

‘Epistemic Virtues’¹ in Prophets’ Directives²: A Dialogic Analysis³

Yasser Fawzi Abd Al-Alim Rateb

Abstract

This paper is mainly dedicated to finding out the ‘epistemic virtues’ that are found in the ‘epistemic stances’ in some dialogues of some Prophets (Noah, Salih, and Shu’aib) with their people in Surah number seven in the Holy Qur’an, i.e., Al-A’raaf. The crucial focus is on their directive acts which, by and large, challenge the addressees’ ‘epistemic statuses’. Therefore, a dialogic analysis approach is adopted in order to mark these ‘epistemic stances’ which are basic constituents in the discourse of Prophets. Results assert the constancy and affirmation of ‘epistemic stances’ in Prophets’ virtuous directive utterances which are challenged by their unknowledgeable people’s responsive rejections.

Keywords: Dialogue Analysis, epistemic, directives Lord, Prophets, Speech Acts.

¹ For Dancy and Sosa (1992; 1993), ‘epistemic virtue’ is “regulating one’s desire for truth”. (p.116)

² (Searle 1979, p.7) suggests five general ways for using language; one of which is ‘directives’.

³ (Short 2014, p.344) patterns of dialogue analysis.

1. Introduction

‘Epistemology’ is the core component of all dialogic communicative interactions, and so is it in the Qura’nic discourse of Prophets with their people. They have come with direct Epistemic Messages that imply the transition from worlds of dims to worlds of light and with glad tidings⁴. Therefore, the fundamental aim of these dialogic ‘talks-in-interactions’ is, by and large, to present the perfect ‘epistemic stances’ to take the people out of the dark hearts of polytheism to the light arenas of monotheism. Thus, Prophets’ linguistic utterances have been their directive acts which have -truly and factually- been performed to fulfill these aims. Accordingly, these directive acts can be referred to as a way of performing utterances by which a speaker urges his addressee to cope with a new thing or to retreat from accomplishing another thing which obliges the speaker to occupy a particular ‘position’⁵. In other words, the speaker seeks to change his addressee’s ‘epistemic models’ for the sake of attaining new ‘mental models’. Thus, it can be achieved by utilizing the Prophetic direct and indirect directives, as well. Hence, Prophets’ attempts are ‘epistemic’ in their first places for the well-being of their people in the Lifetime and in the Hereafter, too. Thus, directives have, by and large, the epistemic constituents that tend to alter fixed ones.

2- What is Dialogue?

Any ‘social interaction’, which is linguistically practiced and has a variety of significant benefits for interlocutors, can be inferred as a dialogue. This ‘talk-in-interaction’ could have multi-faceted inferences that may affect the ‘epistemic statuses’, as well as the ‘epistemic stances’ of interlocutors. Therefore, dialogue can be inferred as a ‘communicative accomplishment’ by interlocutors that has the socio-pragmatic realizations. In this respect, Swearingen (1990) believes that dialogue can be interpreted as a kind of speech or discourse. In other words, it can be inferred as the practicability of ‘language and logic’ (p.52). Thus, the linguistic intersection or integration between interlocutors, which takes the form of mutual movements between the systemic realizations of ‘turns’ and their ‘constructional units’, and has the ability to change or at least add to their ‘epistemic statuses’, can be thought of as a dialogue. In this regard, the social attempts that the ‘self’ seeks to fill in the other’s epistemic holes, i.e. the human efforts launched by the ‘self’ to build not only the linguistic gaps, but to construct the epistemic spaces in the other’s ‘mental models’, can, therefore, be characterized as positive dialogic communicative ‘talk-in-interaction’. Moreover, dialogue can also

⁴ V.24:35, in Al-Hilali and Khan 1984, p.584.

