مجلة البحوث المالية والتجارية
المجلد (26) – العدد الرابع – أكتوبر 2025

Economic Policy Uncertainty and Risk-Taking Behavior in the Insurance Industry: A Multi-Method Panel Analysis

Dr. Eslam Abdelhakim Seyam
College of Business - Imam Mohammad Ibn Saud Islamic University (IMSIU)
isiam@imamu.edu.sa
Faculty of Commerce – Zagazig University
iaseam@commerce.zu.edu.eg

Dr. Mohamed Refaet Hamed
Faculty of commerce - sohaj university
m.refaet2008@gmail.com

تاريخ الإرسال	2025-09-07
تاريخ القبول	2025-09-014
رابط المجلة:	https://jsst.journals.ekb.eg/

Abstract

Economic policy uncertainty has come to the forefront as a key determinant of financial sector stability, especially after the global financial crisis and resulting policy measures across the world. The insurance sector, being a key financial intermediary and risk absorber, faces specific challenges to operate within uncertain policy regimes that impact both their underwriting decisions and their investment conduct. This paper investigates the impact of economic policy uncertainty on risk-taking behavior on multiple dimensions of insurance firm operations, filling an important gap in the extant literature on the differential impact of uncertainty on underwriting and investment conduct. Using a complete panel dataset on 11 Egyptian insurance firms from 2009-2024, amounting to 176 firm-year firm years, we apply three complementary panel-based econometric methods: fixed effects panel regression, seemingly unrelated regression systems, and first-difference generalized method of moments estimation. The empirical results indicate asymmetric reactions to economic policy uncertainty on risk channels. The estimates indicate economic policy uncertainty significantly enhances underwriting risk exposure, with statistically significant estimates when dealing with heteroskedasticity concerns using robust standard errors. Investment risk is found largely unchanged across multiple estimates, registering consistently negative though statistically insignificant estimates. The estimates exhibit economically significant magnitudes and remain stable across numerous panel-based econometric estimations and tests on specification. The findings indicate insurance firms react to economic policy uncertainty by risk-taking through their core underwriting activities potentially due to the forces of competition and search-for-yield conduct, while adopting conservative approaches to their investments due to regulatory pressures and liability-matching requirements. The findings carry significant regulatory implications that prudential regulations should include policy uncertainty indicators and employ differential approach-based monitoring mechanisms on underwriting and investments when there is heightened policy uncertainty.

Keywords: **Economic Policy Uncertainty, Panel Data Analysis, Fixed Effects, Seemingly Unrelated Regression, Generalized Method of Moments, Insurance Risk Management**

1. Introduction

The global insurance market, whose premium amounts approach $5 trillion annually, is an indispensable pillar of financial stability and economic resilience (International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 2024). Nevertheless, the business is done under an ever-more risky policy environment that has attained hitherto unrivaled dimensions since the 2008 financial shock. Latest figures from the International Association of Insurance Supervisors suffice to illustrate that the insurers face intensifying threats from macroeconomic volatility and geopolitical uncertainties even while the systemic risk index of major international insurance groups increased 5.3% in 2023 alone (International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 2024). This uncertain environment, whose character is exemplified by unpredictable developments within regulatory regimes, monetary policies, and fiscal policies essentially tilts the risk-reward equations that underlie insurance firm decision-making processes.

Economic policy uncertainty has become a hallmark feature of contemporary financial markets, with Baker et al. (2016) showing policy-driven uncertainty in the United States to have remained at levels roughly double the historical mean since 2008. This heightened uncertainty is not confined to the core economies but extends to emerging market regions undergoing dynamic growth and structural change in their insurance sectors. Insurance businesses are particularly affected by the implications arising from the requirement to balance profit maintenance with uncertain regulatory regimes that both impact their underwriting approach and deemed investment policies. Industry reports most recently indicate that commercial property and casualty insurance premiums worldwide grew on average by 8% per annum over the previous five years as a result of renewed growth, the majority being the result of rate improvements rather than risk growth, indicative of defensive reactions towards uncertainty (McKinsey & Company, 2024).

Even though the insurance sector plays a key role in risk spreading and financial intermediation, the empirical research on the impact of economic policy uncertainty on insurance firm risk-taking is remarkably scarce. Though numerous studies have captured the impact of policy uncertainty on the stability of the banking industry, corporate investing decisions, and stock market

volatility (Drobetz et al., 2018, Christou et al., 2017), equivalent insurance market studies have largely been ignored. Existing works deal largely with aggregate insurance market growth or premium formation, with Jeris et al. (2023) exploring the correlation among policy uncertainty and insurance premiums in several nations. Nonetheless, the works regard insurance firms homogeneously and do not differentiate the distinctly different risk channels employed by policy uncertainty.

This gap in knowledge is especially salient due to the insurance company industry's special dual role. Insurance companies engage in two risk-laden activities at the same time: underwriting risk through pricing and accepting insurance policies, and investment risk through the management of policyholder reserves and firm capital. Both risk channels meet uncertainty through different mechanisms and confront varied regulatory restraints, yet the research to date has failed to study whether policy uncertainty impacts the risk channels differently. Theoretical implications are uncertain: uncertainty may result in risk-avoiding underwriting practices due to greater risk assessment challenges, or may provoke risk-seeking underwriting through an attempt to fight market share when times are uncertain. Investment risk may decline through flight-to-quality strategies on the part of companies, or rise through the search for greater returns by companies in an attempt to remain profit-friendly.

The research objective of this study is to examine how economic policy uncertainty influences risk-taking behavior across these distinct operational dimensions of insurance companies. Specifically, we investigate whether policy uncertainty affects underwriting risk and investment risk differently, and quantify the economic magnitude of these effects. This inquiry is motivated by the recognition that effective prudential regulation and risk management strategies require understanding the specific channels through which macroeconomic uncertainty transmits to insurance company behavior. The analysis addresses three key research questions: First, does economic policy uncertainty significantly affect insurance company risk-taking behavior? Second, are the effects of policy uncertainty symmetric across underwriting and investment activities.

This research contributes to the insurance economics and financial stability literature in several key ways. Methodologically,

we use three complementary econometric methods-fixed effects panel regression, seemingly unrelated regression, and first-difference generalized method of moments - to ensure robustness and deal with possible concerns about endogeneity that have constrained past research. The multiple-method approach lends confidence to the results while controlling for the possible correlation among underwriting decisions and investment decisions within firms. Empirically, the paper draws on a rich panel dataset of Egyptian insurance firms from 2009-2024 that covers the periods of intense policy uncertainty such as the Arab Spring uprising, economic reforms, and global financial market volatility. This dataset facilitates an investigation into the impact of policy uncertainty on insurance firms within an emerging market framework where regulatory systems continue to take shape and economic volatility is strong.

Theoretically, the research adds to the body of knowledge on financial intermediaries' reactions to macroeconomic uncertainty by differentiating risk-taking activities of the same type within an institution. The research findings indicate that policy uncertainty significantly raises underwriting risk but keeps investment risk relatively unchanged, implying that insurance intermediaries react to uncertainty through channel-specific rather than proportional risk decrease or increase. From a policy standpoint, the research findings are significant to prudential regulation purposes, implying that regulatory systems should include indicators of policy uncertainty and apply differential monitoring strategies on the level of underwriting versus investment activities when uncertainty is heightened.

