al-Zuhūr*, vol. 3, p. 391; Doris Behrens Abouseif, *Cairo of the Mamluks: A History of the Architecture and its Culture* (Cairo: American University in Cairo press, 2007), p. 17-20.

¹⁰⁰ Sultan al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy met a particularly brutal end at the hands of his father's mamlūks, who executed him with extreme violence. His head was severed from his body, and his corpse was left abandoned on the ground for an entire day before it was eventually shrouded and buried the following day in the mausoleum of al-Ashraf Qāyṭbāy. At the time of his death, the young sultan was approximately seventeen years old. For further, see: Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i' al-Zuhūr*, vol. 3, pp. 401–403; Ibn al-Ḥimṣī (d. 934/1527), Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-Anṣārī al-Ḥimṣī, *Ḥawāḍith al-Zamān wa-Wafayāt al-Shuyūkh wa-l-Aqrān*, ed. ʿUmar Tadmurī, 3 vols, 1st ed., (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-ʿAṣriyyah, 1999), vol. 2, p. 58–59.

prominent figure. Ṭūmān Bāy, who was the chief architect behind the assassination of Sultan Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy,¹⁰¹ strategically delayed his own ascent to power. Instead, he acted with caution and political acumen by advancing the candidacy of emir Qānṣūh al-Ashrafi – maternal uncle of the deceased sultan – as a temporary figurehead. With the support of Ṭūmān Bāy, Qānṣūh ascended the throne on 17 Rabī‘ al-Awwal 904/1 December 1498, assuming the title of al-Malik al-Zāhir Abū Sa‘īd. Notably, Ṭūmān Bāy was the first to bestow ceremonial robes of investiture (*khil‘a*) upon the new sultan, reaffirming his political dominance behind the scenes. In return, he was reappointed to the office of Grand Dawādār (Chief Chamberlain), thereby consolidating his authority within the court and continuing to influence state affairs during this turbulent phase of Mamluk history.¹⁰²

Ṭūmān Bāy demonstrated considerable political acumen by promoting Qānṣūh al-Ashrafi to the sultanate, thereby safeguarding himself from the potential treachery of rival emirs who harbored ambitions for the throne. With keen insight and strategic foresight, Ṭūmān Bāy recognized that the period following the assassination of Sultan Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy was one of political volatility, transitional in nature and marked by instability and conspiracies. Rather than immediately asserting his own claim to power, he chose to support figures like Qānṣūh al-Ashrafi who were eager for the position of sultan, positioning himself as a cautious observer of the political landscape. This calculated restraint allowed him to remain insulated from immediate danger while awaiting a more favorable moment to act. When the time was ripe, he made his move with resolute determination, ultimately seizing the throne unchallenged.

Sultan al-Zāhir Qānṣūh al-Ashrafi endeavored to govern the state with prudence and diplomacy. However, his efforts were met with resistance from prominent emirs, most notably emir Jān Balāṭ,¹⁰³ the Atābak al-‘Askar (commander-in-chief), and emir Ṭūmān Bāy. These powerful figures conspired against him, fueling unrest through widespread rumors and political intrigues. As tensions escalated and opposition solidified, the authority of Sultan Qānṣūh gradually eroded. Ultimately, his reign came to an end with his deposition on the 29th of Dhū al-Qa‘dah 905/25 June 1500, concluding a rule that lasted approximately one year and eight months.¹⁰⁴

Following the deposition of Sultan Qānṣūh al-Ashrafi, the throne remained vacant for two days. During this interim, emir Ṭūmān Bāy refrained from putting himself forward for the sultanate, primarily due to the presence of Atābak Jān Blāṭ, a prominent emir whose political

¹⁰¹ Emir Ṭūmān Bāy orchestrated an ambush targeting Sultan Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy during his passage through the district of al-Ṭalibiyya. The assailants swiftly encircled the sultan and struck him down with swords, executing him in a most brutal manner. A decisive blow to his neck severed his head from his body. For further, see: Ibn Iyās, *Badā‘i‘ al-Zuhūr*, vol. 3, p. 401; Ibn Ṭūlūn (d. 953/1546), Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī ibn Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn al-Ṣāliḥī, *Mufākahat al-Khillān fī Hawādith al-Zamān*, annotated by Khalīl al-Manṣūr, 1st ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1998), p. 167.

¹⁰² Ibn Iyās, *Badā‘i‘ al-Zuhūr*, vol. 3, p. 404–406.