⁵ Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 64.

be recognized as the ‘science of architectonics’; that is, the way of how dialogic entities – initiations, responses, ‘turn construction units’, sequentiality organizations’ – make up one another, and fill in the epistemic gaps of interlocutors (cf. Holquist 1990, p.150). Consequently, any approach that includes these linguistic, as well as social, ramifications can be inferred as an epistemic dialogic ‘talk-in-interaction’. Therefore, ‘otherness’ is the fundamental key in the concept of dialogue. That is, dialogue can also be identified in terms of the social and the ‘epistemic’ targets that are to be fulfilled through any ‘talk-in-interaction’, that is, dialogue is sometimes thought of as a purposeful social as well as linguistic interaction that has a mutual practical correlation of a give-and-take constructional form.⁶ In this respect, the direct epistemic content of dialogue is the fact that recognizes it from other approaches and gives it the dialogic ramifications.

2.1. ‘Epistemology’ in Dialogue

The basic aims of any dialogic ‘talk-in-interaction’ is the maximization of interlocutors’ positive ‘epistemic stances’, and, at the same time, the minimization of their negative ‘epistemic stances’, that is, they interact in order to make a shift in their shared – or possibly forming new – ‘mental models’. In other words, they attempt, by and large, to steer the knowledge models for specific aims. Moreover, van Dijk (2014) affirms the fact that ‘talks-in-interaction’ play a fundamental “role... in the reproduction of knowledge.” (p.21) Hence, this trial is primarily achieved by the performance of speech acts, particularly ‘directives’ – whether direct or indirect. In this regard, van Krogh (1995) affirms the fact that ‘epistemology’ is primarily dedicated to delving deep into the “origin, nature, and validity of knowledge” (p.7). Therefore, the dialogic nature of language makes it accessible to interlocutors’ ‘epistemic statuses’, that is, every one seeks to affect the other’s epistemic area. Consequently, the ‘self’ tries to get acquainted with the other’s ‘epistemic’ paces and, at the same time, seeks to modify these models. In other words, there is “a reciprocal and mutual...shaping” of ‘talk-in-interaction’ (Linell 2001, p.77). It is ‘other-orientation’ which constitutes the dialogic nature of discourse (cf. Graumann 1995). Hence, the mutual functions of dialogic communicative interactions are to reshape the ‘common ground’ of interlocutors, that is, the ‘self’ seeks to add more true knowledge to this ‘common ground’ or, at least, to correct the false knowledge that resides in the other’s mentality. In this respect, Holquist

⁶ Linell (2007) defines dialogue in terms of ‘dialogism’ which refers to the “asymmetries in knowledge and participation, and complementarity in the division of communicative labour in actual interactions” (p.6)

(1990; 2002) asserts the fact that utterances are “active elements in dialogic exchange” (p.66), and the main function of these utterances is to make ‘epistemic’ balance in ‘talks-in-interaction’, that is, interlocutors’ production of these utterances is crucial in maintaining their roles of correcting the epistemic direction of discourse.

2.2. What is Dialogue Analysis?

Dialogue analysis serves as a vehicle for religious as well as ‘social actions’⁷. Therefore, this approach is crucial in manifesting the social ramifications in ‘talks- in-interaction’. Hence, this approach is, by and large, crucial in manifesting the social ramifications in ‘talks-in-interactions’. In the same vein, this approach can be defined as a way of exploring the human diversity in ‘epistemic’ regularities (cf. Sidnell 2013, p.77). Thus, the main work of Dialogue Analysis can be inferred as a way of delving deep into the socio-pragmatic inferences of human interactions in discourse. Accordingly, Drew and Curl (2008) affirm that Dialogue Analysis is a multi-sub-disciplinary approach which tries to “discover patterns in social interactions” (p.23) through the highlighting of social ramifications of linguistic utterances by using ‘turns at talk’. In the same regard, the approach can be thought of a way of studying texts with special reference to their ‘pragmatic structures’ and the ‘talks-in-interaction’ that are included in these texts.⁸ Hence, as it is stated in 2.1. above, the practicability of dialoging entails some specific constituents that form ‘talks-in-interaction’ such as turns initiations, responses, ‘turn-constructional units’, and ‘sequentiality. These items have, by and large, to be analyzed in terms of their social ramifications. Therefore, analyzing dialogue can be inferred as the investigation of linguistic constituents of discourse in their relatedness to the social divergence. In this regard, Weigand (2009) maintains that Dialogue Analysis aims at finding out the ‘dialogical competence’, that is, the ‘self’s linguistic as well as social behavior and capability to impose his/her dominant ‘epistemic status’ over the ‘other’ and vice versa. In other words, it is a ‘systemic’ way to detect parties’ trials to proclaim their “own ideals, beliefs, and norms” (p.73). In this respect, the discipline can be thought of as the investigation, as well as the manifestation, of the multi-layered linguistic and social components of any ‘talk-in-interaction’ for the sake of attaining the divergent outcomes of the affinity between interlocutors – the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ (cf. Weigand 2016). Moreover, it can be inferred