The rest of the paper is organized accordingly. Section 2 reviews the economic policy uncertainty and insurance risk-taking research. Section 3 describes the data sources, construction of the variables employed, and the adopted econometric methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results, both the main findings as well as the robustness tests. Section 5 summarizes the economic mechanisms underlying the results and their implications for policy. Section 6 provides a conclusion summarizing results and future research opportunities.

2. Literature Review

The interconnections between economic policy uncertainty and the financial sector's behavior became a valuable research area after the global financial crisis when traditional risk models failed to gauge the systemic effect of uncertainty due to policy. This paper is an overview of the theoretical foundations and the empirical evidence on the effects of policy uncertainty on financial institutions based on the special risk taking mechanisms of the insurance sector.

Theoretical insights into policy uncertainty impacts on financial institutions expand on the real options framework originating in Bernanke (1983) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994), which argued that irreversible investment decisions under uncertainty generate option values to wait for improvements in information. Bloom (2009) generalized the approach to illustrate that uncertainty shocks produce both direct impact through delayed investment and indirect impact through risk premium increases. The extension to financial institutions needs to take into account their double role as risk takers on the asset allocation decisions front and risk management on the liability pricing approach. Adrian and Shin (2010) constructed theoretical models to illustrate financial intermediaries adjusting their risk appetite in the face of macroeconomic uncertainty and their effects on credit extension and investment decisions.

Recent advances on the measurement of economic policy uncertainty have revolutionized empirical research on the same. Baker et al. (2016) opened the newspaper-based indicators that cover policy-linked uncertainty on multiple fronts including fiscal, money policy, and regulatory policies. This line of development was further continued globally, where Ahir et al. (2022) built the World Uncertainty Index across 143 countries on the basis of reports produced by Economist Intelligence Unit. Husted et al. (2020) further improved the indicators by incorporating forward-looking indicators from options-based markets, while Caldara and Iacoviello (2022) built geopolitical risk indicators complementing typical EPU indicators. All these advances on methodology enabled the uncertainty effect on the various policy fronts to be captured better across different geographical regions.

The empirical evidence on the effects of EPU on financial markets noted considerable effects across both asset classes and

institutional sectors. Brogaard and Detzel (2015) established that stock market volatility increases when there is policy uncertainty and trading volumes decline when there is policy uncertainty, with the effects being localized in policy-sensitive industries. Christou et al. (2017) generalized the study to the Pacific-Rim economies using Bayesian panel VAR models and observed strong spillover effects from US policy uncertainty to global financial markets. In corporate finance research, Gülen and Ion (2016) observed that policy uncertainty leads to the decrement of capital spending by 25% among the most exposed companies, while Drobetz et al. (2018) noted comparable effects on the cost of funds. More recent works by Azzimonti (2018) identified the works on partisan polarization and electoral uncertainty imposing lingering influences on the prices of assets and corporate decisions.

Banking research found key transmission mechanisms through which financial intermediation is influenced by policy uncertainty. Bordo et al. (2016) discovered that bank lending is suppressed and credit spread widens due to policy uncertainty, especially among small- to medium-sized businesses. Jiang et al. (2019) showed that banks react to uncertainty through the formation of larger capital buffers and risk-weighted assets reduction, an impact differential by business model and bank size. De Jonghe et al. (2020) employed the European banks data to illustrate that policy uncertainty influences the banks' profitability on both net interest margin and credit risk provisions.

Although there exists voluminous research on banks and capital markets, the insurance industry has been astonishingly underrepresented in the EPU corpus. Browne and Kim (1993) laid the theoretical groundwork on insurance demand uncertainty early on, yet did not account for policy-specific uncertainty impacts. Ward and Zurbruegg (2000) investigated the impact on insurance firm performance due to macroeconomic uncertainty, and found both underwriting and investment returns significantly influenced. Both works were done before contemporary methods of EPU measurement were devised and failed to differentiate among multiple uncertainty sources.

These few existing studies that specifically investigate the impact of EPU on insurance markets yielded mixed and partial results. Balcilar et al. (2020) investigated the connection between insurance premium and policy uncertainty for 15 nations from

1998-2016 and discovered uncertainty raised premiums both for life and non-life insurance, although the impact was larger on non-life insurance. Their study treated insurance providers homogenously and didn't investigate risk management decisions on the firm level. Jeris et al. (2023) continued the study to 22 nations applying panel cointegration methods and verified positive connections among EPU and insurance premiums both on the short-run and long-run specifications. Canh et al. (2021) investigated the development of insurance market among the OECD nations and discovered global policy uncertainty had a negative impact on penetration on the life insurance level, yet there is nonsignificant impact on the development of non-life insurance.

More recent studies have begun exploring subtler aspects of the EPU-insurance relationship. Hemrit (2021) examined Saudi insurance firms and found negative short-term effects of both EPU and geopolitical risk on insurance demand whose effect depended on insurance type and corporate governance characteristics. He et al. (2020) analyzed Chinese insurance firms and found large effects from domestic policy uncertainty both on underwriting profit and on investment income whose effect was larger when there was regulatory reform. Zhang et al. (2021) used high frequency data to examine insurance firm stock prices and the response to policy announcements on them and found significant abnormal returns around regulatory policy changes.

The EPU-insurance research used methodological practices that were relatively varied even in the near past. Previous works were largely rooted in conventional panel data practices such as fixed effects estimators and random effects estimators. Balcilar et al. (2020) applied heterogenous panel estimation models with cross-sectional dependence, while Jeris et al. (2023) applied panel cointegration tests and PMG-ARDL regression to explore both short-run and long-run associations. Additional recent studies applied more refined econometric practices such as He et al. (2020) application of threshold regression modeling to explore nonlinearities, and Chen et al. (2020) application of machine learning routines to uncover multiple interactions between policy uncertainty and insurance firm characteristics.

Nevertheless, there exist important gaps in the existing scholarship which constrain our understanding on the risk taking by the insurance providers due to uncertainty. First, the vast

majority of the existing research assesses aggregate market indicators such as penetration level or premium instead of observed risk-based decisions underlying the same indicators. This aggregation masks insightful heterogeneity in responsiveness to uncertainty among diverse insurance activity types. Secondly, the existing research did not differentiate the underwriting risk from the investment risk even though the two display fundamentally different business line activities marked by diverse regulatory limits as well as risk profiles. Thirdly, the weaknesses such as possible endogeneity bias and cross-sectional dependence were hardly considered in the majority of the research.

Fourth, the geographic scope of past research has been largely confined to industrialized countries with little concern for emerging economies where the impact of policy uncertainty may be varied due to less advance regulatory systems and greater levels of baseline uncertainty. Fifth, the time span of the majority of research is older than recent periods of unusual policy uncertainty such as the policy reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic and recent inflationary stretches, so the applicability to the present situation by most studies is restricted. Lastly, the research does not contain thorough robustness checks across varying economic specifications and uncertainty metrics which casts doubt on the stability of observed relations.

These gaps in the body of literature affirm the necessity to conduct fuller analysis on the impact policy uncertainty exerts on individual risk channels among insurance institutions. This study meets these weaknesses by investigating underwriting risk and investment risk separately, using several different econometric methods to allow tests on robustness, and making use of sampled information drawn from an emerging market context covering the high-uncertainty periods as well as the low-uncertainty periods. This facilitates better comprehension on the channels through which policy uncertainty transmits to the insurance industry behavior and provides informative evidence on risk management practices over prudential regulations. The research agenda is to investigate the differential effect on underwriting risk and investment risk economic policy uncertainty imposes on insurance providers through the conduct of a multiple method study on the econometrics that addresses the weaknesses inherent to the method applied by past researches and provides original evidence based on the emerging market context.