¹⁰³ Jān Balāṭ was among the close confidants of Sultan Qāyṭbāy, who initially appointed him as a khāṣṣakī (personal attendant) and later entrusted him with the office of al-dawādāriyya al-kubrā (grand dawādār). During the reign of al-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy, he served as the governor of Aleppo and subsequently of Damascus. Following Qānṣūh’s deposition, Jān Balāṭ ascended to the sultanate and ruled for approximately six months and a few days. For further, see: Ibn Iyās, *Badā‘i‘ al-Zuhūr*, vol. 3, p. 438; Ibn al-‘Imād (d. 1089/1678), Shihāb al-Dīn Abū al-Falāḥ ‘Abd al-Ḥayy ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-‘Ukrī al-Ḥanbalī al-Dimashqī, *Shadharāt al-Dhahab fī Akhbār man Dhahab*, ed. Maḥmūd al-Arnā‘ūt, 11 vols. 1st ed (Beirut: Dār Ibn Kathīr, 1986), vol. 10, p. 41.

¹⁰⁴ Ibn Iyās, *Badā‘i‘ al-Zuhūr*, vol. 3, p. 404–438; Ibn al-‘Imād, *Shadharāt al-Dhahab*, vol. 10, p. 41.

ambitions posed a significant obstacle to Ṭūmān Bāy's aspirations. Recognizing the strategic necessity of neutralizing Jān Blāṭ, Ṭūmān Bāy deliberately advanced his candidacy, much as he had previously done with Qānṣūh al-Ashrafī. His intention was to entangle Jān Blāṭ in the political rivalries among the emirs, thereby weakening his position while Ṭūmān Bāy quietly consolidated his own power. Jān Blāṭ was proclaimed sultan on the 2nd of Dhū al-Ḥijjah 905/28 June 1500, adopting the regnal title al-Ashraf Abū al-Naṣr.¹⁰⁵ In recognition of Ṭūmān Bāy's support, Sultan Jān Blāṭ granted him numerous high-ranking positions: he confirmed him in the office of Great Dawādār, appointed him as commander of the armory (*Emir al-Silāḥ*), and entrusted him with the responsibilities of the vizierate (*wizāra*), the administration of the royal household (*ustādāriyya*), and the oversight of land inspection (*kashf al-kushshāf*), in addition to managing the general affairs of the state (*Mudabbir al-Mamālik*).¹⁰⁶ As a result, Ṭūmān Bāy's influence grew substantially. He emerged as the true power behind the throne, exercising de facto control over the sultanate. Sultan Jān Blāṭ was effectively reduced to a figurehead, unable to make decisions without Ṭūmān Bāy's approval. Thus, Ṭūmān Bāy became the undisputed arbiter of political authority within the Mamluk realm during Jān Blāṭ's brief reign.¹⁰⁷

Sultan Jān Blāṭ lacked the political foresight necessary to manage the delicate and volatile dynamics of the Mamluk court. His tenure was marked by escalating tensions with leading emirs, most notably emir Qaṣrūh,¹⁰⁸ the viceroy of Damascus. Jān Blāṭ's failure to discern the hidden agendas around him – particularly those of emir Ṭūmān Bāy – left him vulnerable to manipulation. Believing Ṭūmān Bāy to be a trusted advisor, Jān Blāṭ unwittingly became a pawn in the latter's calculated pursuit of power. The crisis between the Sultan and emir Qaṣrūh revealed Ṭūmān Bāy's covert ambitions. Qaṣrūh openly defied Jān Blāṭ's authority, declaring rebellion, an act that was, in fact, orchestrated behind the scenes by Ṭūmān Bāy in coordination with Qaṣrūh. Jān Blāṭ, unaware of this prearranged collusion, continued to rely on Ṭūmān Bāy's counsel and sought his approval in political affairs. In an effort to suppress Qaṣrūh's insurrection, Sultan Jān Blāṭ assembled a punitive expedition and entrusted its leadership to Ṭūmān Bāy.¹⁰⁹ Departing for Syria in Rabī' al-Ākhar 906/ October 1500, Ṭūmān Bāy arrived in Damascus where he met with Qaṣrūh and summoned the region's judges (*quḍāt*). During this assembly, they conspired to depose Sultan Jān Blāṭ and install Ṭūmān Bāy in his place. The plan was successfully executed: Ṭūmān Bāy was formally proclaimed sultan and adopted the regnal title *al-Malik al-ʿĀdil Abū al-Naṣr*. Following his ascension, Ṭūmān Bāy consolidated his authority in Syria, securing the Friday sermons (*khuṭab*) in his name and appointing Qaṣrūh as *Atābak al-ʿAsākir* (Commander of the Army). With his power base

¹⁰⁵ Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr*, vol. 3, p. 404–438

¹⁰⁶ The *Mudabbir al-Mamālik* was the official responsible for overseeing state affairs and deliberating on matters in light of their potential consequences. For further, see: al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā*, vol. 4, p. 27, 69; Muḥammad Qandīl al-Baqlī, *al-Taʾrīf bi-Muṣṭalahāt Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā*, p. 305.

