

Political Relations between the Safavids of Persia and the Mamluks of Egypt and Syria in the early Sixteenth Century

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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the evolution of political relations between the Safavids and the Mamluks during a very critical period in their history. At the beginning of the sixteenth century there were three competent powers in the Eastern Mediterranean. i.e. the Ottomans, the Safavids and the Mamluks. The Ottoman Empire was the most powerful among them. After it had established itself in Europe, the Ottoman Empire turned its face to the east in order to prove its identity and qualifications as the most powerful Muslim Empire at that time(1).

The game of paramount power was complicated and sensitive.. The Ottomans won in the end because they isolated the Mamluks from the conflict circle by encouraging the deterioration of relations between the Safavids and the Mamluks. After they had defeated the Safavids, they destroyed the Mamluk Sultanate and thus became the most powerful Muslim state in the area. The losers were the Mamluks, who, because of their internal and external weakness, could not participate in the game from the beginning. It would seem as though the Mamluks themselves were expecting their fate to be decided at the hands of the winner, either the Ottomans or the Safavids (2).

In the summer of 906-7 A.H./1501 A.D. Ismail the Safavid entered Tabriz and proclaimed himself Shah Ismail the First although his domain at the time was only Azarbayjan. He

declared Shieism to the formal doctrine of the new state. Shah Isma,il not only distinguishe his new state from the Sunni Ottoman Empire, but re-established national unity in Persia. Since the Arab conquest in the 7th century, Persia had been a mere geographical province belonging to the Caliphs of Medina or Damascus or Baghdad, and was often divided into a number of petty dynasties. But after 1501, Persia became one state(3).

During the ten years following the fall of Tabriz, Shah Isma,il conquered all of Persia and extended his state to the Fertile Crescent. In 908 A.H./1503 A.D. he defeated the ak-Koyunlu forces near Hamadan and established himself in central and south Persia. A few years later he conquered Mazandaran and Gorgan, the provinces of the Caspian Sea, extending his realm to Diyar Bakr. In 914\1508 Shah Ismaeil captured Baghdad and in the next years he conquered Shirvan, Khurasan and Samarquant. In brief, within a very short time Shah Ismaeil extended the borders of his empire from the Persian Gulf in the south to the Caspian Sea in the north, from the Euphrates in the west to Transoxania in the east, and his state thus became an opponent to the Sunni Ottoman empire(4).

As for Egypt and Syria, they had been ruied from Cairo by the Mamluk Sultans since 648/1250. In the late 15th century, or even before, the Mamluk Sultanate suffered from Maladministration of week sultans and corrupt amirs, in additions to troubles caused by the qadis fuqaha and common peoplè. This was accompanied by economic decline as a result of the deterioration of the inta system, (5) the frequent occurrences of the plague and epidemics with their catastrophic effects on a country that relied mainly on agriculture (6). Egypt during the late 15th century lost its important commercial position in the apice and other oriental trade because of the arrival of the Portuguese on the coasts of the Indian Ocean. In 892/1487 the Portuguese

discovered the Cape of Good Hope and after a few years they reached India(7).

In the year 907/1501, according to the contemporary historian Shams al-Din Ibn Tulun (d. 953/1546) disturbing news circulated in Damascus concerning Shah Ismaeil's victorious campaigns and his intention to conquer Syria(8). Sibay, the Mamluk vice-Sultan in Syria imposed illegal additional taxes on the people in order to prepare and equip an army of infantry to be quartered in Aleppo in fear of a Safavid invasion(9).