⁷ For Sidnell and Stivers (2013), Dialogue Analysis is a “dominant approach to the study of human social interaction across the disciplines of Sociology, Linguistics and Communication.” (p.1)

⁸

as the anatomy of the ‘self’s manipulation of linguistic variables (such as directives) to force certain ‘epistemic stances’ on others. That is, these speech acts have, by large, the power to modify the knowledge of interlocutors⁹. Thus, interlocutors seek to implant epistemic stances in each other’s ‘mental models’ with the selection of linguistic variables.

3-‘Epistemic’ Virtues¹⁰ in ‘Directives’

Directives: (direct and indirect) have futuristic references to events.

In this regard¹¹, these acts can be identified in terms of their epistemic identity or their individualistic characteristics of maximizing the knowledge of addressees. That is, in a dialogical sense, the ‘self’ seeks to develop or to expand the ‘epistemic stances’ of the ‘other’. Hence, if a speaker tells his addressee the direct directive: ‘Do not smoke’, this can be inferred in terms of the speaker’s excess knowledge of the bad outcomes of smoking itself, or the social, political, and law restrictions that would afflict the addressee, and in this way, s/he may add more knowledge to his addressee’s ‘epistemic stances’. Moreover, when a speaker asks his addressee the direct directive: Be careful! It may be inferred that the speaker knows something more than his addressee does, or a sudden outcome would befall the addressee. Therefore, the speaker, by and large, seeks to add or at least expand the ‘epistemic stances’ of the addressee disregarding his response.

In this respect, Spencer-Oatey (2000) affirms that directives influence our “autonomy, freedom of choice [...] and imposition” (p.17). Thus, responses do not depend mainly on the ‘epistemic’ value of directives, but they are firmly attached to interpersonal relations, as well as the pre-perspectivized assumptions which the ‘self’ suggests about the ‘other’ and vice versa. Therefore, the individualistic desire to ‘regulate’ truth is, thus, located in the sense of the ‘self’s directives to the ‘other’s non-factual beliefs that can be altered as soon as s/he discards ‘jealousy and personal bias’. Moreover, directives can have the ‘power’ or ‘force’ which can make differences in interlocutors’ epistemic varieties and seeking for knowledge. Besides, the variety of directives – orders, commands, instructions, suggestions, advice, reminding, warnings ... – affirms the ‘epistemic virtues’ of these kinds of speech acts.

⁹ Culpeper and Archer (2008) affirm that ‘directives’ metaphorically force addressees to interact with social conditions. (p.54)

¹⁰ Dancy and Sosa (1992; 1993, p.116) believe that ‘epistemic virtue’ is the individual qualities not hypothesis, theories’ or ‘strategies’.

¹¹ Jucker and Taavitsainen (2010) mention the notion of analyzing ‘real written’ communicative interactions which have various linguistic references (p.8).

Consequently, the prime function of directives is to make alteration in the course of relationships between the 'self' and the 'other' and vice versa disregarding the responsive acts of interlocutors. In other words, if interlocutors step psychological or social bias aside, directives would be faithful in maintaining the 'shared models', and, thus, have the correct 'epistemic virtues' that are the crucial consequences of any 'talk-in-interaction'.

4- Data Discussion and Analysis

Data is extracted from the Surah of Al-A'raf (The Heights). It is adopted from the translation of Al-Hilali and Khan (1984). That is, some Quranic dialogues between Prophets and their people are to be analyzed in terms of the virtuous 'epistemic stances' in the directive acts of Prophets.

4.1. Dialogue one

It is between Prophet Noah and the disbelievers in his people.