¹⁰⁷ Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr*, vol. 3, p. 445–447, 463–464

¹⁰⁸ Emir Qasrawuh served as the viceroy (*nāʾib*) of Damascus and, at a critical juncture, declared open rebellion, assuming autonomous control over the region. He maintained a close political alliance with Emir Ṭūmān Bāy, the Second Dawādār, with whom he jointly orchestrated the political landscape and conspired against Sultan Jān Blāṭ. Their collaboration played a pivotal role in the broader power struggle that ultimately led to Jān Blāṭ's downfall. For further, see: Ibn Tūlūn (d. 953/1546), Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad ibn Tūlūn al-Ṣāliḥī, *Iʿlām al-Warāʾ bi-Man Waliya Nāʾiban min al-Turk bi-Dimashq al-Shām al-Kubrā*, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīm Ḥamid Khattāb, 2 vols. (Cairo: ʿAyn Shams University Press, 1973), vol. 2, p. 100–125.

¹⁰⁹ This expeditionary force was composed of eleven senior-ranking emirs (*Umaraʾ al-Muqaddamīn*), twenty emirs of the *ṭablakhāna*, in addition to more than two thousand mamluks from the sultan's corps. For further, see: Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr*, vol. 3, pp. 450–451.

secure, he began preparations to march on Cairo to depose Jān Blāṭ officially and secure recognition of his rule by both the Abbasid caliph and the chief jurists (*quḍāt*) of Egypt, thereby realizing his political ambitions.¹¹⁰

Upon receiving news from Syria regarding the developments orchestrated by Ṭūmān Bāy, Sultan al-Ashraf Jān Blāṭ was deeply unsettled. The political and military implications of Ṭūmān Bāy's maneuvers, in alliance with emir Qaşrūh and other dissenting emirs, plunged Jān Blāṭ into a state of alarm and urgency. In response, he began making preparations for an anticipated confrontation. As a precautionary measure, Jān Blāṭ summoned the Abbasid Caliph, the four chief judges (*quḍāt*), and senior emirs to the citadel. During this assembly, he required the emirs to take an oath of allegiance, swearing not to defect or conspire with Ṭūmān Bāy upon his arrival in Cairo. All those present complied with the oath. Subsequently, Jān Blāṭ undertook a series of defensive enhancements to fortify the Cairo Citadel against a potential siege. He ordered the installation of artillery emplacements, reinforcing the fortress walls and towers with cannons (*makāhil*) and other defensive structures. He also oversaw the construction of a new gate above the *sullam al-mudraj* (graded stairway), and commissioned the building of a fortified tower made of stone around the Bāb al-Silsila, outfitted with arrow slits and smaller gates for tactical defense. Moreover, he ordered the sealing of strategic entrances, including the Bāb al-Maydan, Bāb Ḥawsh al-ʿAzab, and Bāb al-Istabl. Jān Blāṭ personally inspected the progress of the fortifications twice daily, reflecting his increasing anxiety and determination to defend his regime. In his view, the citadel had become a sufficiently fortified stronghold against Ṭūmān Bāy's anticipated assault. The only remaining vulnerability was the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan, which had historically served as a base for artillery offensives during internal political conflicts, and thus posed a potential threat to the security of the citadel.¹¹¹

7.1. The Impact of the Political Struggle between Ṭūmān Bāy and Sultan Jān Blāṭ on the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan:

Despite all the fortifications carried out by Sultan Jān Blāṭ to reinforce the citadel in anticipation of a potential violent conflict with Ṭūmān Bāy, the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa remained the most powerful and decisive strategic stronghold for any force that controlled it; owing to its advantageous location directly facing the citadel. Fully aware of the threat posed by the madrasa, Sultan Jān Blāṭ reportedly issued orders for its complete demolition, aiming to eliminate any potential danger it might represent and to prevent his opponents from exploiting it as a military fortress threatening the citadel. The demolition began during the last days of Jumada al-Awwal in the year 906/December 1500. Some destruction was inflicted behind the mihrab of the dome, and the demolition efforts continued for three days (Fig.6). However, the workers encountered significant difficulties due to the robustness and precision of the building's construction, ultimately rendering the attempt unsuccessful.¹¹² These acts of vandalism provoked public indignation and the disapproval of several senior emirs of Sultan Jān Blāṭ's court. Among them, emir Taghrībirdī al-Ustadār spoke directly with the Sultan, arguing that the destruction of the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa was unjustifiable and served no practical purpose. He persuaded Jān Blāṭ that preserving the structure was more prudent than

¹¹⁰ Ibn Iyās, *Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr*, vol. 3, p. 450–454.

¹¹¹ Ibid, vol. 3, p. 455.

¹¹² Ibid, vol. 3, p. 455.

demolishing it. Consequently, Jān Blāṭ rescinded his order and commanded an immediate halt to the demolition and destruction.




Fig.6: Remains of destruction behind the mihrab wall of the dome. © the author.

