

القسم الجانبى

فكر الحدين الرازى، حياته وأعماله

ملاحظات حول المصادر

القسم الثانى

ملخص

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تحاول هذه الدراسة فى قسمها الثانى أن تواصل البحث فى المصادر التى عنيت بترجمة الرازى ، وذلك فى إطار الجدل الذى أثير حول قضية العلاقة بين العقل والنقل فى حوار الفلاسفة والكلاميين ، كما يشار إليها فى الدراسات الحديثة .

وتقدم مؤلفات الرازى أفكارا شتى فى هذا الموضوع ، ولكنها فى مجملها العام - كما يرى بعض المستشرقين - تعبر عن ضرب من السعى نحو خلق سبيل من التوازن العام بين الفلسفة وعلم الكلام ، مما يسمح بقدر أكبر من تلاقى الأفكار المختلفة على صعيد واحد ، فى عصر ضعفت فيه سيطرة السلطة المركزية فى بغداد على أطراف الدولة الإسلامية .

لقد كان هذا الضعف إرهاباً بتمزق إسلامى وشيك للوحدة السياسية للمسلمين ، وهو ما حدث فعلاً بسقوط بغداد ، بعد ذلك مباشرة ، فقد توفى الرازى سنة ٦٠٦هـ / ١٢١٠م ، وسقطت بعد ذلك الخلافة فى بغداد سنة ٦٥٦هـ / ١٢٥٨م ، حيث كانت مجرد شبح شكلى لسلطة ضائعة اغتصبها مرتزقة آسيويون جهلة ، وسياسيون فاسدون طامعون فى السلطة ومد النفوذ ، فازداد أصحاب المذاهب تفرقا ، وحاول الفكر الرازى أن يجمع بينها وأن يقدم مائدة موسعة من الأفكار المختلفة تسمح لكل مجتهد أن يجد له مكاناً فيها ، دون تطرف أو مغالاة ، أو محاولة لجمع الكلمة قهراً حول مقولات محددة .

وربما كان الرازى على هذا الأساس داعية وحدة سياسية ، خصوصاً فى عهد الخليفة الناصر الذى أبدى تعاطفاً خاصاً نحو بعض مذاهب الشيعة لتحقيق قدر من التماسك السياسى للأمة ، ولكن هذا يتم فى أعمال الرازى دون تصريح واضح .

لقد عبر الرازى عن ذلك بقبوله الفكرى لمبدأ التعدد الذى يطرح كل الآراء ، ويبسج القول بالرأى والرأى الآخر فى كثير من الأحيان دون حسم نهائى للخلاف .

وهذا المنهج في قبول المتعارضات ، والترحيب بالمتعدد في ذاته ، نجد من يلحظه من قدامى العلماء ، ويعيبه عليه ، وهو المنهج الذي جعل مواجهة الرازي للفلسفة مختلفة عن مواجهة الغزالي من قبل في كتابه : «تهافت الفلاسفة» ، وذلك على الرغم من وحدة المذهب الكلامي والفقهي الذي يجمع بين الرجلين ، ولذلك قال فيه بعضهم : «إنه يورد شبه المخالفين في المذهب والدين على غاية ما يكون من التحقيق ، ثم يورد مذهب أهل السنة والحق على غاية من الوهاء» .

هذا ما تقدمه بعض الأعمال الاستشراقية في تأويل شخصية فخر الدين الرازي ، ودوره في تاريخ الفكر الإسلامي ، إلى جانب ما قدمناه من آراء أخرى عن دوره الفكري في المصادر المختلفة التي عنيت بالترجمة له .



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Fakhr al-Din al-Rāzī

His life and works II. Dr. Effat al-Shaṣṣāwī, 3 - 11

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Fakhr Al Dīn Al Rāzī

His Life and Works

A Note on the Sources

Part II

Dr. Effat Al-Sharqāwī

As it was mentioned in the first part of this paper, the problem of the sources of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's life and works is approached in this study with the specific aim of determining his position between Ghazālī's theory in *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* and Ibn Sinā's metaphysics. Such an inquiry would have been best undertaken with special reference to his two books dealing particularly with the problem. In his *Tā'jīz al-Falāsifah* (*The Deficiency of the Philosophers*) and *Tahjīn Ta'jīz al-Falāsifah* (*Repudiation of the Deficiency of the Philosophers*), he is supposed to have explicitly shown his attitude towards the metaphysics of earlier philosophers. According to his biographers, these two books -- both of which are unavailable -- were written in Persian. The first is listed among his works by both Ibn Abī 'Uṣaybi'ah,¹ and al-Safadī,² and the second only by Ibn al-Qifti.³ It is in such books that one could expect a direct dialogue or confrontation between theologians and philosophers as envisaged by Rāzī.