59. Indeed, We have sent Nuh (Noah) to his people and he said: **"O my people! Worship Allah! You have no other *Illah* (God) but Him.... Certainly, I fear for you the torment of a Great Day!"**

60. The **leaders** of his people **said:** "Verily, we see you in plain error."

61. [Nuh (Noah)] said: **"O my people!** There is no error in me, but I am a Messenger from the Lord of the '*Alamin*' (mankind, jinn, and all that exist)!

62. "I convey unto you the Messages of my Lord and give sincere advice to you. **And I know from Allah what you know not.**

63. **"Do you wonder that** there has come to you a Reminder from your Lord through a man amongst you, that he may warn you, so that you may fear Allah and that you may receive (His) Mercy?" (Al-Hilali and Khan 1984, pp.209-10)

First of all, Noah's direct appeal to his people '*O my people!*' can be inferred as an 'epistemic virtue' of relating them to his own identity, and, in this way, he seeks to mitigate the imposition of the 'epistemic directive' that follows. That is, he adds more 'epistemic stances' to their own limited knowledge; i.e., he tries to create new 'shared mental models' by directing them to *Worship Allah Alone*, as they have no other God but Him. Hence, Noah maximizes his people's 'epistemic status' by affirming the fact that there is no '*Illah*', Who is worth worshiping, but Allah Alone. Therefore, he asserts his 'epistemic claims' by using the 'epistemic certainty adverb' i.e. *certainly* which, according to Vandenberg and Aijmer (2007), "conveys epistemic commitment to the hypothetical state of affairs" (p.90). Moreover, in verse 61, when his people accuse him of being in a 'plain error', his virtuous epistemic

indirect directives inform them the fact that he is not in error, but he is a faithful Messenger who has come with significant ‘epistemic values’ that will make differences in their Lifetime and in the Hereafter. In this regard, Noah also indirectly urges the people to get acquainted with his new ‘epistemic stances’, otherwise they will be punished by ‘a torment of a Great Day’, that is, his ‘epistemic directives’ can, by and large, change the world of his addressees from the isolated state of polytheism to the shared world of monotheism. Therefore, in verse 61, he firmly asks his people to believe in him, as he is a Messenger of his Lord who is sincerely advising them, that is, he honestly increases their knowledge of what they do not seek to know. Thus, the ‘epistemic virtues’ in his directives lie in the fact that he directs them to the Right Path of his Lord, and, consequently, he indirectly distances the defects that the less knowing people accuse him of, and, at the same time, Noah tells them that his utterances are sincere and factual. Thus, in verse 63, the ‘epistemic virtues’ of his directives are apparently manifested, that is, the affirmation of the fact that he knows from his Lord what his people do not know. Therefore, he concludes the epistemic maximization of his directives with the interrogative directives in verse 63, that is, he is astonished by his people’s exclamation about his identity as a ‘Reminder’ who comes with the epistemic virtuous scales with which he warns them so that they will fear Allah, and, consequently, they would be able to receive the Mercy of his Lord.

The next dialogue is between Prophet Saleh and the arrogant leaders of his people whose ‘epistemic virtues’ are apparent in the linguistic variables that he uses.

4.2. Dialogue Two

73. And to Thamud (people). We sent their brother Salih (Saleh). He said: "**O my people! Worship Allah! You have no other *Ilah* (God) but Him.** (*La ilaha ill-Allah: none has the right to be worshipped but Allah*). **Indeed** there has come to you a clear sign (the miracle of the coming out of a huge she-camel from the midst of a rock) from your Lord. **This she-camel of Allah is a sign unto you; so you leave** her to graze in Allah's earth, and **touch** her not with harm, lest a painful torment should seize you.