The Ottomans moved at that time to prevent war between the Mamluks and the Safavids. It seems that the Ottomans realized that if Shah Isma'il destroyed the weak Mamluk Sultanate, he would gain control of Syria and Egypt, thus putting the Ottoman's own plans in jeopardy. They might have thought at this stage of having the Mamluks on their side, or at least of isolating them in their future struggle with the Safavids. They pretended that they i.e. the Ottomans wanted to establish an alliance with the Mamluks to stop the Safavids from reaching the heart of the Sunni world. The contemporary Mamluk historian Ibn Iyas (d. 930/1524) reports that in Rabi II 908/October 1502, the envoy of the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II arrived in Damascus carrying correspondence addressed to the Mamluk Sultan al-Ghuri. The envoy was well received in Damascus and was made even more welcome in Cairo. He transmitted the presents and the messages of his master, which contained information about the Ottoman's intention concerning Safavid preparations for war. The Ottoman envoy left Cairo in Rajab 908/January 1503 carrying the reply of the Mamluk Sultan(10).

When news of the Ottoman-Mamluk rapprochement reached Shah Isma-c-il, he waited until 913/1507 before he marched westwards to the borders of the Mamluk Sultanate near Aleppo. Meanwhile, more money was being collected from the inhabi-

tants of Damascus to prepare troops for the defense. The Mamluk vice-Sultan ordered a parade of Mamluk troops, and they marched under his command to Aleppo on Thursday 7, Jumada II 913/14 October 1507 (11). Sultan al-Ghawri in Cairo was disturbed by this news. He consulted his amirs and they decided to send troops to stop the Safavid invasion. The Mamluk army for this campaign comprised 5 high-ranking amirs of thousands, 20 amirs of forty and amirs of Ten, and 1500 Sultani Mamluks(12).

The Egyptian troops did not leave Cairo however, because news arrived that the Safavid army had crossed the Mamluk borders at the Euphrates in the same month (Jumada II 913\ October (1507), and had met the army of the amir Ali Dulat, of the Mamluk buffer principality Dulgadir (Dhu al-Ghadir). According to Ibn Iyas, the Safavid army was defeated. The amir Ali sent to Cairo a number of Safavid soldiers' heads and a distinguished Safavid prisoner of war. Sultan al-Ghawri was so pleased he ordered the heads to be hung on the Zuwayla Gate in Cairo, and halted the preparation for sending troops to Syria. All this happened during the presence of an Ottoman envoy in Cairo. The Mamluk sultan bestowed robes of honor on him and his comrades and sent them back to the Ottoman sultan with the good news(13). The Syrian Mamluk troops subsequently returned from Aleppo to Damascus in Sha-ban 913/December 1507(14).

In the same month (Sha-ban 913\December 1507) Shah Ismai-c-il sent his envoy to Sultan al-Ghawri with a letter containing an apology for what had happened at the Euphrates and for any initiative his troops may have taken. The Shah emphasized in his letter that the incident was not intended, that the Safavid soldiers had lost their way, and that the Shah did not give his personal order for such action or even have any knowledge of it. Sultan al-Ghawri accepted this apology and set the

Safavid prisoner free to return to Persia accompanied by the Safavid delegation. Ibn Iyas comments that : «the Safavid envoys were very impudent, they wore red conical caps on their heads but were not as elegant as the Ottoman envoys»(15).

From his incursion of 913/1507 to the Emphrates and his subsequent mission to Cairo. It would seem that Shah Isma-c-il wanted not to attack the Mamluk sultanate directly, but to keep it at bay and prevent it from impeding his future invasion of Iraq or any future conflict with Ottomans. This assumption is supported by the statement of Ibn Iyas, that in the next year (914/1508) Shah Isma-c-il conquered Iraq and captured Baghdad the ruler of Baghdad the Sultan Khan Ibn Ya'cq-ub Ibn Hassan al-Tawil arrived Cairo in Ramadan 914\December 1508 asking the Mamluk Sultan to provide him with troops to fight the Shah. Sultan al-Ghawri refused to do so because he was not ready to face the Safavid. It seems also that Sultan al-Ghawri was aware, at that time, of the movements of the Venetians and Hospitalers in the Mediterranean and the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. The Protuguese went too far in their policy.