It is not overly hazardous to assume that the titles of these two books indicate contradictory attitudes. In the first book, he apparently sided with the theologians and in the second, with the philosophers. This double standard, on the part of Rāzī sounds odd and requires explanation.

The question then is whether Rāzī drastically changed his views to the extent that he contradicted himself on one and the same issue. Did he simply divide the questions into different categories, in one of which he challenged the philosophers and in the other he supported them? Is it one and the same book, the title of which was misread either by Ibn Abī 'Uṣaybi'ah and al-Safadī or by Ibn al-Qifti? Could it be that the two books were in reality one book of such an ambiguous character as to allow one biographer, missing the real title, to take it as a challenge to philosophers and another as a defence of them?

Unfortunately none of these questions can be definitely answered, not only because the two books are lost but also because we cannot find a direct statement by the author in any available book that solves the problem. A thorough examination of the catalogues of world libraries has not yet helped to locate these books or even to assess the possibility of their existence, whether in published or manuscript form.

Until these books are found and examined the student of Rāzī's thought, primarily interested in his refutation of the philosophers as a theological exposition of the relation between religious tradition and philosophy in Islamic thought, is unfortunately obliged to content him/herself with Rāzī's extant works.

But what was the problem which might suggest such a contradictory attitudes towards philosophy, as indicated in the two titles.

In answer to this question, it is enough to consider the conflict between Religious tradition and Philosophy before Rāzī, insofar as the conception of existence is concerned.

On the one hand, Muslim philosophers, as expounders and interpreters of the Peripatetic and the Neo-Platonic philosophers had their own world view, conception of God, and the universe.

The classical conception in *Kalām* (Theology), on the other hand, was somewhat different. It was the product of a certain world view in which God was seen, before anything else, as the creating, Supreme, and Absolute will. In this system, the relation between God and the universe was conceived primarily as a relation between the Creator and the creature. The focal issue in the whole theological discussion, including the arguments for God's attributes and His relation to the universe was therefore the idea of creation.

In the philosophical system known to Muslim thinkers, the notion was quite different. The Avicennian School, for example, saw existence through the analysis of being. The ontological relation between God and the universe was therefore conceived essentially as a relation between two modes of being: the necessary (al-wājib) and the possible (al-mumkin). Between *Kalām* as a theistic philosophy of creation and *Falsafah* as an analytic philosophy of being lies the subtle difference between the two systems and, consequently, the difference between what one might call *a posteriori* and *a priori* arguments for existence.

Fahkr al-Dīn al-Rāzī – the Persian Ash'arī theologian of the twelfth century – was definitely influenced by the natural theology of Ibn Sīnā as well as the dogmatic theology of Ash'arī. In his theology, one can perceive a conscious effort to bridge the gap between the Ash'arī conception of an Eternal Creator (Al-Qadīm) and Ibn Sīnā's notion of a Necessarily Existent Being (Wājib al-wujūd). The two conceptions come closer to each other in his system than anywhere else

in Islamic thought. This attempt had its effect on the development of *Falsafah* as well as that of *Kalām*, as was noticed by Ibn Khaldūn.⁴

As Rāzī was an Ash^{ʿarī} theologian and the great successor of Ghazālī, there has been a tendency among some modern scholars to see in his work a continuation of the Ghazālīan refutation of the metaphysics of the philosophers. If this view could be established historically, it would throw more light on both Ghazālī's influence and the development of *Falsafah* after him. But curiously enough Rāzī, as one of the early readers and commentators of Ibn Sīnā's philosophy, is considered also by some other scholars as the continuator of the Avicennian system. These two contradictory opinions have been put forward by different scholars with no special investigation that could support one or the other.

The question of Rāzī's reaction to the metaphysics of Ibn Sīnā is very significant. It is not only because of its own theoretical value that we need to examine his attitude towards Ibn Sīnā's metaphysics, against which Ghazālī had already raised certain objections, but also because of its historical importance in indicating Ghazālī's influence on him as one of his great successors, and all of what this influence ultimately exercised in molding the development of philosophical thought in the world of Sunnī Islam.