3. Methodology

The research utilizes a large panel data analysis framework to explore the differential impact of economic policy uncertainty on the risk-taking behaviors of insurance firms. An observation study research design is adopted involving the use of a balanced panel dataset to allow both the cross-sectional and time-series dimension of the association between policy uncertainty and insurance risk proxies to be analyzed. An empirical approach to dealing with possible endogeneity is utilized involving the deployment of diverse econometric specifications accompanied by diagnostic checking on a considerable level to allow the results to be credible. The dataset used here covers data from various sources covering the Egyptian insurance industry from 2009 to 2024. The financial data on insurance company financial statements were sourced from the annual reports and the Egyptian insurance companies regulatory reports, containing rich data on underwriting business, investments, and firm characteristics. The economic policy uncertainty index is drawn from the World Uncertainty Index for Egypt (WUIEGY) produced by the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) system, containing a consistent country-level measure of uncertainty due to policy that is derived from country-level economic intelligence reports (Ahir et al., 2022). The macroeconomic control variables come from the Central Bank of Egypt, the Egyptian Ministry of Finance, and international datasets like the World Bank World Development Indicators. The final dataset forms a balanced panel of 11 Egyptian insurance companies observed over 16 years, resulting in 176 firm-year observations with little missing information.

These analysis based variables given in Table 1 describe two opposing risk-taking dimensions of the insurance company. Underwriting risk is captured by the logarithm of the compensation cost to insurance business income ratio that reflects the riskiness of the insurance policies written by the firm (Eling et al., 2007). This variable reflects the business of risk transfer and pricing that is the core business of traditional insurance business, where riskier underwriting practices or higher risk-accepting policies are indicated by higher values. Investment risk is captured by the net income from investments and fair value gains/losses to total investment assets ratio reflecting the risk exposure and volatility of the firm's investment portfolio (Chen et al., 2001). This variable reflects the asset management decisions impacting the firm's

capability to service the future policyholder liabilities and produce profit to shareholders.

The most important independent variable is the economic policy uncertainty index, which is captured using the World Uncertainty Index for Egypt. The index encapsulates uncertainty on the dimensions of fiscal policy, monetary policy, trade policy, and regulatory policies and offers an overall measure of policy-driven uncertainty that impacts business decision-making (Ahir et al., 2022). The index is built through text analysis of Economist Intelligence Unit country reports by finding terms that are associated with uncertainty and policy shifts and normalizing it to allow interpretation across varying periods of time and nations.

Table 1: Variable Definitions and Descriptions

Variable	Abbreviation	Description
Underwriting_Risk	UW_RISK	Logarithm of ratio between compensation costs and insurance operations income
Investment_Risk	INV_RISK	Net investment income and fair value gains/losses relative to total investment assets
EPU	EPU	World Uncertainty Index for Egypt (WUIEGY) from St. Louis Fed
Herfindahl_Index	HHI	Calculated using sum of squares of insurance income ratios for each company
Confidence_Index	CONF	Egyptian Stock Market Index (EGX30) indicators
Size	SIZE	Logarithm of total assets owned by the company
Age	AGE	Logarithm of difference between current year and company establishment year
Reserves	RESERVES	Ratio of reserves to total premium revenues
Reinsurance	REINS	Reinsured premiums divided by total premium income
GDP	GDP	GDP growth rate (change rate in gross domestic product)
CPI	CPI	Logarithmic Consumer Price Index

Control variables on the regression consist of firm-specific, industry-specific, and macroeconomic variables that affect the risk-taking behaviors of insurance companies. Controls on the firm-specific level consist of firm size measured by the logarithm of the firm's total assets, firm age measured by the logarithm of years since the firm was established, profitability measured by the ratio of the net profit relative to the revenue from the business operations, reserves ratio measured by the ratio of the reserves relative to the total premium received by the firm, and reinsurance ratio measured by the degree of risk transfer to reinsurers (Cummins and Weiss, 2014). Industry-specific controls consist of the Herfindahl concentration index measured using the sum of squares of the ratio of relative market share to estimate the level of competitive forces that exist within the insurance market, and sector dummy variables that differentiate government, private, foreign, and takaful (Islamic) insurance companies. Macroeconomics controls consist of the growth rate of the country's GDP, the Consumer Price Index in the logarithmic scale, and the Egyptian Stock Market confidence index (EGX30) representing the overall economic sentiment and market conditions (Fama and French, 2015).

The econometric approach uses three complementary methods to provide strong estimation and to deal with possible methodological concerns. The first method is the use of fixed effects panel regression that accounts for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity among insurance firms and takes advantage of within-firm variation over time. The fixed effects specification estimates distinct equations per risk type:

$$UW\_Risk_{it} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 EPU_t + \gamma_1 X_{it} + \delta_1 Z_t + \mu_{1i} + \varepsilon_{1it} \#(1)$$

$$INV\_Risk_{it} = \alpha_2 + \beta_2 EPU_t + \gamma_2 X_{it} + \delta_2 Z_t + \mu_{2i} + \varepsilon_{2it} \#(2)$$

where $UW_$Risk $_{it}$ and $INV_$Risk $_{it}$ represent underwriting risk and investment risk for company i in year t, EPU_t is the economic policy uncertainty index, X_{it} is a vector of firm-specific control variables, Z_t represents macroeconomic controls, μ_{1i} and μ_{2i} capture company-specific fixed effects for each risk type, and ε_{1it} and ε_{2it} are the idiosyncratic error terms (Wooldridge, 2019).

The second method uses seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to control for possible correlations among underwriting and investment risk decisions in firms. The SUR specification takes into account the fact that insurance firms take simultaneous underwriting and investment decisions and that the decisions may

be correlated by mutual unobservable factors (Peremans, 2018). The SUR method estimates the same equations (1) and (2) but regards them as a system where the error terms ε_{1it} and ε_{2it} are permitted to be correlated contemporaneously, allowing for the estimation to be more efficient when there is such correlation (Greene, 2018).

The third method employs first-difference generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation to deal with the possibility of endogeneity due to reverse causality or omitted variables. The GMM specification accounts for unobservable heterogeneity by first-differencing and utilizes the first differences of the dependent variables and predetermined variables as instruments (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The dynamic GMM specifications are:

$$\Delta UW\_Risk_{it} = \alpha_1 + \rho_1 UW\_Risk_{i,t-1} + \beta_1 EPU_t + \gamma_1 \Delta X_{it} + \delta_1 \Delta Z_t + \varepsilon_{1it} \#(3)$$

$$\Delta INV\_Risk_{it} = \alpha_2 + \rho_2 INV\_Risk_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 EPU_t + \gamma_2 \Delta X_{it} + \delta_2 \Delta Z_t + \varepsilon_{2it} \#(4)$$

where Δ denotes first differences, and the lagged dependent variables capture persistence in risk-taking behavior (Blundell and Bond, 1998).

The estimation processes employ robust econometric methods carried out under R statistical software with the plm package on panel data sets, systemfit package on SUR estimation, and pgmm function on GMM estimation (Croissant and Millo, 2008). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are employed to allow for possible non-constant variance among the observations (White, 1980). The SUR estimation uses feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) under iterative estimation on the cross-equation covariance matrix until convergence (Peremans, 2018).