Albuquerque sent his envoys to Shah Isma-c-il urging him to agree with the Portuguese that the Safavids should invade the Mamluk Sultanate from the east, while the European naval powers would invade the Syrian coasts. The plan was intended to remove the Mamluk sovereign in Syria and to revive the old trade toute i:e: the persian Gulf - Iraq - Syria - Europe(17).

It seems that Shah Isma'il took the plan to heart and made it his own. he decided to put it into effect even if he would have to face both the Ottomans and the Mamluks. No doubt Ismail wanted to have control of the trade route, to reach the Red Sea area and to become the guardian of the two holy cities, Mecca and Medina in the Hijaz. Shah Isma'il wrote escretly to the consuls of the Franks in the main Egyptian and Syrian cities

asking them to write to their kings to invade Egypt from the sea, whilst he would invade by land the territories of both the Mamluk and Ottoman sultans. In 916/1510 the Mamluk ruler of al-Bira on the eastern Mamluk borders in Syria captured some Safavid envoys carrying letters addressed to these consular officials, and sent them to the Mamluk Sultan in Cairo(18). Ibn Tulun adds that in the same year some Franks from Aleppo and its environs arrived in Damascus under arrest. It was said that they were carrying letters from the Franks to Shah Ismail, hiding them in their walking-sticks(19).

When Sultan al-Ghawri was informed of these incidents on 23 Dhu al-Qada 916/21 February 1511 he summoned the European consuls, including those of Alexandria, of Damascus and of Tripoli. He insulted and threatened them with hanging. Then he ordered them to be handed over to the **Nasir al-Khass** for further investigation of the matter (20).

The response of Shah Ismail was to send a squadron to attack al-Bira because its Mamluk ruler had captured the Safavid envoys who had passed nearby. Sultan al-Ghawri was disturbed and reacted as if he believed this Safavid incursion was the beginning of a campaign against the Mamluk Sultanate. He sent a delegation headed by the **amir Tamur-Bay** to discuss the matter with Shah Ismail. In Tabriz the Shah met the amir Tamur-Bay only once and kept him as a prisoner for about two years (21).

Relations between the Mamluk Sultanate and the Safavid Empire deteriorated as went by. In Dhu al-Hijaz 916\ March 1511 Shah Ismail defeated and killed Ozbeg Khan, a Tartar chieftan. Sultan al-Ghawri was disquieted by such news(22). A Safavid envoy to the Mamluk Sultan arrived in Damascus on Safar 917/10 May 1511, (23) and in Cairo on 18 Rabi I\ 15 June 1511 of the same year. The Mamluk Sultan was very anxious and concerned about the purport of such a mission. He sent

his amirs to welcome the envoy outside Cairo. The Sultan himself went personally, but in disguise, to the Matariyya, outside Cairo, to watch the arrival of the Safavid envoy. Ibn Iyas comments that it was something very old for the Sultan to do so. After two days the Safavid envoy met the Sultan. The letter of Shah Ismail was read in the presence of the Mamluk amirs and the Safavid envoy presented the gifts of his master : a copy of the Holy Quran, a prayer carpet, a crossbow and a small box. When the box was opened in the presence of the Sultan, they found inside the head of Ozbeg Khan whom the Shah had killed in previous year. Sultan al-Ghawri ordered the head to be buried and the crossbow was broken.

Ismail's gift to al-Ghawri had its dangerous and unequivocal implications. It suggested that al-Ghawri — in the view of the Safavid Shah — was an old man who could not participate in battle, so he should keep himself to the prayer carpet, praying to God and reciting the Quran, leaving the Mamluk Sultanate to vigorous men, like Shah Ismail, who were able to kill their enemies. like Ozbeg Khan, on the battle field.