The interesting question which the student of Rāzī's thought has to face before any other, then, is whether Rāzī pursued the same critical attitude towards Avicennian metaphysics, as Ghazālī had and if so, to what extent.

Western orientalist, who showed a special interest in Rāzī, have found in him a new Ash^{ʿarī} rationalist, deeply interested and influenced by Ibn Sīnā's metaphysics. For such scholars, Rāzī's thought represented a new rationalistic attempt on the part of the Ash^{ʿarīs} to reconcile the principles of philosophy with the religious tenets of Islam.⁵ Other students of Islamic thought, generally Muslim scholars, have seen in him a new Ghazālī who was dedicated to the destruction of the metaphysics of the philosophers and all that it represented.⁶

Modern research on the man has revealed him to be one of the most celebrated theologians and exegetes of Islam: a subtle dialectician and the possessor of vast philosophical and theological knowledge⁷ as well as intellectual courage.⁸ But more significant is the supposition which has been repeated, and partially documented, about his reconciliatory spirit. Horton, Kraus, Arnaldez and Kramers all have claimed with varying emphases and different interpretations, a compromising tendency on the part of Rāzī in his attempt to reconcile philosophy with religious tradition.⁹ Others have suggested a similar attitude towards Muslim sects. Goldziher suggested such an attitude

towards the Mu^ctazillīs¹⁰ (he called it 'influence'); Kholeif, towards the Māturīdīs (he described it as 'inclining at times to Māturīdīte doctrines');¹¹ Arnaldez, towards the Shī^cah¹² (this has certain political implications); Mustafā ^cAbd al-Rāziq and Nasr towards Sūfism (the first from an heresiographical point of view, the second on a personal level).¹³ As a matter of fact this view seems, to some extent, to be true insofar as his attitude towards the Muslim sects is concerned. But the claim that he tried to effect a reconciliation between philosophy and religious tradition is still merely hypothetical, liable either to refutation or confirmation.

Horten was the first scholar to initiate a special interest in Rāzī among both Western and Eastern scholars. He was also the one who cautiously and in a passing remark put forward this theory in 1910, but without making any detailed investigation. It was taken up after him by Kraus who in 1937 stressed it a little more, but again without special documentation. It was pushed further by Arnaldez and finally accepted by Kramers as an historical fact.

Horten was interested primarily in presenting two different points of view concerning speculative and positive theology as illustrated in Rāzī's *Muhassal* and Tūsī's commentary on it. Rāzī's theology appeared to him as more speculative and rationalistic than that of Ghazālī insofar as it was an attempt to reconcile the Qur'ānic world-view with the requirements of philosophical inquiry.¹⁴ Rāzī's attempt, therefore, represents a new system different from the various earlier liberal and orthodox ones. According to Horten, Ghazālī's struggle to destroy philosophy was by no means effective, as some scholars want us to believe. On the contrary, the mystical element which Ghazālī suggested as a solution of the problem was replaced by more rational factors in the writings of Rāzī.

In spite of the highly suggestive remark in his introduction, Horten never showed in a comprehensive investigation what kind of system Rāzī had developed as an attempt at a new reconciliation between philosophy and religious tradition and what his answers were to Ghazālī's concrete objections against the metaphysics of the philosophers. But, to be sure, the author never set out to undertake such a task. Instead, as he himself stated, and in spite of his revealing and informative introduction and notes, he simply intended to provide the German reader with an abridged translation of Rāzī's *Muhassal* and Tūsī's commentary on it, both of which reflected the condition of philosophy in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the value of this translation, according to Kraus, is rendered doubtful "because of the great number of errors in translation and arbitrary interpretation".¹⁶

Kraus was the second Western scholar to show special interest in Rāzī's thought. It was he who, impressed by the originality of Rāzī, drew more attention, on the part of modern students of Islamic thought, to the man.