74. "And **remember** when He made you successors after 'Ad (people) and gave you habitations in the land, you build for yourselves palaces in plains, and carve out homes in the mountains. So **remember** the graces (bestowed upon you) from Allah, and **do not go about** making mischief on the earth." 79. Then he [Salih (Saleh)] turned from them, and said: "**O my people!** I have **indeed** conveyed to you the

Message of my Lord, and have given you good advice but you like not good advisers." (Al-Hilali and Khan 1984, pp.211-12)

This ‘talk-in-interaction’ is dense with direct and indirect directive acts which bear the ‘epistemic virtues’ of form and meaning. First, the whole context of dialogue is characterized by the individualistic traits of truth claims, and a serious situation by the speaker to implant the new ‘epistemic stances’ to his addressees. That is, these new ‘stances’ can be inferred from the multiplicity of the graces that are bestowed on them. Thus, as it is stated in 4.1. above, he directly directs them to adopt a new ‘epistemic virtues’, i.e., to worship Allah Alone Whose Graces are countless on all his creatures (polytheists and monotheists); to be careful of the miracle which has come to them – to leave her ‘graze’ freely in the land, and not to do harm to her – lest a severe torment should seize them. Hence, these ‘epistemic virtues’ are recognized by van Dijk (2014) as knowledge which is “defined as *justified true beliefs*” (p.6, italics are in source). Therefore, these epistemic ‘true beliefs’ are affirmed by the ‘epistemic adverb of certainty’¹², i.e. ‘indeed’ which, by and large, verifies Saleh’s ‘epistemic virtues’ of being a Prophet, who comes with ‘true’ epistemic beliefs that he is a Messenger of his Lord, Who sends the ‘true’ sign of the she-camel that affirms Saleh’s ‘true’ identity. Therefore, in verse 74, he narrates the Magnitude Graces which are bestowed on his people by his Lord; he reminds them that Allah has made them as followers of the people of A’d; He has given them ‘habitations in the land’; He has also given them the magnitude power to build their ‘palaces in plains’, and to carve their houses in stony mountains as well¹³. In this regard, Saleh signs out his ‘true’ epistemic virtuous directives which assert the individualistic characteristic of the speaker. Hence, in verse 79, he reuses the ‘epistemic certainty adverb, *indeed*’ which constructs affinity amidst “*important and which gives rise for concern.*” (Vandenberg and Aijmer (2007, p. 107, italics are in source); in this respect, Saleh commands them not to do ‘mischiefs’ in the land. Thus, he makes a link between what is important, that is, Allah’s Graces are countless, and his people who are related to his own self, as well as the fact that he has come only to advise them to worship Allah Alone, and to inform them of the ‘epistemic virtue’ that he is ‘indeed’ a Messenger of his Lord whose mission is to convey Messages from his Lord, however, the people do not respond positively to him. Consequently, he concludes

¹² Vandenberg and Aijmer (2007) state that ‘indeed’ has developed from the state of being a “‘prepositional phrase’ to the ‘epistemic modal adverb expressing the speaker’s/writer’s [future] commitment to the truth of the proposition” (p.104).

¹³ Al-Qortobi 1938, vol.7, pp. 239-40

this ‘talk-in-interaction’ with the assertion, despite the fact that he is a Messenger who lives amongst them and whose job is to advise them, that his people do not like advisers. The next dialogue is also an ‘epistemic’ talk-in-interaction’, which is composed of a variety of virtuous directives that enhance the ‘epistemic virtue’ of the addresser.

4.3. Dialogue three is between Prophet Shu’aib and his people.

85. And to (the people of) Madyan (Midian), (We sent) their brother Shu’aib. He said: “**O my people! Worship Allah! You have no other *Ilah* (God) but Him.** ... so **give** full measure and full weight and **wrong not** men in their things, and **do not mischief** on the earth after it has been set in order, that will be better for you, if you are believers. 86. “**And sit not on every road, threatening, and hindering** from the Path of Allah those who believe in Him, and **seeking** to make it crooked. **And remember** when you were but few, and He multiplied you. **And see what** was the end of the *Mufsidun* (mischief-makers, corrupts, liars). 87. “**And if there is a party of you who believes in that with which I have been sent and a party who do not believe, so be patient** until Allah judges between us, and He is the Best of judges.”

93. Then he (Shu’aib) turned from them and said: “**O my people! I have indeed** conveyed my Lord’s Messages unto you and I have given you good advice. Then **how can I sorrow for** the disbelieving people’s (destruction)” (Al-Hilali and Khan 1984, pp.212-13).