The historian ‘Abd al-Bāsiṭ ibn Khalīl al-Ḥanafī expressed his deep disapproval and sorrow over the demolition that affected the dome of the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa. He lamented the deteriorating state of this monumental structure in both prose and verse, reflecting on the tragedy with a sense of historical and moral loss. In his poetic response, he wrote:

هُتَكَتْ قُبَّةُ الْحَسَنِ وَانْتَفَى وَصْفُهَا الْحَسَنِ
إِنْ فِي ذَا لَعِبْرَةٍ لَكِنَّ الْمُسْتَفِيقَ مَنْ؟

The writer and poet Muḥammad ibn Qānṣūwah ibn Ṣādiq also reacted emotionally to the partial demolition of the dome of the *Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan*. His poetic response reflected both grief and indignation at the desecration of such a revered architectural and cultural monument. He expressed his lament in the following verses:

حَسَنُ السُّلْطَانِ قَدْ هُتَكَتْ خِيفَةُ الْمَحْذُورِ قُبَّتُهُ
تَعْسُ الرَّاضِي بِذَا وَعَدَتْ مِثْلَهَا فِي الْهَتَكِ حَرَمَتُهُ¹¹³

It may be argued that Sultan Jān Blāṭ’s decision to demolish the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan was both unjustified and strategically unsound, particularly given that this madrasa was regarded as one of the finest architectural and educational institutions ever constructed, indeed, the world had seen nothing comparable to its scale and craftsmanship. Even if Jān Blāṭ had succeeded in its total demolition, such an act would likely have had little to no impact on the broader political dynamics between him and Sultan Ṭūmān Bāy. A temporary siege by Ṭūmān Bāy would have been sufficient to compel Jān Blāṭ’s surrender, especially considering Ṭūmān Bāy’s commanding position at the time, he enjoyed the unwavering support of the military, the Mamluk elite, and the general populace. In stark contrast, Jān Blāṭ’s own circumstances were marked by instability, weakness, and signs of imminent failure. Had he possessed a measure of political foresight and military prudence, he would have done better to seize the madrasa and bring it under his control. From there, he could have fortified it with troops, archers, and

¹¹³ Ibn Iyās, *Badā’i’ al-Zuhūr*, vol. 3, p. 456.

artillery, just as he had done with the citadel. In doing so, Jān Blāṭ would have secured for himself two fortified positions: The citadel and the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan. This dual stronghold strategy might have significantly enhanced his prospects of achieving victory or at least prolonging resistance against Ṭūmān Bāy.

It is noteworthy that although Sultan Jān Blāṭ ultimately reversed his decision to demolish the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan – following the intervention of emir Taghrībirdī – his fear and apprehension of Sultan Ṭūmān Bāy remained palpable. As a precautionary measure, he ordered the removal of the madrasa's staircases, believing that this would prevent access to its roof and minarets, thereby inhibiting its potential use as a fortified position from which the Citadel could be targeted or attacked.¹¹⁴

On the ninth of Jumādā al-Ākhirah 906/30 December 1500, Ṭūmān Bāy entered Cairo in a ceremonious and imposing procession, accompanied by emir Qaṣruwah, a considerable force of soldiers, and a formal declaration of hostilities against al-Ashraf Jān Blāṭ. The emirs and regional deputies aligned with Ṭūmān Bāy dispersed strategically throughout the Ṣalībāh¹¹⁵ area, each assuming positions in preparation for the anticipated military engagement. The leadership of the campaign fell to emir Qaṣruwah, then serving as Governor of Damascus, who spearheaded the military operations on Ṭūmān Bāy's behalf. Qaṣruwah ordered the excavation of four trenches¹¹⁶ and commenced the construction of *al-Magānīq* (stone-throwing siege engines) to facilitate a direct siege of the citadel. A decisive turning point in the conflict occurred when Qaṣruwah successfully seized control of the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan, transforming it into a forward operating base. Owing to its strategic location opposite the citadel, the madrasa played a crucial role in the military campaign. Heavy artillery was mounted on its roof, and sharpshooters were stationed on its minarets, from which they launched sustained barrages of gunfire and projectiles toward the Citadel. The assault inflicted substantial casualties on the defenders and significantly undermined the morale of Jān Blāṭ's forces. Subsequently, Qaṣruwah secured the Bāb al-Silsilah and gained access to the citadel via the staircase, encountering no resistance. The extensive fortifications and defensive towers constructed by Jān Blāṭ – along with his placement of artillery on the citadel's walls – proved ineffective. The siege thus culminated in a decisive military and symbolic victory for Ṭūmān Bāy. Despite this success, Jān Blāṭ's position remained unstable. He was ultimately unable to maintain control over the artillery deployed atop the madrasa for an extended period. Forced to retreat alongside his remaining allies, he was subsequently deposed.¹¹⁷ His reign, which lasted approximately six months and eighteen days, came to an abrupt end. Thereafter, Ṭūmān Bāy assumed the sultanate, fulfilling his long-standing ambition to ascend the throne, following a protracted and bitter period of political rivalry with Qānṣūwah al-Ashrafī, Jān Blāṭ, and other prominent emirs.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i' al-Zuhūr*, vol. 3, p. 456.