Al Ghawri was furious at the Safavid letter which the envoy handed him. It contained abusive verses insulting the Mamluk Sultan who used to visit parks and enjoy himself in gardens and festivas. The verses say :

The sword and the dagger are our flowers

hie on the narcissus and the myrtle

Our wine is the blood of our enemies

And our cup is an empty skull (25)

Sultan al-Ghawri ordered some of his close and trusted Mamluks especially the amir Ozdamur, to take care of the Safavid envoy during his stay in Cairo, to prevent anyone whats-

oever from approaching him, and not to let nyone of the Safavid delegation go to market tomeet anyone of the inhabitants. Only once the Safavid envoy was permitted to visit the tombs of the Imam al-Shafii and the Imam al-Laythi accompanied by the amir Oz-damur (26). No doubt the Sultan's instructions reflected his fear that the Safavid envoy was sent to approach foreign personalities in Cairo, and his order preventing the delegation to go to the markets of the city may have been motivated by his concern that they should not contaminate the Sunni doctrine of the Egyptians.

The two abusive verses which Shah Ismail sent in his letter to al-Ghawri became a topic of competition among the Egyptian poets and writers, such as Ibn Iyas, al-Ushmuni, al-Hijjar, al-Shirbini, Ibn al-Tahhan and others, to write verses in reply. Sultan al-Ghawri chase two verses written by Safiyy al-Din al-Hilli which say :

I have a horse for good purposes and that is its rein

I have a horse for evil purposes and that is its saddle

Whoever wants to show me the right way. I am ready to respond in kind.

Whoever wants to lead me astray, I will repay him in kind

After being kept in Cairo for two months (from Rabi. I to Jumada I 917) the Safavid envoy returned to his master carrying al-Ghawri's letter of reply (28).

However, relations between the Safavids and the Mamluks went form bad to worse. In Muharram 918/ April 1512, bad news reached Sultan al-Ghawri from Aleppo to the effect that Safavid infantry battalions had arrived at al-Bira. This news disturbed the Sultan because he had at that time to face disor-

ders caused by the Bedouin tribes of al-Buhayra, the Fayyum and other Egyptian provinces. These were accompanied by devastation of crops, plunder and disorder. Ibn Iyas comments that Sultan al-Ghawri found himself in great difficulties with the Bedouin disorders on one side and the Safavid problem on the other (29).

On Thursday 18 Rabi I 918/3 June 1512 the Mamluk ruler of Sis sent to the Sultan in Cairo ten heads topped with red conical caps of Safavid soldiers whom he had killed while they were rampaging through his domain. Sultan al-Ghawri immediately ordered these heads to be struck on lances and put on display in the streets of Cairo, and finally to be hung on the gates of Bab al-Futuh and Bab al-Nasr. (30) No doubt Shah Ismail was unhappy when he heard this news. He sent a Safavid delegation of about 100 men to Cairo. He sent with them the Mamluk delegation headed by the amir Tamur-Bay which the Shah had kept in Tabriz for two years (31). Two Safavid envoys met Sultan al-Ghawri on 14 Rabi II 918/ 29 June 1512 and handed him a letter which contained «abusive and hard words». Al-Ghawri was enraged. It seems that Shah Ismail blamed the Sultan for parading the Safavid heads in the streets of Cairo and even mocked the Sultan with taunts that he could not engage in combat with him. The Safavid delegation stayed in Cairo for less than one month. It was sent back to Persia with al-Ghawri's reply which also contained abusive words. Ibn Iyas comments on this event by saying that it was the beginning of the enmity between the Sultan and Shah Ismail (32).

Al-Ghawri, by virtue of these experiences, was more conversant with the tactics of Shah Ismail, and more aware of his intentions, than were the Ottomans themselves. When the news of the death of the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II reached Cairo on 2 Jumada I 918/16 July 1512, al-Ghawri mourned him and expressed his grief for the loss. The inhabitants of Cairo were

ordered to mourn the Ottoman Sultan by prayer in the mosques of al-Azhar, al-Hakim and others (33). But when the Mamluk vice-Sultan in Aleppo reported in Rabi II 919/June 1513 that Shah Ismail had been defeated by some of his Tartar enemies, had lost many thousands of troops, and that he himself had been injured and was in hiding — no one knew where, Sultan al-Ghawri was pleased with the news, obviously, because he thought that with this setback Shah Ismail would or could not attack the Mamluk Sultanate at that time (34).