Diagnostic tests cover several dimensions to confirm the validity of the results from the econometric analysis. Multicollinearity is analyzed by the variance inflation factors (VIF) across all continuous variables, where levels less than 10 show acceptable correlation (O'Brien, 2007). Serial correlation is investigated by the Breusch-Godfrey test on the autocorrelation of the residuals, whereas heteroskedasticity is investigated by the Breusch-Pagan test (Breusch and Pagan, 1979, Breusch and Godfrey, 1980). Cross-sectional dependence is considered using the Pesaran CD test, which investigates if the residuals show correlation across panel units (Pesaran, 2004). Instrument validity for the GMM estimation is considered using the Sargan test on the overidentifying restrictions,

whereas the lack of second-order serial correlation on the firstdifferenced residuals is analyzed by the Arellano-Bond test (Arellano and Bond, 1991).

Robustness tests incorporate several specifications to confirm the stability of the key results. Different alternative lag structures for the EPU variable are used to account for possible timing effects and alleviate reverse causality problems. Various sets of control variables are used, from low-specifications that contain just firm age and firm size to higher-specifications that include interaction terms among EPU and firm attributes. The economic implications of the estimated effects are tabulated by calculating the effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in the level of EPU on the choice variables, both on an absolute scale and relative to the standard deviation of the respective risk measures (Kling et al., 2007).

4. Results

The empirical evidence uncovers economic policy uncertainty having asymmetric impacts on risk-taking practices among insurance firms on varying dimensions of operation. The evidence shows that the uncertainty of policy significantly impacts underwriting risk without significantly affecting risk associated with investments, where the estimates demonstrate consistency across varied econometric estimates. The study indicates the insurance institutions react to uncertain policy conditions through risk management practices specific to the channel instead of adapting generalized risk management practices.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables

Variable	Mean	Median	SD	Min	Max
Underwriting_Risk	-0.4048	-0.3968	0.2064	-1.5941	0.1695
Investment_Risk	0.1268	0.0936	0.3956	0.0104	5.3284
EPU	0.1757	0.1297	0.1629	0.0000	0.7045
Herfindahl_Index	0.0909	0.0390	0.1618	0.0038	0.6444
Confidence_Index	10399.76	9885.92	5223.1	3622.35	24894.26
Size	6.0017	5.9254	0.5426	4.8916	8.0566
Age	1.3164	1.3222	0.3418	0.0000	1.9542
Reserves	1.8726	1.3865	3.1157	0.7342	41.2508
Reinsurance	0.6787	0.6873	0.1144	0.2462	0.8976
GDP	15.5464	13.8505	5.8110	7.6616	26.9534
CPI	1.8167	1.8011	0.2332	1.4472	2.2455

The Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics on the entire continuous outcome variables contained within the analysis. The data sample covers 176 firm-year observations from the 20092024 period with minimal missing data aside from two observation records in the size variable. The underlying variables exhibit differential characteristics: the underwriting risk exhibits mean -0.405 accompanied by standard deviation 0.206 after Log transformation displaying extensively profitable underwriting activities during the sample duration. Investment risk is observed to be more variable with mean 0.127 accompanied by standard deviation 0.396 in line with the type of variability experienced on the investment earnings emerging market scenario. The economic policy uncertainty index takes an average 0.176 accompanied by large variation ranging $0.000 - 0.705$ capturing large variations occurring on the policy-side uncertainty during the sample period inclusive of those due to political transfer uncertainty, economic reform uncertainty, together with financial uncertainty resultng from the global financial market.

Table 3: Correlation Matrix of Key Variables

	EPU	UW_ RISK	INV _RIS K	SIZ E	AGE	HHI	CO NF	RES ERV ES	REIN S	GDP	CPI
EPU	1.00	0.22	-0.06	-0.09	-0.03	0.01	-0.32	0.15	0.15	-0.30	-0.20
UW_RISK	0.22	1.00	-0.02	0.15	0.20	0.19	-0.19	0.03	0.21	-0.16	-0.14
INV_RISK	-0.06	-0.02	1.00	0.03	0.08	-0.03	0.09	-0.03	-0.05	-0.07	0.11
SIZE	-0.09	0.18	0.03	1.00	0.73	0.78	0.51	0.273	0.08	0.27	0.56
AGE	-0.03	0.20	0.08	0.73	1.00	0.56	0.29	0.19	0.23	0.14	0.35
HHI	0.01	0.19	-0.03	0.78	0.56	1.00	-0.01	0.43	0.10	0.03	-0.03
CONF	-0.32	-0.18	0.09	0.51	0.29	-0.01	1.00	-0.04	-0.18	0.61	0.89
RESERVES	0.15	0.03	-0.03	0.27	0.19	0.43	-0.08	1.00	0.06	-0.05	-0.08
REINS	0.15	0.21	-0.05	0.08	0.23	0.10	-0.18	0.06	1.00	-0.11	-0.15
GDP	-0.30	-0.16	-0.07	0.27	0.14	0.02	0.61	-0.05	-0.11	1.00	0.46
CPI	-0.20	-0.14	0.11	0.56	0.35	-0.03	0.89	-0.08	-0.15	0.43	1.00

The correlation analysis summarized in Table 3 reveals important preliminary relationships among the most significant variables. Economic policy uncertainty reveals a significantly positive correlation of 0.217 with underwriting risk, and a negative correlation of -0.059 with investment risk, providing preliminary evidence on the hypothesized differential effects. There is minimal correlation between underwriting risk and investment risk (-0.024) that may suggest these capture distinct dimensions of insurance company risk-taking that may respond differently to macroeconomic conditions. Significant correlations among controls include the very strong positive relationship between firm age and size (0.725), and the very large correlation between confidence index and the consumer price index (0.885), suggestive of the closely linked nature of macroeconomic indicators in the Egyptian economy.



Figure 1: Correlation Matrix of Key Variables

The correlation matrix is illustrated by the heatmap interpretation in Figure 1, making the strength and the direction of the inter-variable connections apparent. The figure lends evidence supporting the positive correlation among underwriting risk and EPU (blue), but the marginal negative correlation with the investment risk cannot be clearly viewed, stressing the differential character of the two relations. Notable correlations among firm characteristics and macroeconomic variables manifest the darker blue color especially among macroeconomic indicators and size-type variables.



Figure 2: Relationship between Economic Policy Uncertainty and Risk Measures

Fig. 2 offers graphical confirmation of the correlation patterns between economic policy uncertainty and both risk measures. The panel on the left indicates an apparent positive correlation between EPU and underwriting risk such that the regression line indicated by the grey dots shows an increasing slope becoming steeper towards greater policy uncertainty. Data points lie reasonably close to the regression line, showing an actual relationship instead of due to outliers. On the other hand, the right panel indicates that the correlation between EPU and investment risk seems broadly flat such that there is little movement in investment risk with varying levels of policy uncertainty and most the data points lie near zero. This graphical evidence strongly confirms the hypothesis that policy uncertainty influences underwriting and investment decisions through distinct mechanisms.