¹¹⁵ The term *Ṣalībāh* refers specifically to Ṣalībāt Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn, a historic locality situated in the southern part of Cairo, positioned between Mīdān al-Rumayla to the north and Mīdān al-Sayyidah Zaynab to the south.

¹¹⁶ The trenches were distributed as follows: one trench at Ra's al-Ramlah, near Sūwayqat Mun'im; a second at Ḥadarat al-Baqar; a third at Bāb al-Wazīr; and a fourth at the head of the Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn Mosque. For further, see: Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i' al-Zuhūr*, vol. 3, p. 458.

¹¹⁷ Following his deposition from the sultanate, Jān Blāṭ was arrested and imprisoned, where he remained until he was strangled to death in Sha'bān 906/March 1501. For further, see: Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i' al-Zuhūr*, vol. 3, p. 462, 472.

¹¹⁸ Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i' al-Zuhūr*, vol. 3, p. 458-472.

It is worth noting that the Madrasa of Sultan Ḥasan suffered significant structural damage as a result of the political conflict between Jān Blāṭ and Ṭūmān Bāy. The building's walls were partially destroyed, particularly the wall located behind the miḥrāb of the main dome, overlooking Maydān al-Rumayla. The dome itself was seriously damaged, the staircases leading to the roof were demolished, and the minaret stairways were similarly ruined. The madrasa thus fell into a state of disrepair and devastation, prompting the attention of Sultan Ṭūmān Bāy. He consequently issued an order to restore and renovate the damaged sections of the structure. The restoration was completed by the end of Jumādā al-Ākhirah 906/January 1501, at which point the madrasa had been returned to a state of excellent condition and renewed architectural elegance.¹¹⁹

Conclusion:

The study examined seven political conflicts that adversely affected the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa. It highlighted that emir Barqūq ibn Anas was the first to exploit the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa in his political struggle against emir Baraka. He was also the first to establish the practice of occupying the madrasa's rooftops for military purposes during his confrontations with adversaries. The study further demonstrated the negative consequences resulting from the madrasa's involvement in these conflicts: the dome of the madrasa was burned and collapsed, the staircase of the main gate and the platform leading to the main entrance were demolished, the entrance itself was blocked with stones, the minarets' stairways were destroyed; rendering the call to prayer inoperative and the academic activities were suspended. All of this occurred under the direct orders of Barqūq after he ascended to power.

During the reign of Sultan al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh, the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa endured significant hardship as a result of his conflict with al-Nāṣir Faraj. This hardship was most notably manifested in the appropriation of the madrasa's door and bronze chandelier (*tanūr*), which were dismantled and repurposed for use in al-Mu'ayyad's own madrasa and mosque located adjacent to Bāb Zūwayla.

The Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa continued to suffer from neglect, vandalism, and structural degradation until the reign of Sultan Barsabāy, who sought to restore and rehabilitate the institution. In Ramadan of the year 825/August 1422, he ordered the removal of the stones placed by Barqūq to block the madrasa's main entrance. He commissioned the installation of a new door to replace the one previously appropriated by Sultan al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh. Furthermore, he authorized the repair and restoration of the staircases leading to the rooftop and the minarets. Under his directives, the call to prayer was reinstated, and scholarly activities – including teaching and study circles – were revived after a disruption that had lasted for approximately thirty years.

The renovations and restorations initiated by Sultan Barsabāy did not bring lasting stability to the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa, as it was once again drawn into political conflict – this time between Qarāqmās and Jaqmaq – in the month of Rabī' al-Ākhar 842/September 1438. This conflict had detrimental consequences for the madrasa: the main entrance door installed by Barsabāy was burned, the staircases leading to the rooftop were destroyed, and the stairways of both minarets were also demolished. Notably, the study highlights that, for the first time in

¹¹⁹ Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i' al-Zuhūr*, vol. 3, p. 468

the history of the Mamluk state, these actions were carried out under judicial authority rather than by direct order of the sultan.

The Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa also suffered considerably during the conflict between emir Aqburdī and Sultan Muḥammad ibn Qāyṭbāy. The madrasa was subjected to acts of vandalism, looting, and destruction, including the burning of its main entrance for a second time. Additionally, carpets, lamps, and marble were plundered, and the copper windows and doors of the madrasa's dome were removed. These events occurred in Dhu al-Hijjah 902/August 1497. The madrasa remained in a state of disrepair until emir Ṭūmān Bāy who undertook its restoration. He repaired the burned entrance, sealed the windows of the dome, reinstated the marble that had been stripped, and restored the damaged parts. These efforts were carried out during Ramadan 903/May 1498, after which Friday sermon (*khuṭba*) and the *tarāwīḥ* prayers were resumed for the first time after a suspension that had lasted for nearly ten months.