In fact the only thing which saved the Mamluk Sultanate from a definite clash with the Safavid was the transference of the circle of conflict to the Safavid — Ottoman axis. There were many reasons for the emergence of armed struggle between the Safavids and the Ottomans. The Ottomans Empire, the most powerful Sunni authority of the time, could not allow a Safavid defeat of the weakened Mamluk Sultanate because, if it happened, it would mean that the Shi i Shah would become the guardian of the two holy cities of Islam in the Hijaz and the master of the Red Sea trade. Of course there were other reasons such as the case of the amir Ahmad, brother of Sultan Selim I and his rival, who was welcomed by the Shah offered asylum. Other reasons were the Shi ite mutiny which occurred in Asia Minor, against the Ottomans, and the persecution of the Sunni **Fuqaha** in Iraq and Iran(35).

The Safavid and the Ottoman armies met at Chaldiran, near Tabriz, on 2 Rajab 920/23 August 1514. Shah Ismail was defeated and Sultan Selim entered Tabriz. The Ottomans tried to follow Ismail who withdrew eastwards devastating the villages on his way in order to weaken the Ottoman advance and lengthen their supply lines. Sultan Selim was forced to withdraw because of bad roads, cold weather and over-extended supply routes (36).

The news of the defeat of Shah Ismail reached the Mamluk Sultan al-Ghawri a few days on 10 Rajab/31 August after its occurrence. At the beginning, the Sultan could not believe the news, although he was happy enough with it. He ordered the Quran to be recited in some of the mosques of Cairo and Fustat (37). News of the Ottoman victory was circulated among the inhabitants of Cairo next month (Sha-ban 920\November 1514), but the Sultan did not order the drums to be beaten for festivals as usual in such caases, since he ws determined to wait for confirmation of the news (38). At last on 29 Ramadan 920/17 November 1514 an Ottoman envoy arrived in Cairo carrying a detailed correspondence concerning Ismail's defeat at Chaldiran. The most important point was that even after the arrival of the official news, Sultan al-Ghawri did not order the drums to be beaten and did not declare that Cairo should be decorated in celebration of this occasion. The contemporary historian Ibn Iyas comments : «the reason was not known»(39).

The reason was obvious later on; no doubt Sultan al-Ghawri was aware of the consequences of such a victory, and realized that he would drink from the same cup as Shah Ismail. The Ottomans, after defeating the Safavids, turned their attention to the Mamluks, to the conquest of their lands, to the guardianship of the two holy cities, to extending their influence into the Red Sea and to becoming the hole Muslim power in the area. Ibn Abi al-Surur al-Bakri states that Sultan Selim wanted to destroy the Mamluk Sultanate because good relations had been established between Shah Ismail and al-Ghawri, and during the Ottoman-Safavid war, al-Ghawri had sent his orders to Aleppo to prevent the Ottoman supply trains from reaching the army of Sultan Selim(40). Ibn Tulun reports also that it was circulated among the people that the reason for the Ottman conquest was that Sultan Selim had captured al-Bahlawan, one or al-Ghawri's men, who was carrying a letter from his master to Shah Ismail. In this letter the Mamluk Sultan asked the Persian Shah for help

to fight Sultan Selim(41). In other version al-Ghuzzi states that Sultan al-Ghawri announced among his troops that the purpose of his movement to Syria was to arrange peace between Selim and Shah Ismail. Al-Ghawri adds that when al-Ghawri wrote to Selim about his peace mission, Selim was suspicious of the reasons for such movement and decided to fight the Mamluk Sultan (42).