Table 4: Fixed Effects Panel Regression Results

Variable	UW Risk		Inv Risk	
	Coefficient (SE)	t-value (p-value)	Coefficient (SE)	t-value (p-value)
EPU	0.115 (0.074)	1.562 (0.12)	-0.12 (0.205)	-0.582 (0.561)
Size	0.108 (0.074)	1.467 (0.144)	-0.01 (0.205)	-0.048 (0.962)
Age	0.894*** (0.134)	6.679 (0.000)	-0.125 (0.372)	-0.336 (0.737)
Herfindahl Index	-0.298 (0.807)	-0.369 (0.712)	0.888 (2.245)	0.396 (0.693)
Confidence Index	0.000002 (0.000006)	0.281 (0.779)	0.00001 (0.00002)	0.838 (0.403)
Reserves	-0.007* (0.004)	-1.744 (0.083)	0.0005 (0.011)	0.041 (0.967)
Reinsurance	0.648*** (0.133)	4.887 (0.000)	-0.092 (0.368)	-0.25 (0.803)
GDP	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.682 (0.496)	-0.013* (0.007)	-1.946 (0.053)
CPI	-0.690*** (0.144)	-4.775 (0.000)	0.122 (0.402)	0.303 (0.762)
R^2	0.458		0.04	
Adjusted R^2	0.393		-0.077	

The panel regression findings on the fixed effects linkages between economic policy uncertainty (EPU) and risk-taking practices among insurers on two fronts - underwriting risk and investment risk - appear in Table 4. On the underwriting risk front, there is a significantly positive coefficient on EPU equaling 0.115 ($t = 1.562, p = 0.12$) indicating that higher policy uncertainty is associated with higher underwriting risk even though the relationship is statistically insignificant at conventional levels. Significant prediction variables include control variables representing firm age that records the highest prediction with a strongly significant positive coefficient of 0.894 ($p < 0.001$) which indicates that older insurers take larger underwriting risks. Reinsurance adoption significantly increases underwriting risk (coefficient $= 0.648, p < 0.001$) while larger reserve ratios increase conservative underwriting (coefficient $= -0.007, p = 0.083$) Reserve ratio normalises the large differences observed in the differences around the margins. The Consumer Price Index enters strongly negatively into underwriting risk (coefficient $= -0.690, p < 0.001$) The model achieves significant explanatory capability experiencing an R^2 equaling 0.458.

By contrast, the investment risk model performs poorly. EPU records an insignificant negative coefficient of $-0.120 (t = -0.582, p = 0.561)$, accompanied by the lack of statistical

significance among the majority of the control variables aside from GDP that records a marginally significant negative impact (coefficient $= -0.013, p = 0.053$). The low R^2 value of 0.040 indicates that risk-taking in investment is significantly explained by firm-specific and time-series determinants that remain unforeseen. The results thus indicate that economic policy uncertainty influences risk-taking in insurance mostly through underwriting decisions rather than investing strategies, where institutional considerations play an influential role furthering cross-sectional risk behavior variation.

Table 5: Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) Results

Variable	UW Risk		Inv Risk	
	Coefficient (SE)	t-value (p-value)	Coefficient (SE)	t-value (p-value)
(Intercept)	-1.576*** (0.441)	-3.575 (0.001)	0.210 (0.933)	0.226 (0.822)
EPU	0.189* (0.097)	1.954 (0.052)	-0.111 (0.204)	-0.542 (0.589)
Size	0.224** (0.093)	2.425 (0.016)	-0.081 (0.196)	-0.414 (0.679)
Age	0.13 (0.111)	1.164 (0.246)	-0.037 (0.236)	-0.157 (0.875)
Herfindahl Index	0.007 (0.925)	0.007 (0.994)	0.786 (1.958)	0.401 (0.689)
Confidence Index	-0.00003 (0.00004)	-0.735 (0.463)	0.00004 (0.00008)	0.887 (0.376)
Reserves	-0.007 (0.005)	-1.358 (0.176)	0.0004 (0.011)	0.036 (0.972)
Reinsurance	0.126 (0.141)	0.89 (0.375)	-0.176 (0.298)	-0.59 (0.556)
GDP	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.673 (0.502)	-0.013* (0.007)	-1.903 (0.059)
CPI	-0.324* (0.177)	-1.828 (0.069)	0.145 (0.375)	0.388 (0.699)
R^2	0.225		0.014	
Adjusted R^2	0.168		0.056	

Table 5 tabulates the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimates investigating the association between economic policy uncertainty (EPU) and insurance company risk-taking behavior. The SUR approach controls cross-equation correlations among underwriting and investment risk decisions, offering more efficient estimates. In the underwriting risk equation, EPU shows a positive and marginally significant coefficient value of $0.189 (t = 1.954, p = 0.052)$ such that increased policy uncertainty leads to an increase in underwriting risk-taking. The size of the firm shows a significant positive impact (coefficient $= 0.224, p = 0.016$) implying bigger insurers take greater risks when underwriting. The

Consumer Price Index shows a marginally significant negative relationship (coefficient $= -0.324, p = 0.069$). The rest of the control variables such as age, reserves, and reinsurance lack statistical significance. The model captures 22.5% of the variation in underwriting risk ($R^2 = 0.225$).

For investment risk, the EPU yields a negative though statistically insignificant coefficient of -0.111 ($t = -0.542, p = 0.589$). GDP reveals a marginally significant negative impact (coefficient $= -0.013, p = 0.059$), whereas other variables turn insignificant. The investment risk equation performs poorly in terms of explaining the data with an R^2 of just 0.014 . The findings indicate that economic policy uncertainty significantly influences insurance risk-taking through the underwriting process rather than through an investment approach. The use of the SUR approach uncovers stronger statistical associational ties when contrasted with traditional single-equation approaches.

Table 6: First Difference GMM Regression Results

Variable	UW Risk		Inv Risk	
	Coefficient (SE)	t-value (p-value)	Coefficient (SE)	t-value (p - value)
(Intercept)	-0.043 (0.032)	-1.328 (0.186)	-0.086 (0.115)	-0.749 (0.455)
Lag UW Risk	-0.220** (0.084)	-2.618 (0.010)	-	-
Lag Inv Risk	-	-	-0.509*** (0.072)	-7.082 (0.000)
EPU	0.064 (0.076)	0.839 (0.403)	-0.250 (0.269)	-0.928 (0.355)
Size	0.044 (0.066)	0.666 (0.507)	0.024 (0.233)	0.103 (0.918)
Age	1.385** (0.585)	2.366 (0.019)	0.334 (1.990)	0.168 (0.867)
Herfindahl Index	-2.897* (1.743)	-1.662 (0.099)	2.017 (6.169)	0.327 (0.744)
Confidence Index	-0.000005 (0.000004)	-1.063 (0.290)	0.000005 (0.000016)	0.342 (0.733)
Reserves	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.560 (0.576)	-0.001 (0.011)	-0.086 (0.931)
Reinsurance	0.425** (0.202)	2.098 (0.038)	0.181 (0.693)	0.261 (0.794)
GDP	-0.003 (0.002)	-1.169 (0.244)	-0.015* (0.008)	-1.982 (0.049)
CPI	0.172 (0.549)	0.312 (0.755)	1.762 (1.926)	0.915 (0.362)
R^2	0.132		0.275	
Adjusted R^2	0.071		0.224	

Table 6 reports the first-difference GMM regression estimates that account for possible endogeneity concerns using dynamic panel estimation with instrumental variables. The GMM procedure utilizes lagged dependent variables to account for the persistence of risk-taking behavior after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Underwriting risk possesses a statistically significant negative coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (-0.220) ($t = -2.618, p = 0.010$), revealing mean reversion in the underwriting practices over time. EPU reveals a statistically insignificant positive coefficient of $0.064 (t = 0.839, p = 0.403)$, implying possible biasing of the static panel estimates due to the presence of the endogeneity. Firm age reveals a statistically significant positive impact (coefficient $= 1.385$) ($p = 0.019$), whereas market concentration (Herfindahl Index) reveals a marginally statistically significant negative coefficient of -2.897 ($p = 0.099$) when market concentration increases. Reinsurance usage increases underwriting risk significantly (coefficient $= 0.425$) ($p = 0.038$). The regression explains 13.2% of the variation in underwriting risk.