Shu’aib’s dialogue is certainly an ‘epistemic’ talk-in-interaction’, that is, the speaker’s direct, as well as indirect, directives of ‘epistemic virtues’ are manifested in his discourse. Initially, Shu’aib, as well as his predecessors, urges his people to worship Allah Alone, the Only ‘*Illah*’ Who is worth worshipping by all His Creatures. Secondly, Prophet Shu’aib accumulates other direct virtuous directives, such as giving the full amounts, when they measure for themselves and for others; not minimizing the values of others’ belongs and properties, and not to corrupt the ordered system which is set by his Lord on earth. In verse 86, Shu’aib multiplies the various ways of corruption on earth; he asserts the facts that the people must not do corruptive actions such as ‘sitting on roads’ for threatening others and preventing them from the ‘true’ ‘Path of Allah’, seeking to make the whole matter as twisted towards their own whims and desires. Prophet Shu’aib also tries to remind them of his Lord’s Graces that are bestowed on them, that is he seeks to maximize their knowledge of the social beliefs¹⁴ which are the main traits of the

¹⁴ Van Dijk (2014) points out that “[k]nowledge is justified belief *socially shared* among members of (social, cultural) communities” (p.94)

society members. Hence, he asserts the ‘epistemic social virtues’ which the ‘self’ is eager to implant in the ‘other’s’ ‘mental models’. Moreover, he informs them that they were few in number, but his Lord has made them more and more. In this way, they have to remember these graces, otherwise they would be counted as ‘mischief makers’. Therefore, he informs them to ‘think’ deeply in the destiny of those who committed mischievous acts such as those which he warns his people of, that is, he directs them to ‘see the outcomes of the ‘*Mufsidun*’ – mischief-makers, corrupts, and liars – who do not respond to the ‘epistemic virtues’ that are found in the directives of their Prophets (Noah, Hud, and Saleh). In this regard, Shu’aib has informed his people that they would suffer a similar fate like the people who rejected the ‘epistemic virtues’ in the directives of their Prophets, and like the people of Lout as well.¹⁵ Moreover, in verse 87, recognizing his people’s rejection of the ‘epistemic values’ in his directives, Shu’aib asks them to ‘be patient’, i.e., they have to wait until the outcomes of these rejections will be manifest in a form of a severe torment which will afflict them. He also urges them not to precipitate the coming of this torment, as it will inevitably take place as soon as Allah allows it. Concluding the ‘epistemic’ case of his directives, in verse 93, Prophet Shu’aib turns from them and functionalizes the ‘epistemic adverb of certainty’ ‘*indeed*’ which confirms the fact that the speaker’s expectations have been in contrast with the preceding ‘state of affairs’¹⁶ of his addressees. In other words, the expectations of the ‘self’ are not hoped from the ‘other’, consequently, he asserts the fact that he will never be sorry for those who do not get acquainted with his beneficial directives, so he places the interrogative directive act that frees him from being dishonorable in his advice; due to the fact that his people are those who are faithful to their virtuous epistemic directives.

5- Conclusions

As it is formerly stated in sections 4.1., 4.2., and 4.3., the common characteristics amongst the three dialogues are the highlighting of the direct initial epistemic virtuous directive that all people should know the fact that there is no God Who is worth worshipping but Allah Alone. It is the ‘true’ epistemic virtuous directive fact. Therefore, Prophets have made the best manifestation of Allah’s Graces which are bestowed on their people. In the same respect, they have also directed them using the ‘epistemic adverb of certainty’, i.e. ‘indeed’ which has the ‘epistemic’ power of making connection between the various ‘epistemic virtues’ of directives. Moreover, the regular marking of the Graces can be

¹⁵ cf. Al-Hilali and Khan (1984, p.299).

¹⁶ cf. Vandenberg and Aijmer (2007, p. 104).

inferred in terms of informing the ‘other’ to interact positively with the directives of the ‘self’. Besides, prophets’ dialogic sense in using these kinds of knowledge implantation in their people disregarding their responses can be an assertion of their ‘epistemic virtues’.