The study demonstrates that the Sultan Ḥasan Madrasa reached the peak of its destruction during the reign of Sultan Jān Blāṭ, amid his conflict with Ṭūmān Bāy. In an effort to prevent the madrasa from being used militarily by his rival, Jān Blāṭ ordered its complete demolition. The destruction began at the end of Jumada al-Awwal 906/December 1500 and continued uninterrupted for three days. As a result, the madrasa's dome was severely damaged, a portion of the mihrab wall was demolished, and the staircases – both those leading to the rooftop and those accessing the minarets – were destroyed. At that point, influential figures intervened and urged Sultan Jān Blāṭ to halt the destruction. Consequently, the demolition was stopped, but the madrasa remained in a dilapidated state until Ṭūmān Bāy ascended to power. Upon assuming the throne, he ordered the restoration of the dome, the repair of the qibla wall, and the reconstruction of the staircases. The madrasa was officially reopened in Jumada al-Thānī 906/January 1501. This event marked the final instance in which the madrasa was exploited for political conflict, bringing an end to its involvement in the struggles that plagued the Mamluk period.

Bibliography

Sources:

- Al-ʿAynī (d. 855/1451), Badr al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-ʿAynī, *Iqd al-Jumān fī Tārīkh Ahl al-Zamān: Ḥawādith wa Tarājim (807–814 AH / 1404–1411 CE)*, ed. Muḥammad Jamāl al-Shurūbajī (Cairo: The Egyptian General Book Organization, 2021)
- Al-ʿAynī (d. 855/1451), Badr al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-ʿAynī, *al-Sayf al-Muḥannad fī Sīrat al-Malik al-Muʿayyad Shaykh al-Maḥmūdī*, ed. Fahīm Muḥammad Shaltūt, 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub wa al-Wathāʾiq al-Qawmiyya, 1998)
- Al-Fayrūzābādī (d. 817/1414), Majd al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Yaʿqūb al-Fayrūzābādī, *al-Qāmūs al-Muḥīṭ*, ed. Abū al-Wafā Naṣr al-Hūrīnī (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2008)
- Al-Ishāqī (d. 1060/1650), Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Muʿī ibn Abī al-Faṭḥ ibn Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Mughnī ibn ʿAlī al-Ishāqī al-Manūfī, *Akḥbār al-Awwal fīman Taṣarrafa fī Miṣr min Arbāb al-Duwal* (Cairo: Maktabat al-Multazimiyya, n.d)

- Al-Jawharī (d. 398/1008), Abū Naṣr Ismāʿīl ibn Ḥammād *al-Ṣiḥāḥ: Tāj al-Lughā wa-Ṣiḥāḥ al-ʿArabiyya*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥammad Tāmir et al. (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 2009)
- Al-Maqrīzī (d. 845/1442), Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Maqrīzī, *al-Mawāʾiz wa al-Iʿtibār fī Dhikr al-Khutaṭ wa al-Āthār*, 6 vols., ed. Ayman Fuʾād Sayyid (London: al-Furqān Foundation, 1995–2003)
- Al-Maqrīzī (d. 845/1442), Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk li-Maʾrifat Duwal al-Mulūk*, 12 vols, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Ziyāda and Saʿīd ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ ʿĀshūr (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa al-Wathāʾiq al-Qawmiyya, 1997)
- Al-Maqrīzī (d. 845/1442), Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Maqrīzī, *al-Sulūk li-Maʾrifat Duwal al-Mulūk*, 8 vols, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAtṭā, 1st ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1997)
- Al-Qalqashandī (d. 821/ 1418), al-Shaykh Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-Aʾshā fī Ṣināʿat al-Inshāʾ*, 14 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub wa-al-Wathāʾiq al-Qawmiyyah, 1922)
- Al-Sakhāwī (d. 902/1497), Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sakhāwī, *al-Dawʾ al-Lāmiʿ li-Ahl al-Qarn al-Tāsiʿ*, 12 vols., 1st edn (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1992)
- Al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), al-Ḥāfiẓ Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Suyūṭī, *Husn al-Muḥāḍara fī Tārīkh Miṣr wa al-Qāhira*, ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, 2 vols., 1st ed. (Cairo: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyya, 1968)
- Al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), al-Ḥāfiẓ Jalāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Suyūṭī, *Bughyat al-Wuʾāt fī Ṭabaqāt al-Lughawiyyīn wa al-Nuḥāt*, ed. Muḥammad Abū al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, 2 vols., 1st ed. (Cairo: ʿĪsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī Press, 1964)
- Al-Ṣayrafi (d. 900/1495), al-Khaṭīb al-Jawharī ʿAlāʾ ibn Dāwūd, *Nuzhat al-Nufūs wa al-Abdān fī Tawārīkh al-Zamān*, ed. Ḥasan Ḥubbashī, 3 vols. (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub, 1970)
- Ibn al-Ḥimṣī (d. 934/1527), Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-Anṣārī al-Ḥimṣī, *Hawāḍith al-Zamān wa-Wafayāt al-Shuyūkh waʾl-Aqrān*, ed. ʿUmar Tadmurī, 3 vols, 1st ed., (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-ʿAṣriyyah, 1999)
- Ibn al-ʿImād (d. 1089/1678), Shihāb al-Dīn Abū al-Falāḥ ʿAbd al-Ḥayy ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-ʿUkrī al-Ḥanbalī al-Dimashqī, *Shadharāt al-Dhahab fī Akhbār man Dhahab*, ed. Maḥmūd al-Arnāʾūt, 11 vols. 1st ed (Beirut: Dār Ibn Kathīr, 1986)
- Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1448), al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥāfiẓ Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad, known as Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *Inbāʾ al-Ghumr bi-Abnāʾ al-ʿUmr*, ed. Ḥasan Ḥabashī, 4 vols. (Cairo: Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, 2011)