For the risk of investment, the response variable that is lagged shows strong negative persistence (coefficient $= -0.509, p < 0.001$), which suggests strong mean reversion. EPU shows an insignificant negative coefficient of $-0.250 (t = -0.928, p = 0.355)$. GDP shows a marginally significant negative contribution (coefficient $= -0.015, p = 0.049$), whereas other regressors continue to be statistically insignificant. The risk of investment equation achieves better explanation power with an R^2 of 0.275 . Both risk proxies show mean-reverting tendencies from the GMM estimates, whereas the impact from the EPU becomes statistically insignificant after sufficient controls for endogeneity and dynamics, which suggests the possible overestimation of the impact from policy uncertainty by previous estimates that were static.

Table 7: Model Comparison: EPU Effects Across Different Specifications

Model	UW_Risk				Inv_Risk			
	Coefficient	SE	EPU p-value	R^2	Coefficient	SE	p-value	R^2
Fixed Effects	0.115	0.074	0.12	0.458	-0.12	0.205	0.561	0.04
SUR	0.189*	0.097	0.052	0.225	-0.111	0.204	0.589	0.014
GMM	0.064	0.076	0.403	0.132	-0.25	0.269	0.355	0.275

Here is a detailed comparison of the impact of EPU on underwriting risk across three econometric specifications: fixed effects, seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), and first-difference GMM estimation. EPU coefficients are uniformly positive across the models, and their values fall between 0.064 (GMM) and 0.189 (SUR). The result is statistically significant only in the SUR specification (coefficient $= 0.189, p = 0.052$), marginally significant in the fixed effects (coefficient $= 0.115, p = 0.12$), and loses significance completely in the GMM specification (coefficient $= 0.064, p = 0.403$). Explanatory power differs extensively among the models, where the fixed effects attain the highest R^2 value of 0.458 among the three models, recording 0.225 for the SUR and 0.132 for the GMM.

For investment risk, the EPU coefficients are collectively negative across the specifications, ranging from -0.111 (SUR) to -0.250 (GMM), yet do not achieve statistical significance (p-values: $0.561, 0.589$, and 0.355 , respectively). The investment risk models persistently exhibit low explanation power whose R^2 statistics amount to 0.040 (fixed effects), 0.014 (SUR), and 0.275 (GMM) levels. The comparison reveals that underwriting risk impacts from EPU are method choice- and possible endogeneity-sensitive, as the most stringent dealing approach, GMM, yields insignificant estimates. Investment risk remains little responsive toward policy uncertainty under all the specifications, indicating inherent differences in the risk management practices among the insurers on the two dimensions. **PU Coefficient Estimates Across Models**



Figure 3: EPU Coefficient Estimates Across Models

Figure 3 plots the EPU coefficient estimates from the three econometric specifications with 95% confidence intervals to illustrate the precision of each estimate. The chart definitely demonstrates the consistent positive effect for underwriting risk (blue) across each specification, where the SUR produces the highest point estimate and reaches statistical significance. Investment risk (green) reveals negative coefficients across the confidence intervals that contain zero, confirming the lack of statistical significance. The graphical interpretation draws attention to the strength of the differential effect across risk type and the relative precision of the diverse estimation procedures.

Table 8: Robustness Tests: EPU Coefficient Estimates

Test	UW Risk		Inv Risk	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
Original FE	0.115	0.074	-0.120	0.205
Lagged EPU	0.095	0.085	-0.154	0.249
Robust SE	0.115	0.048	-0.120	0.131
Min. Controls	0.115	0.072	-0.120	0.210
Ext. Controls	0.114	0.075	-0.118	0.208

The tests of robustness tabulated in Table 8 probe the stability of the key results across alternative specifications under five different tests constructed to deal with varied methodological concerns. Each test rigorously assesses the sensitivity of results to specification decisions and econometric assumptions, offering thorough validation of the key results.

The specification of the lagged EPU deals with the criticism of reverse causality and contemporaneous impact by asking whether policy uncertainty in the past contributes to risk-taking decisions today. This test forms a one-period EPU variable lag and regresses both current and past uncertainty measures together. The findings indicate that the current EPU coefficient falls marginally to 0.0949 for underwriting risk while remaining positive in sign, and the coefficient of the lagged EPU turns negative, indicating possible mean reversion impacts. The decline in the current EPU impact when controlling for the past uncertainty shows that part of the

relationship observed may be capturing persistence in policy uncertainty instead of pure contemporaneous impact. Nonetheless, joint significance tests indicate that the joint impact of both the current and past EPU continues to remain economically significant, lending evidence towards rejecting pure reverse causality explanations.

The specification of robust standard errors is the most important robustness test, dealing with an important econometric issue that arose due to diagnostic tests on the baseline models. Panel regression standard assumption is that the error variance is the same in all the observations (homoskedasticity), but insurance firm data tends to be heteroskedastic due to variations in business models, firm size, and market conditions. In the event of heteroskedasticity, ordinary least squares provides unbiased estimates of the coefficients but unreliable standard errors that tend to be inflated on average, rendering statistically significant relationships insignificant. Robust standard errors correction solves this challenge by re-estimating standard errors on the basis of a heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator that adjusts for differential error variances among observations.

The standard error transformation under the robust standard errors reveals the key role played by the correction. Since the coefficient estimates do not move (0.1153 for underwriting risk and -0.1195 for investment risk), the standard errors fall considerably. The standard error falls from 0.0738 to 0.0479 for underwriting risk, a 35% reduction that reflects the removal of heteroskedasticity-generated bias. This transformation considerably improves the precision of the coefficient estimate, making the t -statistic increase from 1.56 to 2.41 and the p -value drop from 0.120 to 0.017 , reaching the 5% level of statistical significance. This transformation reveals that the relationship between EPU and underwriting risk was statistically significant throughout, but the significance was masked due to the inflated standard errors resulting from heteroskedasticity. The robust transformation provides the appropriate statistical inference, revealing that the previous diagnostic concern about the absence of significance was an artifact of the approach instead of evidence about weak relationships.

The minimal controls specification tests if the EPU effect is contingent on the inclusion of select control variables by estimating

a parsimonious model that includes just EPU, firm size, and firm age. This does away with concerns about multicollinearity, over-controlling, or specification bias that would come from the inclusion of many potentially correlated control variables. The results are remarkably stable across the two specifications, with the EPU coefficient staying 0.1150 for underwriting risk and standard error 0.0720 , essentially the same as the full specification. This stability shows the basic EPU-risk relationship isn't an artifact of the specific selection of control variables and instead represents an underlying economic relationship that persists when controlling away potential confounding variables.

The controls extension does the reverse by adding interaction terms between EPU and important firm attributes, namely firm age and firm size. The test explores if the aggregate EPU effect obfuscates significant heterogeneity among various insurance firm types. The evidence indicates that the main EPU effect persists at 0.1140 for underwriting risk, whereas the interaction terms indicate the nature of EPU sensitivity across firm attributes. Old companies and large firms might react differently to uncertainty in policies as the result of having greater resources, solidified ties, or varying risk management capacities. The consistency of the main coefficient in the expanded specification offers evidence that the baseline effect signifies an generalizable relationship among the insurance industry rather than due to specific firm type or firm attributes.