In the absence of more date one cannot refute or accept such information. In any case, it was two years after the battle of Chaldiran, on Sunday 25 Rajab 922/24 August 1516 Sultan Selim met Sultan al-Ghawri on the field of battle at Marj Dabiq north of Aleppo. Of course the by then weakened Mamluk army could not face up to the firepower of the Ottomans. The Mamluk army was defeated and the Mamluk Sultan al-Ghawri was killed on the battle field. The Ottoman Sultan Selim conquered the cities of Syria and at last reached Cairo. The last Mamluk Sultan Tuman-Bay was defeated at al-Raydaniyya, near Cairo, and in other places, and was hanged at the Zuwayla Gate on 22 Rabi I 923/14 April 1517 (43). In the end Egypt became a provincial territory. but attached to the Empire of the Sunni Ottomans, rather than the Shii Safavids.

Footnotes

- (1) Inalcik, K., **The Ottoman Empire, The classical age 1300—1600** (London, 1973), pp. 23-40; Holt, P.M. **Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516—1922**, (London, 1966), pp. 23-32
- (2) For the decline of the Mamluk Sultanate in the later middle age, cf. Lapez, Miskimin and Udovitch, «England to Egypt. 1350-1500», in Cook, M., **Studies in the economic history of the Middle East**, (London, 1970), pp. 115-128.
- (3) Savory, R.M., 'Safavid Persia', in **The Cambridge History of Islam**, I. p. 398.
- (4) Sharaf Khan al-Bidlisi, **Sharaf nama**, Arabic translation by Muhammad 'Ali Awni, (Cairo, 1962), II, pp. 118-129; Sykes, p., **A History of Persia**, 3rd ed. (London 1963), II, pp. 158-62; Savory, 'Safavid Persia'. p. 399.
- (5) For the iqta system during the Heyday of the Mamluk Sultanate, cf. Rabie, H., **The financial system of Egypt A.H. 564-741\A.D. 1169-1341**, (London, 1972), pp. 26-72.
- (6) See, al-Maqrizi (Ahmad ibn Ali), **Ighathat al-umma bi-kashf al-Ghumma**, (Cairo, 1940), pp. 32-47; Rabie, op. cit. pp. 20-22, 49; Dols M. W., **The black death in the Middle East**, (1976).
- (7) Serjeant, R. B., **The Portugeuse off the South Arabian Coast**, (London, 1963), pp. 13-21.
- (8) Ibn Tulun (Shams al-Din Muhammad). **Mufakahat al-Khilan fi hawadith al-zaman**, ed. Muhammad Mostafa, (Cairo, 1962), I, p. 252.
- (9) Ibid., I. p. 261.
- (10) Ibn Iyas (Muhammad ibn Ahmad), **Bada'i al-Zuhur fi waqa'i al-duhur**, 2nd edition, ed. Muhammad Mostafa, Vol. IV (Cairo 1960), pp. 46-7.
- (11) Ibn Tulun, **Mufakaha**, I. pp. 316-17.