In a penetrating essay on Rāzī's controversies in Transoxiana he was the first to establish an authentic, richly documented biography of Rāzī, throwing light on his personality and some aspects of his thought.¹⁷ But again as with Horten, the same suggestion is postulated, this time with more emphasis:

The doctrine of Fakhr al-Dīn represents a curious and original attempt to reconcile philosophy with religious tradition. Though an avowed Ash'arite, he was not afraid to contradict the essential points of the doctrine of the founder of this school. His rationalism, which led him to accept all the dictates of reason, gave him the courage to venture where none of his precursors had dared. In his "*Commentary of Ishārāt*" and in his "Oriental researches" (*al-Mabāhith al-Mashriqiyyah*) he appears not only as the criticiser, but moreover as the interpreter and continuator of Avicenna's work. The reconciliation of philosophy with theology established itself for Rāzī on a Platonic system, derived lastly from the interpretation of *Timaeus*.¹⁸

This assertion is offered without further documentation or investigation. but the inquiry was not the task which Kraus had intended to perform. His aim was simply to present "a document which is capable to throw some light on the personality of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī".¹⁹ Nevertheless, so inspiring was this presentation that the same text was the subject of a more detailed study by Kholeif who revealed its other dimensions.

The hypothesis of a reconciliatory attitude on the part of Rāzī toward philosophy was picked up again by Arnaldez in his "L'Oeuvre de Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī commentateur du Coran et philosophe". According to him:²⁰

Al-Rāzī est de la lignée des conciliateurs, comme al-Ash'arī, comme al-Ghazālī. Il n'aime pas les extrêmes ... al-Ghazālī, tout en critiquant la métaphysique des Falsafa, avait emprunté beaucoup à leur méthode rationnelle et à leurs concepts. Mais il restait chez lui une pieuse défiance. Sur cette voie al-Rāzī a été beaucoup plus loin, et nous verrons comment. Conciliateur, oui, mais non pas en proposant un juste milieu défini par un équilibre instable, avec des formules de défensive, qu'illustre bien cette célèbre proposition Ash'arite: les attributs divins ne sont pas Dieu et ils ne sont pas autre que Dieu. Non pas davantage en recommandant, entre une connaissance sensible trop grossière et une connaissance rationnelle trop abstraite, la juste mesure (iqtisād) de l'intuition concrète du cœur. La conciliation d'al-Razi est peut-être moins une tentative pour accorder des doctrines, en évitant ce qui est excessif et en conservant ce qui est le plus

modéré, qu'un effort pour offrir à des esprits différents un champ commun de pensée, où ils puissent tous se retrouver et évoluer à leur aise. En d'autres termes, il s'agit peut-être moins de concilier raison et foi que de réconcilier le philosophe et le croyant.

But although Arnaldez had the opportunity in the following pages of his study to use two important books of Rāzī's to pursue this hypothesis with some detailed investigation, he was satisfied with presenting an analysis of some aspects of Rāzī's philosophy and leaving to the reader the problem of linking the contents of this presentation with his introductory hypothesis. As a matter of fact, he shifts his whole theme to another issue and tries to connect Rāzī's conciliatory attitude toward the Shī'ah with al-Nāsir's (the 'Abbasid Caliph) attempts to restore the internal unity of the Muslim world. Al-Nāsir tried to unite the Muslims under his banner by showing a deep sympathy for the Shī'ah Twelvers; Rāzī, responding to the same feeling, "n'a ressenti aucune sympathie pour les sectes shī'ites estoteriques et leur doctrine de l'imam infallible".²¹ Although he himself was a avowed Ash'arī "il n'est ni sectaire ni partisan",²² thus accommodating in his vast system everything that could "contribute to the reconstruction of a coherent, solid, rich, and open Islamic thought".²³

Finally, we find Kramers accepting the same hypothesis as an historical fact without hesitation. In his words, "al-Rāzī's life-work is of importance by his attempt at reconciliation of philosophy and religious traditions, in which he displayed a rationalism unknown for his time".²⁴

The supposition which has been bred into Western scholarship and which has remained there as unproven theory is opposed by another contradictory idea, repeated especially in the works of Eastern scholars, but again without full investigation. For many of these scholars Rāzī was an Ash'arī theologian who rejected the metaphysics of the philosophers in a continuation of Ghazālī's attempt.²⁵ According to Nasr, who has presented the most elaborate theory on the man from this point of view, Rāzī was "one of the most influential and colourful figures ... who played a major role in the attack against rationalists".²⁶ Rāzī's main role in the intellectual life of Islam was, in his opinion, to support the orthodox policy of the caliphate of his time to suppress the rationalistic philosophy in favour of theology.²⁷ In general, he saw the importance of Imam Rāzī in philosophy to lie more in his criticism of the philosophers than in the establishment of a new school.²⁸

Nasr's view was supported by J. Van Ess in his recent study on al-Ijī. In this study, Van Ess referred to Rāzī as a weak, inconsistent, skeptical, unsystematic scholar.²⁹ He saw in Rāzī's thought a new attempt to refute philosophy and attack it in the person of Ibn Sīnā, although he himself had adopted a great number of Ibn Sīnā's ideas.