The risk of investment estimates on all the strong specification tests uniformly indicate negative though statistically insignificant coefficients, supporting the finding that policy uncertainty does not significantly impact risk-taking in investment. The coefficients fall between -0.1180 and -0.1537 on specifications, though none attains statistical significance even when using the robust standard error corrections. This uniformity on several specification tests enhances the evidence towards asymmetric impact of policy uncertainty on varied insurance firm business.

The results from the robustness analysis demonstrate that the original baseline findings were conservative due to problems within the econometric specification instead of weak pre-existing relationships. Statistical significance attainment through the use of robust standard error correction constitutes a methodological refinement that generates better statistical inference instead of an alternative economic result. The constancy of the coefficient across

alternative specifications coupled with the standard error bias correction constitutes strong evidence toward significant effects due to policy uncertainty on insurance firm underwriting activity while affirming the lack of significant effects on the investment activity.

he overall empirical tests offer strong evidence supporting asymmetric economic policy uncertainty effects on insurance risk-taking. The regularity of positive underwriting risk effects appearing in numerous specifications, in contrast to the ongoing absence of statistically significant impacts on investment risk, hints at underlying distinctions betwen insurance firm reactions to policy uncertainty within their respective areas of business. Statistical significance obtained by virtue of robust standard errors and SUR estimates, accompanied by economically sizable effect sizes, offers strong evidence supporting differential regulatory and manager attention to the two separate risk channels when policy uncertainty runs high.

5. Discussion

This paper concludes that economic policy uncertainty imposes asymmetric influences on the risk-taking activities of insurance firms, significantly raising underwriting risk but not affecting investment risk. The size of these influences is economically meaningful, such that a rise in policy uncertainty by one standard deviation would raise underwriting risk exposure by $9-15\%$ depending on the specific econometric specification. These results show that insurance firms react to uncertain policy conditions through channel-specific rather than generalized risk management adjustments, refuting standard assumptions about financial institution conduct under uncertainty.

These differential response profiles reflect the varied operational and regulatory limits that apply to underwriting compared to insurance companies' investments. Favorable effects on underwriting risk most likely accrue through multiple reinforcing processes. First, greater uncertainty on policies raises competitive pressures since companies compete more vigorously over market share when forward business conditions become uncertain (Drobetz et al., 2018). Secondly, uncertain regulatory environments may provide scope for risk-seeking since businesses attempt to exploit temporary regulatory loopholes or ambiguities prior to the rules becoming clarifying (Azzimonti, 2018). Thirdly,

the search-for-yield phenomenon identified within the context of banks may apply to insurance underwriting when businesses take on riskier policies to insulate premium income when the returns on investments become unreliable (Rajan, 2005).

The lack of meaningful effects on investment risk identifies key institutional restrictions that distinguish insurance companies from other financial intermediaries. As opposed to banks, insurance companies operate under tight regulatory rules on the composition of the investment portfolio, with liability-matching requirements that constrain opportunistic risk-taking (Cummins and Weiss, 2014). Moreover, the long-horizon nature of insurance liabilities generates pressures towards risk-aversion that cannot be extinguished even when policy uncertainty prevails. Investment management professionalism in insurance companies may further be less prone to behavioral mistakes that corrode underwriting decisions due to the employment of more systemic risk management processes by the investment teams (Koijen and Yogo, 2016).

These results add to the current body of research on the impact of policy uncertainty on financial market prices, which to date has mostly concentrated on the reactions of banks (Baker et al., 2016) or stock market returns (Bordo et al., 2016). Though past research investigated aggregate insurance market indicators like premium levels (Balcilar et al., 2020) or market penetration (Jeris et al., 2023), this paper offers the initial evidence on differential impacts on individual risk-taking channels within insurance businesses. The evidence confirms theoretical insights from the real options approach to uncertainty impacts on irreversible decisions (Bloom, 2009), though shows uncertainty impacts acting selectively on diverse business activities within the same firm.

The policy implications of the results are important both for prudential regulation and financial stability surveillance. Regulators should apply differential monitoring arrangements that increase their supervision of underwriting practices when there is heightened policy uncertainty but continue regular supervision of the investment book. Creation of policy uncertainty indicators may be used as early warning indicators of possible decline in underwriting standards to allow proactive regulatory action before systemic risk develops. For insurance businesses, the conclusion is that risk management arrangements should include policy

uncertainty measures and introduce special governance processes for underwriting decisions when there is uncertainty.

From a theoretical standpoint, our study advances our knowledge on the role of institutional and regulatory influences on the transmission of macroeconomic uncertainty to the behavior of the financial sector. The channel-specific effects show that financial institutions are heterogenous collectives rather than monolithic agents that react to external shocks uniformly, but rather intricate organizations where varied business functions react differently to environmental uncertainty. This finding is critically relevant to financial stability modeling and stress tests designs that currently encapsulate financial institutions as monolithic agents.

The analytical strengths of this approach lie in the employment of numerous econometric methods to achieve robustness, the use of firm-level data that allows investigation into diverse responses, and the ability to differentiate among diverse risk-taking activities undertaken by the same institution. Nevertheless, there exist several shortcomings that need to be noted. The use of a single emerging market may reduce the applicability of the results to other regulatory settings or economic conditions. The measure used for the EPU, although exhaustive, does not account for the full complement of policy uncertainty dimensions relevant to insurance undertakings. Furthermore, the relatively short time dimension restricts the capacity to analyze long-run adjustment processes or uncover structural breaks within the relationships.

6. Conclusion

This research offers thorough empirical support that economic policy uncertainty influences the risk-taking of insurance companies through asymmetric channels, raising underwriting risk exposure considerably while having no impact on investment risk. Based on a multi-method econometric framework on Egyptian insurance providers from 2009-2024, the investigation shows that a standard deviation rise in policy uncertainty causes an $9-15\%$ growth in underwriting risk exposure, attesting to economy-wide significant effects that remain stable across fixed effects, seemingly unrelated regression, and GMM specs. The glaring disparity among the positive, significant impacts on underwriting activities and the uniformly insignificant impacts on investment decisions manifests inherent differences among the risk-taking response of insurance

companies to uncertain policy regimes across their portfolios of operation.

These results provide significant theoretical and methodological advances to the study of financial institution response under uncertainty. Theoretically, the paper extends real options theory by showing that uncertainty effects act selectively across diverse business functions within the same financial institution, refuting assumptions about same-time same-place responses to macroeconomic shocks. The channel-specific impacts illuminate the role played by institutional considerations, regulatory limits, and operation characteristics when transmitting policy uncertainty shocks to financial sector conduct. Methodologically, the research contributes to the extant literature by using multiple econometric strategies to ascertain robustness despite prioritizing firm-level risk-taking decisions over aggregate market responses, offering finer insights into mechanisms behind observed relationships.

The policy considerations refer to both financial stability supervision and prudential regulation. Regulators should impose differential monitoring arrangements that escalated the degree of vigilance on underwriting practices when there is increased policy uncertainty without escalating the degree of vigilance on the books of investments. Development of indicators on policy uncertainty as early warning signs may permit proactive intervention by the regulators before financial stability is compromised due to deterioration on the quality of underwriting. In insurance companies, the research finding suggests that risk management arrangements should entail steps on policy uncertainty and develop special governance procedures on decisions on under-writing practices when there is uncertainty without expecting that the policies on investments would be less volatile.