- (12) Ibn Iyas, *Bada i*, IV, p. 118; for the Mamluk army of, Ayalon, D., 'Studies on the structure of the Mamluk army', BSOAS, XV (1953), pp. 203-28, 448-76, XVI (1954). pp. 57-90.
- (13) Ibn Iyas, *Bada i*, IV, pp. 118-9, 121-2.
- (14) Ibn Tulun, *Mufakaha*, I, p. 318.
- (15) Ibn Iyas, *Bada i*, IV, pp. 123-4.
- (16) *Ibid.*, IV, p. 146.
- (17) Cf. Ibn Iyas, *Bada i*, IV, pp. 82, 129, 163; Darrag, A. al-**Mamalik wa al-Firanj**, (Cairo, 1961), pp. 127-57.
- (18) Ibn Iyas. *Bada i*, IV, pp. 191, 205.
- (19) Ibn Tulun, *Mufakaha*, I, pp. 342-3.
- (20) Ibn Iyas, *Bada i*, IV, p. 205; for the **Nazer al-Khass** who became the most important official in the Mamluk Sultanate after 1329, cf., Rabie, H., *op. cit.*, pp. 142-4.
- (21) Ibn Iyas, *Bada i*, IV, pp. 184, 265, 271, see below, p.
- (22) *Ibid.*, IV, p. 207.
- (23) Ibn Tulun, *Mufakaha*, I, p. 354.
- (24) Ibn Iyas, *Bada i*, IV, pp. 218-20.
- (25) *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 221-2; Ibn Tulun *Mufakaha*, I, p. 357; for al-Ghawri's gardens, cf. Azzam (Abd al-Wahhab), **Majalis al-Sultan al-Ghawri**. (Cairo, 1941), pp. 29-30.
- (26) Ibn Iyas, *Bada i*, IV, p. 221.
- (27) *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 222-7.
- (28) Ibn Tulun, *Mufakaha*, I, p. 357.
- (29) Ibn Iyas, *Badai*, IV, pp. 256-7.
- (30) *Ibid.*, IV, p. 262.
- (31) *Ibid.* IV, p. 265 ff. see above, pp. 41-2.
- (32) *Ibid.*, IV, p. 271.
- (33) *Ibid.*, IV, p. 270.
- (34) *Ibid.*, IV, p. 311.

- (35) cf. al-Ghuzzi, **al-Kawakib al-sa'ira fi a'yan al-mi'a al-shira**, MS., Dar al-Kutub (Egyptian National Library), no. 1206 **Tarikh**, Vol. I, fol. 398; Savory, *Safavid Persia*, pp. 399-400; Helt, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-5; Inalick, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
- (36) Sharaf Khan al-Bidlisi, **Sharaf Nama**, II, pp. 140-1; al-Ghuzzi, **al-Kawakib**, I, fols. 398-9; Savory, *Safavid Persia*, pp. 400-1; Inalcik, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
- (37) Ibn Iyas, **Bada'i**, IV, p. 393.
- (38) *Ibid.*, IV, p. 396.
- (39) *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 402-4.
- (40) Ibn Abi al-Surur al-Bakri, **al-Minah al-rahmaniyya fi al-dawa al-Uthmaniyya**, MS. Dar al-Kutub, Cairo, no. 1926 **Tarikh**, fol. 21 r-v; *id.*, **al-Kawakib al-Sa'ira fi Akhbar Misr wa al-Qahira**, (available in photocopy as No. 2112 **Tarikh Taymur**, Dar al-Kutub, Cairo), fol. 18 t.
- (41) Ibn Tulun, **Mufakaha**. II, p. 23.
- (42) al-Ghuzzi, **al-Kawakib**, I, fol. 399.
- (43) Ibn Iyas, **Bada'i al-Zuhur**, Vol. V ed. M. Mostafa (Cairo - Wiesbaden 1961), pp. 60-177; al-Tshbili (Ali ibn Muhammad), **al-Durr al-musan fi sirat al-Muzaffar Selim Khan**, ed. H. Ernst, (Cairo, 1962), pp. 8-16; Ibn Tulun, **Mufakah**. II, pp. 23-4; (Cairo, 1962), pp. 8-16; Ibn Tulu Sultan al-Ghawri ma'a Selim al-Uthmani, ed. Abd al-Mun'im Amir (Cairo, 1962), pp. 26 ff; Ibn Abi al-Surur al-Bakri, **al-Minah**, fol. 21 v; Ziada, M.M., *Nihayat Salatin al-Mamalik, al-Mijalla al-Tarikhyya al-Misriyya*, Vol. IV, i (1951); Lewis. B., *Egypt and Syria; in the Cambridge History of Islam I*, pp. 229-230; Holt, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-41.