Thus Rāzī, who appeared as a controversial figure in the works of ancient oriental biographers and historians,³⁰ has remained controversial in modern research. The student of his thought is left at a loss, facing at least two contradictory hypotheses in the evaluation of the nature of his contribution to Islamic philosophy.

In such a situation, we are prompted to examine the truth of the matter. But until now, the traditional way of presenting some aspects of Rāzī's thought has, as such, produced no convincing conclusions in the works of modern scholars insofar as his role in philosophy is concerned.

Footnotes

¹ Ibn Abī 'Uṣaybi'ah, *'Uyūn al-Anbā' Fi Tabaqāt al-Atibbā'* (Beirut: Al-Hayāh, 1965), p. 470.

² Al Safadī, *Al-Wāfī bi al-Wafayāt*, ed. Dederling (Damascus: Hāshimiyyah, 1959), IV, p. 255.

³ Ibn al-Qifti, *Tārīkh al-Hukamā'*, ed. J. Lippert (Leipzig: Dieterich, 1903), p. 293.

⁴ Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddimah* (Tijāriyyah: Cairo), p. 466.

⁵ P. Kraus, "The Controversies of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī", *Islamic Culture*, XII, (1938), 131-153. (= "Les controverses de Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī", in Bull. de l'Institut d'Égypte, XIX, (1937), 187-214.) ; M. Horten, *Die Philosophischen Ansichten von Rāzī und Tūsī* (Bonn: Verlag von Peter Hanstein, 1910), p. III.

⁶ S. H. Nasr, "Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī", in *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, ed. Sharif, (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1963), I, 644.

⁷ See R. Arnaldez, "L'oeuvre de Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī: commentateur du Coran et philosophe", *Cahiers de civilisation médiévale*, III (1960), 307-323.

⁸ Kraus, *loc.cit.*

⁹ Horten, Kraus, and Arnaldez, *loc. cit.*; Kramers in art. "al-Rāzī"; *S.E.I.*, (Leiden: Brill, 1961).

¹⁰ I. Goldziher, "Aus der Theologie des Fachr al-Dīn al-Rāzī", *Der Islam*, III, (1912), 213-247.

¹¹ F. Kholeif, *A Study on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and His Controversies in Transoxiana* (Beirut: Dar al-Machriq, 1966), p.4.

¹² Arnaldez, *op. cit.*, p. 322 f.

¹³ M. °Abd al-Rāzīq, *Al-Sūfiyyah wa al-Firaq al-Islāmiyyah*, written in 1932, but published in 1938; see al-Rāzī, *ʿItiqādāt Firaq al-Muslim īn wa al-Mushriq īn*, ed. Nashshār (Cairo: al-Nahdah, 1938).

°Abd al-Rāzīq's point, based on Rāzī's claim and supported by some arguments, is that Rāzī was the first among the heresiographers to deal with the Sūfis as an independent Muslim sect, pp. 14-16. for Rāzī's sympathy with Sūfism see Nasr, *op. cit.*, p. 653.

¹⁴ Horten, *Die Philosophischen*, *loc. cit.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. iv f.

¹⁶ Kraus, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 131-153.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 132 f.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

²⁰ Arnaldez, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*, p. 323.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Kramers, *loc. cit.*

²⁵ See *al-Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh Bayn al-Falāṣifah wa al-Kalāmiyyīn*, ed. S. Dunyā (Cairo: Halabī, 1958), I, 240; 'Umar Farrūkh, *Tarīkh al-Fikr al-'Arabī*, (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Tijārī, 1962), p. 441 f.; A. Nadvī, *Imām Rāzī* (A'zam Garh: Ma'ārif Press, 1950), introduction; A. al-Sa'idī, *al-Mujaddidūn fī al-Islām*, (Cairo: Maktabat al-Ādāb, n.d.), p. 227; M. H. al-Dhahabī, *al-Taḥsīn wa al-Mufaṣṣirūn* (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-Hadīth, 1961), I, 294; H. Nasr, *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, I, 642-656.

²⁶ Nasr, *op. cit.*, p. 642.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 644.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 648.

²⁹ J. Van Ess, *Die Erkenntnislehre des 'Adudaddīn al-Icī*, (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1966), p. 31 f.

³⁰ See Kholeif, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-15.