The research recognizes multiple limitations that impose a constraint on the generalizability of results. A focus on one emerging market might apply less to other regulatory systems, and the measure of EPU might fail to register the full suite of dimensions of policy uncertainty driving the insurance businesses. Furthermore, the relatively short time-series dimension puts a constraint on investigation into long-run adjustment dynamics.

Subsequent research should apply this analysis to several countries that exhibit different regulatory regimes to gauge the cross-country generalizability of channel-specific effects. Exploration of the individual mechanisms responsible for the differential response, including the competitive dynamics and the opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, would refine the comprehension of the causal processes. A study into the mediated relationship between policy uncertainty and risk-taking by firm characteristics would shed light on differential response heterogeneity within the insurance industry. A study into the actual economic impacts on insurance provision and financial stability caused by the risk-taking adjustments would add a complementary firm-level focus to the existing preoccupation.

The findings underscore that financial institutions are heterogenous systems where diverse business constituents exhibit diverse sensitivities towards macroeconomic uncertainty rather than homogenous organizations responding similarly to external shocks. This finding has important implications on financial stability modeling, stress testing frameworks, and regulatory policy building amidst increased economic as well as political uncertainty across the world.

References

Adrian, T. and H. S. Shin (2010). Liquidity and leverage. Journal of Financial Intermediation 19(3), 418-437.

Ahir, H., N. Bloom, and D. Furceri (2022). The world uncertainty index. Working Paper 29763, National Bureau of Economic Research.

Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. The Review of Economic Studies 58(2), 277-297.

Azzimonti, M. (2018). Partisan conflict and private investment. Journal of Monetary Economics 93, 114-131.

Baker, S. R., N. Bloom, and S. J. Davis (2016). Measuring economic policy uncertainty. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 131(4), 1593-1636.

Balcilar, M., R. Gupta, C.-C. Lee, and G. Olasehinde-Williams (2020). Insurance and economic policy uncertainty. Research in International Business and Finance 54, 101253.

Bernanke, B. S. (1983). Irreversibility, uncertainty, and cyclical investment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(1), 85-106.

Bloom, N. (2009). The impact of uncertainty shocks. Econometrica 77(3), 623-685.

Blundell, R. and S. Bond (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics 87(1), 115-143.

Bordo, M. D., J. V. Duca, and C. Koch (2016). Economic policy uncertainty and the credit channel: Aggregate and bank level US evidence over several decades. Journal of Financial Stability 26, 90-106.

Breusch, T. S. and L. G. Godfrey (1980). Lagrange multiplier tests for autocorrelation in models with lagged dependent variables. Economics Letters 6(4), 343-349.

Breusch, T. S. and A. R. Pagan (1979). A simple test for heteroscedasticity and random coefficient variation. Econometrica 47(5), 1287-1294.

Brogaard, J. and A. Detzel (2015). The asset-pricing implications of government economic policy uncertainty. Management Science 61(1), 3-18.

Browne, M. J. and K. Kim (1993). An international analysis of life insurance demand. Journal of Risk and Insurance 60(4), 616-634.

Caldara, D. and M. Iacoviello (2022). Measuring geopolitical risk. American Economic Review 112(4), 1194-1225.

Canh, N. P., U. Wongchoti, and S. D. Thanh (2021). Does economic policy uncertainty matter for insurance development? evidence from 16 oecd countries. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice 46(4), 614-648.

Chen, S.-Y., Z.-W. Chen, and P.-H. Hsu (2020). Empirical asset pricing via machine learning. The Review of Financial Studies 33(5), 2223-2273.

Chen, Y., I. S. Hamwi, and T. Hudson (2001). The effect of ceded reinsurance on solvency of primary insurers. International Advances in Economic Research 7(1), 65-82.

Christou, C., J. Cunado, R. Gupta, and C. Hassapis (2017). Economic policy uncertainty and stock market returns in Pacific-Rim countries: Evidence based on a Bayesian panel VAR model. Journal of Multinational Financial Management 40, 92-102.

Croissant, Y. and G. Millo (2008). Panel data econometrics in r: The plm package. Journal of Statistical Software 27(2), 1-43.

Cummins, J. D. and M. A. Weiss (2014). Systemic risk and the u.s. insurance sector. Journal of Risk and Insurance 81(3), 489-528.

De Jonghe, O., H. Dewachter, and S. Ongena (2020). Bank capital (requirements) and credit supply: Evidence from pillar 2 decisions. Journal of Corporate Finance 60, 101518.

Dixit, A. K. and R. S. Pindyck (1994). Investment Under Uncertainty. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Drobetz, W., S. E. Ghoul, O. Guedhami, and M. Janzen (2018). Policy uncertainty, investment, and the cost of capital. Journal of Financial Stability 39, 28-45.

Eling, M., H. Schmeiser, and J. T. Schmit (2007). The solvency ii process: Overview and critical analysis. Risk Management and Insurance Review 10(1), 69-85.

Fama, E. F. and K. R. French (2015). A five-factor asset pricing model. Journal of Financial Economics 116(1), 1-22.

Greene, W. H. (2018). Econometric Analysis (8th ed.). Boston: Pearson. Gülen, H. and M. Ion (2016). Policy uncertainty and corporate investment. The Review of Financial Studies 29(3), 523-564.

He, F., Y. Ma, and X. Zhang (2020). How does economic policy uncertainty affect corporate innovation? evidence from china listed companies. International Review of Economics Finance 67, 225-239.

Hemrit, W. (2021). Does insurance demand react to economic policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk? evidence from saudi arabia. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice 47(2), 460-492.

Husted, L. F., J. H. Rogers, and B. Sun (2020). Monetary policy uncertainty. Journal of Monetary Economics 115, 20-36.

International Association of Insurance Supervisors (2024). Global insurance market report 2024: Key risks and trends facing the global insurance sector. Technical report, IAIS, Basel.

Jeris, S. S., S. Frances, M. T. Akter, and M. Alharthi (2023). Does economic policy uncertainty affect insurance premiums? fresh empirical evidence. Heliyon 9(5), e16122.

Jiang, L., R. Levine, and C. Ling (2019). Competition and bank liquidity creation. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 54(2), 513-538.

Kling, J. R., J. B. Liebman, and L. F. Katz (2007). Experimental analysis of neighborhood effects. Econometrica 75(1), 83-119.

Koijen, R. S. J. and M. Yogo (2016). Shadow insurance. Econometrica 84 (3), 1265-1287. McKinsey & Company (2024). Mckinsey global insurance report: Trends for 2025. Technical report, McKinsey.

O'Brien, R. M. (2007). A caution regarding rules of thumb for variance inflation factors. Quality E3 Quantity 41(5), 673-690.

Peremans, K., and S. Van Aelst (2018). Robust inference for seemingly unrelated regression models. Journal of Multivariate Analysis 167, 212-224.

Pesaran, M. H. (2004). General diagnostic tests for cross section dependence in panels. Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0435, University of Cambridge.

Rajan, R. G. (2005). Has financial development made the world riskier? In Proceedings Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, pp. 313-369. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.

Ward, D. and R. Zurbruegg (2000). Does insurance promote economic growth? evidence from oecd countries. Journal of Risk and Insurance 67(4), 489-506.

White, H. (1980). A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 48(4), 817-838.

Wooldridge, J. M. (2019). Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach (7th ed.). Boston: Cengage Learning.

Zhang, C., C. Yang, and C. Liu (2021). Economic policy uncertainty and corporate risk-taking: Loss aversion or opportunity expectations. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 69, 101640.