REFERENCES

- Al-Hilali, M. & Khan (M). Trans. (1984). *The Noble Qur'an: Interpretation of the meanings of the Noble Qur'an in the English Language*. Medina: King Fahad complex of the printing of the Holy Qur'an.
- AL- Qortobi, M. (1938). *Al-Ja'amea Li Ahkam Al-Qur'an*, vol.7. Cairo: Dar-Al-Kotob Al-masreyia.
- Cornille, C. (2013). Introduction: In C. Catherine (Ed.), *The Wiley-Blackwell companions to inter-religious dialogue* (pp.xii-xvii). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Culpeper, J. & Archer, D. (2008). Requests and directness in early modern English trial proceedings and play texts, 1640-1760. In A. H., Jucker & I., Taavitsainen. (Eds.), *Speech acts in the history of English* (pp.45-84). Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Dancy, J. & Sosa, E. (Eds.). (1992; 1993). *A Companion to epistemology*. Oxford: Black well.
- Drew, P. and Curl, T. (2008). Conversation analysis: Overview and new directions. In Vijay K. Bhatia, J. Flowerdew & Rodney H. Jones. (Eds.), *Advances in discourse studies* (pp.22-51). New York: Routledge.
- Graumann, C. F. (1995). Commonality, mutuality, reciprocity: A conceptual introduction. In I. Markova, C. F. Graumann, & K. Foppa (Eds.), *Mutuality in dialogue* (pp.1-24). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Holquist, M. (1990). *Dialogism: Bakhtin and his world*. London: Routledge.
- Holquist, M. (1990; 2002). *Dialogism: Bakhtin and his world* (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge.
- Swearingen, J. C. (1990). Dialogue and dialectical: The logic of conversation and the interpretation of logic. In T. Maranhao. (Ed.), *The interpretation of dialogue* (pp.47-72). Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Jucker, A. H, & Taavitsainen, I., (Eds.). (2008). *Speech acts in the history of English*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Jucker, A. H. & Taavitsainen, I. (2010). Trends and developments in historical pragmatics. In A. H. Jucker. & I. Taavitsainen. (Eds.), *Historical pragmatics* (pp.69-78). Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Linell, P. (2001). *Approaching dialogue: Talk, interaction and contexts in dialogical perspectives* Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Linell, P. (2007). Dialogicality in languages, minds and brains: is there a convergence between dialogism and neuro-biology? *Language Sciences*, 29 (2007), pp. 605–620.
- Searle, J. (1979). *Expression and meaning: Studies in the theory of speech acts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Short, M. (2014). Analysing dialogue. In P. Stockwell & S. Whiteley (Eds.), *The cambridge handbook of stylistics* (pp.344-359). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sidnell, J. (2013). (Eds.). Basic conversation analytic methods. In J. Sidnell & T. Stivers (Eds.). *The handbook of conversation analysis* (pp.77-99). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Sidnell, J and Stivers, T. (2013). (Eds.). Introduction. In J. Sidnell & T. Stivers (1st ed.). *The handbook of conversation analysis* (pp.1- 8). Oxford Wiley-Blackwell.

- Spencer-Oatey, H. (2000). Rapport management: A framework for analysis. In H. Spencer-Oatey (ed.) *Culturally Speaking. Managing Rapport through Talk across Culture*. London: Continuum. pp. 11-46
- Swearingen, J.C. (1990). Dialogue and dialectic: The logic of conversation and the interpretation of logic. In T. Maranhao (Ed.), *The interpretation of dialogue* (pp. 47-72). Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press.
- Vandenberg S-M, A. & Aijmer, K. (2007). *The semantic field of modal certainty: A Corpus-based study of English adverbs*. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- van Dijk, T. A. (2014). *Discourse and Knowledge: A sociocognitive approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- van Eemeren, F. H. & Grootendorst, R. (2004). *A systematic theory of argumentation: The pragma-dialectical approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- von Krogh (1995). *Managing Knowledge: Perspectives on Cooperation and Competition*. London: Sage.
- Weigand, E. (2009). *Language as dialogue: From rules to principles of probability*. Sebastian Feller (Ed.). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Weigand, E. (2016). The dialogic principle revisited: Speech acts and mental states. In A. Capone & J.L. Mey (Eds.), *Interdisciplinary studies in pragmatics, culture, and society*. (pp. 209-232). New York: Springer.