الوعي البشري بين الإرادة الحرة ومسئولية الالتزام الخلقي | ||||
| مجلة الدراسات الإنسانية والأدبية | ||||
| Article 8, Volume 26, Issue 3, January 2022, Page 328-364 | ||||
| Document Type: المقالة الأصلية | ||||
| DOI: 10.21608/shak.2022.232866 | ||||
 View on SCiNiTO | ||||
| Author | ||||
| د/ محمد حامد ذکي همام | ||||
| Abstract | ||||
| أصبح الوعي الآن موضوعًا مثيرًا، وقد فتحت التطورات الحديثة المثيرة في علم النفس هذا الميدان لعلماء البيولوجيا والأعصاب وعلماء النفس والفلاسفة، اکتسبت فکرة أنماط السلوک البشري _ بسبب عوامل خارجة عن سيطرتنا الواعية _ القدرة على جذب وتجديد الاهتمام بالمشکلة القديمة للإرادة الحرة. ولتقييم ما يمکن أن تخبرنا به هذه التطورات التجريبية بشکل صحيح عن الإرادة الحرة والمسئولية الأخلاقية؛ فإننا نحتاج أولًا إلى توضيح الأسئلة التالية: هل الوعي ضروري للإرادة الحرة ؟ وإذا کان الأمر کذلک، فما هو الدور أو الوظيفة التي يجب أن تؤديها الإرادة ؟ على سبيل المثال، وهل الأفراد مسئولون أخلاقيًّا عن الأفعال والسلوکيات التي يتم إجراؤها تلقائيًّا أو بدون تحکم أو توجيه واعٍ ؟ هل هم مسئولون أخلاقيًّا عن الأفعال والأحکام والمواقف التي تنجم عن التحيزات الضمنية أو السمات الظرفية لمحيطهم والتي لا يدرکونها؟ إن توضيح العلاقة بين الوعي والإرادة الحرة أمر حتمي إذا أردنا تقييم الحجج المختلفة المؤيدة والمعارضة للإرادة الحرة. Consciousness is now an exciting topic, and exciting recent developments in psychology have opened this field up to biologists, neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers. The idea of patterns of human behavior due to factors beyond our conscious control has gained the ability to attract and renew interest in the ancient problem of free will. To properly assess what these empirical developments can tell us about free will and moral responsibility, we first need to clarify the following questions: Is consciousness necessary for free will? If so, what role or function should the will play? For example, are individuals morally responsible for actions and behaviors that are performed automatically or without conscious control or direction? Are they morally responsible for actions, judgments, and attitudes that result from implicit biases or situational features of their surroundings that they are not aware of? Clarifying the relationship between consciousness and free will is imperative if we are to evaluate the various arguments for and against free will. | ||||
| Keywords | ||||
| الإرادة الحرة; المسئولية الأخلاقية; الوعي; الوعي الإرادي ) | ||||
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Supplementary Files
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| References | ||||
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[1] - Levy, N. (2014) Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press. And see Caruso, G.D. (2015b) “If Consciousness is Necessary for Moral Responsibility, then People are Less Responsible than We Think,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7–8): 49–60.
[1] - Caruso, G.D., and Mo rris, S.G. (2016) “Compatibilism and Retributive Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of Central Philosophical and Practical Importance,” Erkenntnis 81: and see Feinberg, J. (1970) “Justice and Personal Desert,” in his Doing and Deserving, Princeton: Princeton University Press.and see Pereboom, D. (2001) Living Without Free Will, Oxford: Cambridge University Press.and see alsoe Strawson, G. (1994) “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Studies 75: 5–24.
[1] - د.رءوف عبيد، في التسيير والتخيير بين الفلسفة العامة وفلسفة القانون، مجلة العلوم القانونية والاقتصادية، العدد الثاني، السنة الحادية عشرة، جامعة عين شمس، مصر، ١٩٦٩، ص 109
[1] - توماس بينک، الإرادة الحرة ترجمة/ ياسر حسن، مراجعة/ ضياء ورّاد، الطبعة الأولى، مؤسسة هنداوي للتعليم والثقافة، القاهرة، ٢٠١٥، ص ٣١
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[1] - د.حسن علي ذنو، فلسفة القانون، الطبعة الأولى، مطبعة العاني، بغداد، ١٩٧٥، ص ٢١٧
[1] - Pereboom, D. (2001) Living Without Free Will, Oxford: Cambridge University Press. And Pereboom, D. (2014) Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press.and see Caruso, G.D. (2012) Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
[1] - Levy, N. (2011) Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press.
[1] - Strawson, G. (1986) Freedom and Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press [revised edition 2010]. And see Strawson, G. (1994) “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Studies 75: 5–24.
[1] - توماس بينک، الإرادة الحرة ترجمة / ياسر حسن، مراجعة/ ضياء ورّاد، الطبعة الأولى ,ص 21 [1] - هو الفيلسوف النمساوي کارل بوبر(1902- 1994) د.عبد الله محراش، الحرية والحتمية، دروس الفلسفة، منشورة على الإنترنت على الموقع : http://cdhsos.yoo7.com/t76-topic
[1] - Libet, B., Gleason, C.A., Wright, E. W., and Pearl, D. K. (1983) “Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act,” Brain 106: 623–642.