- Ibn Iyās (d. 930/ 1524), Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Iyās al-Ḥanafī, *Badā' i ' al-Zuhūr fī Waqā' i ' al-Duhūr*, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā, 5 vols., 1st ed. (Cairo: General Egyptian Book Organization, 1984)
- Ibn Taghrī Birdī (d. 874/1470), Jamal al-Dīn Abū al-Muḥāsīn Yūsuf ibn Taghrī Birdī al-Atābakī, *al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi wa al-Mustawfā ba ' d al-Wāfi*, 12 vols, ed. Nabīl Muḥammad ' Abd al-' Azīz and Muḥammad Muḥammad Amīn (Cairo: Center for Editing Islamic Heritage, 1984–2006)
- Ibn Taghrī Birdī (d. 874/1470), Jamal al-Dīn Abū al-Muḥāsīn Yūsuf ibn Taghrī Birdī al-Atābakī, *al-Dalīl al-Shāfi ' alā al-Manhal al-Ṣāfi*, 2 vols, ed. Fahim Muhammad Shaltout, 2nd ed. (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub wa al-Wathā'iq al-Qawmīyah, 1998)
- Ibn Taghrībirdī (d. 874/1470), Jamal al-Dīn Abū al-Maḥāsīn Yūsuf ibn Taghrībirdī al-Atābakī, *Mawrid al-Laṭāfa fī man Waliya al-Salṭana wa al-Khilāfa*, 2 vols., ed. Nabil Muḥammad ' Abd al-' Azīz (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub wa al-Wathā'iq al-Qawmiyya, 1997)
- Ibn Ṭulūn (d. 953/1546), Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ' Alī ibn Aḥmad ibn Ṭulūn al-Ṣāliḥī, *Mufākahat al-Khillān fī Hawādith al-Zamān*, annotated by Khalīl al-Manṣūr, 1st ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-' Ilmiyyah, 1998)
- Ibn Taghrībirdī (d. 874/1470), Jamal al-Dīn Abū al-Maḥāsīn Yūsuf ibn Taghrībirdī al-Atābakī, *al-Nujūm al-Zāhira fī Mulūk Miṣr wa al-Qāhira*, 16 vols., ed. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Shams al-Dīn, 1st ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-' Ilmiyya, 1992)
- Ibn Ṭulūn (d. 953/1546), Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ' Alī ibn Aḥmad ibn Ṭulūn al-Ṣāliḥī, *I' lām al-Warā bi-Man Waliya Nā' iban min al-Turk bi-Dimashq al-Shām al-Kubrā*, ed. ' Abd al-' Azīm Ḥamid Khaṭṭāb, 2 vols. (Cairo: ' Ayn Shams University Press, 1973)
- Ibn Ṭulūn (d. 953/1546), Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ' Alī ibn Aḥmad ibn Ṭulūn al-Ṣāliḥī, *Mut ' at al-adhhān min al-tamattu ' bi-al-aqrān bayna tarājim al-shuyūkh wa-al-aqrān*, ed. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Mawṣilī, 2 vols. (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, n.d.)