[1] - Baumeister, R.F. (2008) “Free Will in Scientific Psychology,” Perspectives of Psychological Science 3: 17
[1] - Nadelhoffer, T. (2011) “The Threat of Shrinking Agency and Free Will Disillusionism,” in L. Nadel and W. Sinnott-Armstrong eds. Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet, New York: Oxford University Press.
[1] - King, M., and Carruthers, P. (2012) “Moral Responsibility and Consciousness,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 9: 200–228.
[1] - Smith, A. (2008) “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment,” Philosophical Studies 138: 367–392.
[1] - Arplay, N., and T. Schroeder. (1999) “Praise, Blame and the Whole Self,” Philosophical Studies 93: 161–199.
[1] - Smith, A. (2005) “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics 115: 236–271.
[1] - Yaffe, G. (2012) “The Voluntary Act Requirement,” in M. Andrei (ed.) Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law, New York: Routledge. 182
[1] - Sher, G. (2009) Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness, New York: Oxford University Press.
[1] - Smith, A. (2005) “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics 115: 237.
[1] - Levy, N. (2014) Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press.1
[1] - Ibid 7
[1] - Ibid 31
[1] - Ibid 36
[1] - Caruso, G.D. (2012) Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. P 100
[1] - Ibid 131
[1] - Caruso, G.D. (2015a) “Précis of Neil Levy’s Consciousness and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7–8): 7–15. And Caruso, G.D. (2015b) “If Consciousness is Necessary for Moral Responsibility, then People are Less Responsible than We Think,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7–8): 49–60.
[1] - Pereboom, D., and Caruso, G.D. (2017) “Hard-Incompatibilism Existentialism: Neuroscience, Punishment,and Meaning in Life,” in G.D. Caruso and O. Flanagan (eds.) Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience, New York: Oxford University Press.
[1] - Rosenthal, D. (2005) Consciousness and Mind, New York: Oxford University Press.
[1] - Shepherd, J. (2015) “Consciousness, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility: Taking the Folk Seriously,” Philosophical Psychology 28: 938.
[1] - Libet, B. (1999) “Do We Have Free Will?” Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8–9): 47–57, reprinted in R. Kane (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
[1] - Soon, C.S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.J., and Haynes, J.D. (2008) “Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain,” Nature Neuroscience 11: 543–545.
[1] - Mele, A. (2009) Effective Intentions, New York: Oxford University Press.
[1] - Soon, C.S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.J., and Haynes, J.D. (2008) “Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain,” Nature Neuroscience 11: 543–545.
[1] - Levy, N. (2014) Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press. 16
[1] - Ibid 39
[1] - Siddiqui, F., Osuna, E., and Chokroverty, S. (2009) “Writing Emails as Part of Sleepwalking After Increase in Zolpidem,” Sleep Medicine 10: 262–264.
[1] - Levy, N. (2014) Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press. 87
[1] - Ibid 88
[1] - Ibid 89
[1] - Ibid 90
[1] - Ibid 94
[1] - Ibid 94
[1] - Ibid 95
[1] - Ibid 132
[1] - سام هاريس، الإرادة الحرة، ترجمة هيبة خطاب، ص 67 [1] - المرجع السابق ص 68 [1] - المرجع السابق ص 69 [1] - سوزان بلاکمور، الوعي مقدمة قصيرة جدا، ترجمة مصطفى محمد فؤاد، الطبعة الأولى، مؤسسة هنداوي للتعليم والثقافة,ص85 [1] - سام هاريس، الإرادة الحرة ص 70 [1] - المرجع السابق ص 71 [1] - S. J. Blackmore, (2003) Consciousness: An Introduction (London:Hodder & Stoughton; New York:Oxford University Press,p. 66
[1] - B. Libet, (1985)‘Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action’, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8:529–39
[1] - سام هاريس، الإرادة الحرة ص 74 [1] - سوزان بلاکمور، الوعي مقدمة قصيرة جدًّا، ترجمة مصطفى محمد فؤاد, ص 90 [1] - Caruso, G.D. (2015b) “If Consciousness is Necessary for Moral Responsibility, then People are Less Responsible than We Think,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7–8): 49–60.
[1] - Searle, J. (2000) “Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10): 9.
[1] - Ibid 10
[1] - Searle, J. (2007) Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language and Political Power, New York: Columbia University Press. 42
[1] - Searle, J. (2000) “Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10): 16
[1] - Hodgson, D. (2005) “A Plain Person’s Free Will,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1): 4.