References:

- al-Sayyid Muḥammad ' Aṭā, *Iqlīm al-Gharbiyya fī ' Aṣr al-Ayyūbiyyīn wa al-Mamālīk: Dirāsa Tārīkhiyya wa Ḥadāriyya* (Cairo: al-Hay' a al-Miṣriyya al-' Āmma li-l-Kitāb, 2002)
- ' Abd al-Mun' im Mājid, *Nuḥum Dawlat Salāṭīn al-Mamālīk wa Rusūmuhum fī Miṣr: Dirāsa Shāmila lil-Nuḥum al-Siyāsiyya*, 2 vols., 2nd ed (Cairo: Maktabat al-Anglū al-Miṣriyya, 1979)
- Doris Behrens Abouseif, *Cairo of the Mamluks: A History of the Architecture and its Culture* (Cairo: American University in Cairo press, 2007)
- Fathi Salem Al-Laheebi and Fa' er Ali Al-Hadidi, "Al-Mamalik al-Jalabān wa-Dawruhum fī al-Awdā ' al-Dākhiliyya li-l-Dawla al-Mamlūkiyya 678–922H/1279–1516AD," *Journal of Basic Education College Research*, vol. 8, no. 4 (2009), pp. 265–287.

- Ḥasan ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, *Tārīkh al-Masājid al-Athariyyah*, 2 vols. (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyyah, 1945)
- Muḥammad Qandīl al-Baqlī, *al-Ta’rīf bi-Muṣṭalaḥāt Ṣubḥ al-A’shā* (Cairo: al-Hay’ah al-Miṣriyyah al-‘Āmmah li-l-Kitāb, 1983)
- Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Sattār ‘Uthmān, *Wathīqat Waqf Jamāl al-Dīn Yūsuf al-Ustādār: Dirāsah Tārīkhiyyah Athariyyah Wathā’iqiyyah* (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1983)
- Muḥammad Ramzī, *al-Qāmūs al-Jughrāfī li-l-Bilād al-Miṣriyyah min ‘Ahd al-Qudamā’ ilā Sanat 1945*, 5 vols. (Cairo: al-Hay’ah al-Miṣriyyah al-‘Āmmah li-l-Kitāb, 1994)
- Muḥammad Aḥmad Dahmān, *Mu’jam al-Alfāz al-Tārīkhiyya fī al-‘Aṣr al-Mamlūkī*, 1st ed. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1990)
- Su‘ād Māhir Muḥammad, *Masājid Miṣr wa-Awliyā’uhā al-Ṣāliḥūn*, 5 vols. (Cairo: al-Majlis al-A‘lá li-l-Shu‘ūn al-Islāmiyyah, 2012)
- Sāmia ‘Alī Miṣīlḥī, “Al-Amīr Jarkas al-Khalīlī Amīr Ākhūr Kabīr (d. 791/1389),” *Majallat Qitā’ al-Dirāsāt al-Insāniyya*, no. 7 (2010), pp. 431–480.



الصراعات السياسية ومردودها على مدرسة السلطان حسن إبان العصر المملوكي

أحمد مجدى سالم

قسم الإرشاد السياحي، كلية السياحة والفنادق، جامعة قناة السويس، جمهورية مصر العربية

ahmad_salem@tourism.suez.edu.eg

الملخص:

اتسم العصر المملوكي بكثرة الصراعات السياسية على السلطة، ومن ثم كثرت الاحتجاجات والثورات وكان ميدان الرملة هو مسرح الأحداث الذي شهد هذه الصراعات. ولإطلاع مدرسة السلطان حسن على ميدان الرملة ومواجهتها لقلعة الجبل: لوحظ أن لعبت دوراً سياسياً وعسكرياً خلال هذه الصراعات والهدف من هذا البحث هو رصد الصراعات السياسية التي استغلت الموقع الاستراتيجي لمدرسة السلطان حسن إبان العصر المملوكي، وتوضيح المردود المباشر لهذه الصراعات على وظيفة المدرسة ووحداتها وعناصرها المعمارية. اتبع البحث المنهج التاريخي في تقصى الصراعات السياسية التي أثرت على مدرسة السلطان حسن، وذلك من خلال الروايات التاريخية الواردة بالمصادر الأولية والثانوية في إطار دراسة تحليلية. وقد ناقش البحث سبعة صراعات سياسية أثرت سلباً على مدرسة السلطان حسن، واتضح ذلك في تعطيل وظيفة المدرسة بشكل متقطع، وتهدم بعض عناصرها ووحداتها المعمارية، ونهب ما بها من أبواب وشبابيك ورخام وتنانير وغيرها. كما عرض البحث لجهود بعض السلاطين - أمثال السلطان برسباي والسلطان طومان باي - الذين تصدوا لأعمال التخريب الناجمة عن استغلال المدرسة سياسياً؛ من خلال إجراء بعض الإصلاحات والترميمات بها التي من شأنها تمكن المدرسة من أداء وظيفتها مرة أخرى، وتعيد إليها رونقها التي كانت عليه قبل استغلالها في الصراعات السياسية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الصراعات السياسية، ميدان الرملة، مدرسة السلطان حسن، العصر المملوكي.