[1] - Ibid 17
قائمة المصادر والمراجع العربية 1- إدمون هورسل، فکرة الفينومنيولوجيا، ترجمة، د فتحي إنقزو، مرکز التوزيع لدراسات الوحدة العربية 2- توماس بينک، الإرادة الحرة، ترجمة: ياسر حسن، مراجعة: ضياء ورّاد، الطبعة الأولى، مؤسسة هنداوي للتعليم والثقافة,القاهرة، ٢٠١٥م . 3- جودتشاکرمحمود،حريةالارادةوالحتميةفيسلوکالإنسان، بحثمنشورعلىالإنترنت علىالموقع: http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=280211 4- د.حسنعليذ نون، فلسفةالقانون,الطبعةالأولى، مطبعةالعاني، بغداد، ١٩٧٥. 5- رءوفعبيد،فيالتسييروالتخييربينالفلسفةالعامةوفلسفةالقانون، مجلةالعلومالقانونيةوالاقتصادية، العددالثاني، السنةالحاديةعشرة، جامعةعينشمس، مصر،١٩٦٩م. 6- سام هاريس، الإرادة الحرة، ترجمة هيبة خطاب . 7- سوزان بلاکمور، الوعي مقدمة قصيرة جدًّا، ترجمة مصطفى محمد فؤاد، الطبعة الأولى، مؤسسة هنداوي للتعليم والثقافة. 8- صلاح محمود عثمان، المنطق متعدد القيم بين درجات الصدق وحدود المعرفة، منشأه المعارف، الإسکندرية، 2002م. 9- د.عبداللهمحراش، الحريةوالحتمية، دروس الفلسفة, منشورةعلىالإنترنتعلىالموقع : http://cdhsos.yoo7.com/t76-topic قائمة المصادر والمراجع الأجنبية 1 - Arplay, N., and T. Schroeder. (1999) “Praise, Blame and the Whole Self,” Philosophical Studies 93: 161–199.
2 - Baumeister, R.F. (2008) “Free Will in Scientific Psychology,” Perspectives of Psychological Science 3: 17
3 - Caruso, G.D. (2012) Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. P 100
4 - Caruso, G.D. (2015a) “Précis of Neil Levy’s Consciousness and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7–8): 7–15.
5 - Caruso, G.D. (2015b) “If Consciousness is Necessary for Moral Responsibility, then People are Less Responsible than We Think,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7–8): 49–60.
6 - Caruso, G.D., and Morris, S.G. (2016) “Compatibilism and Retributive Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of Central Philosophical and Practical Importance,” Erkenntnis 81:
7 - Feinberg, J. (1970) “Justice and Personal Desert,” in his Doing and Deserving, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
8 - Hodgson, D. (2005) “A Plain Person’s Free Will,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (1): 4.
9 - King, M., and Carruthers, P. (2012) “Moral Responsibility and Consciousness,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 9: 200–228.
10 - Levy, N. (2011) Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press.
11 - Levy, N. (2014) Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press.
12 - Libet, B., Gleason, C.A., Wright, E. W., and Pearl, D. K. (1983) “Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act,” Brain 106: 623–642.
13 - Libet, B. (1999) “Do We Have Free Will?” Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8–9): 47–57, reprinted in R. Kane (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
14 - Libet, B, (1985)‘Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action’, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8
15 - Mele, A. (2009) Effective Intentions, New York: Oxford University Press.
16 - Nadelhoffer, T. (2011) “The Threat of Shrinking Agency and Free Will Disillusionism,” in L. Nadel and W. Sinnott-Armstrong eds. Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet, New York: Oxford University Press.
17 - Pereboom, D. (2001) Living Without Free Will, Oxford: Cambridge University Press.
18 - Pereboom, D. (2014) Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
19 - Pereboom, D., and Caruso, G.D. (2017) “Hard-Incompatibilism Existentialism: Neuroscience, Punishment,and Meaning in Life,” in G.D. Caruso and O. Flanagan (eds.) Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience, New York: Oxford University Press
20 - Rosenthal, D. (2005) Consciousness and Mind, New York: Oxford University Press.
21 - Searle, J. (2000) “Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (10): 9.
22 - Searle, J. (2007) Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language and Political Power, New York: Columbia University Press.
23 - S. J. Blackmore, (2003) Consciousness: An Introduction (London:Hodder & Stoughton; New York:Oxford University Press.
24 - Shepherd, J. (2015) “Consciousness, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility: Taking the Folk Seriously,” Philosophical Psychology 28: 938.
25 - Sher, G. (2009) Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness, New York: Oxford University Press.
26 - Siddiqui, F., Osuna, E., and Chokroverty, S. (2009) “Writing Emails as Part of Sleepwalking After Increase in Zolpidem,” Sleep Medicine 10: 262–264.
27 - Smith, A. (2005) “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics 115: 236–271.
28 - Smith, A. (2008) “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment,” Philosophical Studies 138: 367–392.
29 - Soon, C.S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.J., and Haynes, J.D. (2008) “Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human Brain,” Nature Neuroscience 11: 543–545.
30 - Strawson, G. (1986) Freedom and Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press [revised edition 2010].
31 - Strawson, G. (1994) “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Studies .
32 - Yaffe, G. (2012) “The Voluntary Act Requirement,” in M. Andrei (ed.) Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law, New York: Routledge.
مواقع الإنترنت https://politics.rice.edu/faculty/george-sher
https://u.osu.edu/grc/ logos /Susan_R._Wolf
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