

Brotherhood & political Islam in Egypt: Recoil from politics to violence

الإخوان والإسلام السياسي في مصر: الارتداد من السياسة إلى العنف

Heba salama Abokelila

Beni-Suef University, Egypt

Abstract

the Muslim Brotherhood organization was founded by a teacher called "Hassan Al-Banna" as a charity. During this century, the organization practiced official behavior at times and unofficial at other times. It has practiced this behavior in several areas in Egyptian society between social charitable work, political work, violence and terrorism, However, 2011 is the pivotal turning point since the inception of the organization, Where limited and intermittent practices of this organization shifted from the background to the foreground in an exceptional and defining moment the organization has not been available since its inception. However, the organization quickly failed to assume an official role, presenting itself as a national faction. Because it had been accustomed to radical ideas for eighty years, it was difficult for it to give up those ideas and think of a broader approach. it turned to exclusion, violence and terror, ending its moment of politics and starting its usual path of violence and terror. Hence the importance of this research to assess the experience of political Islam in Egypt after 2011, in order to explore the future of it in the foreseeable future, and by answering a major question: Has political Islam as an official political actor in Egypt ended in the foreseeable future? In this study, the researcher uses the systems analysis approach of David Easton to determine the reasons for the encroachment of political Islam into the Egyptian public sphere after 2011, and the implications of its withdrawal from the scene.

Keywords: The Muslim Brotherhood; Political Islam; Islamic Parties; The Egyptian Regime.

المستخلص:

مارس الاخوان المسلمون السلوك الرسمي في بعض الأحيان وغير الرسمي في أوقات أخرى. وقد مارست هذا السلوك في عدة مجالات في المجتمع المصري بين العمل الاجتماعي الخيري والعمل السياسي والعنف والإرهاب، إلا أن عام ٢٠١١ هو نقطة التحول في لحظة إستثنائية ومحددة لم تكن متاحة لها منذ إنشائها. ومع ذلك، سرعان ما فشل التنظيم في الإضطلاع بدور رسمي، حيث قدم نفسه علي أنه فصيل وطني. ولأنها اعتادت علي الأفكار المتطرفة لمدة ثمانين عاماً، كان من الصعب عليها التخلي عن تلك الأفكار والتفكير في نهج آخر. واتجهت إلي الإقصاء والعنف والإرهاب، منهية لحظتها السياسية وبدء طريقها المعتاد من العنف والإرهاب. ومن هنا تأتي أهمية البحث لتقييم تجربة الإسلام السياسي في مصر بعد ٢٠١١، من أجل أستكشاف مستقبله في المستقبل المنظور، ومن خلال الإجابة عن سؤال رئيسي: هل انتهى الإسلام السياسي بصفته فاعلا سياسيا رسميا في مصر بالمستقبل المنظور؟ يستخدم الباحث هذه الدراسة منهج تحليل النظم لديفيد ايستون لتحديد أسباب زحف الإسلام السياسي علي المجال العام المصري عام ٢٠١١، وتداعيات انسحابه من المشهد السياسي.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الإخوان المسلمون، الإسلام السياسي، مصر، النظام المصري، الأحزاب الإسلامية.

Abstract:

Seven years later, it will be a century since the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in March 1928. This organization was founded by a teacher called "Hassan Al-Banna" as a charity. During this century, the organization practiced official behavior at times and unofficial at other times. It has practiced this behavior in several areas in Egyptian society between social charitable work, political work, violence and terrorism, However, 2011 is the pivotal turning point since the inception of the organization, Where limited and intermittent practices of this organization shifted from the background to the foreground in an exceptional and defining moment the organization has not been available since its inception.

However, the organization quickly failed to assume an official role, presenting itself as a national faction. Because it had been accustomed to radical ideas for eighty years, it was difficult for it to give up those ideas and think of a broader approach. it

turned to exclusion, violence and terror, ending its moment of politics and starting its usual path of violence and terror.

Hence the importance of this research to assess the experience of political Islam in Egypt after 2011, in order to explore the future of it in the foreseeable future, and by answering a major question: Has political Islam as an official political actor in Egypt ended in the foreseeable future?

In this study, the researcher uses the systems analysis approach of David Easton to determine the reasons for the encroachment of political Islam into the Egyptian public sphere after 2011, and the implications of its withdrawal from the scene.

Study division:

First: The Brotherhood's position on political Islam.

Second: The reasons for the Brotherhood's encroachment on the public scene after 2011.

Third: The clash between the Brotherhood and the homeland:

Habituation to hidden behavior.

Fourth: The Brotherhood's withdrawal from the scene: the easy losing alternatives.

Fifthly: The impact of international , reginal and domestic context on brotherhood .

Sixthly: The future of political Islam and the Brotherhood in Egypt: narrow alternatives

The first topic; incorporating Islamic parties on the map of political Islam after January 2011

The objectives and strategies of the "Islamic Movement" in general, and in the political affairs in particular, have varied differences across the opposite sides, beginning with the indulgence and co-existence of the historical moment, intending to attempt to radically, directly or violently change that historical moment. The

Islamic Movement has poured their disparate goals and strategies into two purposes of transcendence: "Governance by God, or Revival of the Islamic Caliphate."

As contemporary political life has evolved and the Islamic Movement has moved forward, experience has accumulated, goals and strategies have changed. The political and security map in the Egyptian landscape has shifted in favor of political action, "Al-Wasat party," "Islamic Renewal," "New Islamists," or "New Islamic Cultural Project."

The researcher seeks to highlight the idea of a state in Islamic parties through the first topic and then to drop on these parties' political map after January 2011

1-The state in the political thought of the Islamic parties:

It was influenced - and declared affected - by original references in the crystallization of its political thought, especially its diagnosis of the state's concept. Therefore, in this regard, it is possible to distinguish between four types of references or four generations of references, the first of which is the historical references or "first-generation references" in Islamic political thought. These include the Al-Wasat Party and its leadership, like other affiliates of the Islamic movement, such as the writings of Imam "Al-Mawardi", and to a lesser degree - or unannounced writings of Imam "Ibn Taymiyyah".

The second of these types are the "references of the second generation" the writings of the Islamic reformers in the aftermath of the European Renaissance, such as Jamal al-Din al- Afghani, Muhammad Abdo, and Rashid Rida, and the third of those references are the references of the "third generation" that crystallized in the wake of the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate, which had an impact in the research In Islamic political thought,¹ what helped overcome the crisis that occurred in the thoughts and souls of Muslims at the time, namely the writings of Hassan Al-Banna and Hassan Al-Ashmawi, and to one degree or another the writings of Tawfiq Al-Shawi, author of the book "The Jurisprudence of the Consultation and Consultation," and "Abdel-Raziq Al-Sanhouri," all the way to For the writings and contributions of the fourth generation, which is the generation of contemporaries such as "Muhammad Salim Al-Awa," "Tariq Al-Bishri," "Fahmi Huwaidi," "Ahmed Kamal Abu Al-Majd," "Yusef Al-Qaradawi," and "Sheikh Muhammad Al-Ghazali, may

God have mercy on him." The contributions of the fourth generation of contemporaries revolved around the discourse of Islamic renewal. Al-Sanhuri divided the caliphate for the whole (the rightly guided caliphate) and deficient (the caliphate of the states following it). Hassan al-Ashmawi also distinguished what he called the "problem of governance" between the divine and the human.²

Tawfiq al-Shawi also reached the necessity of separating the religious and juristic imamate and the political imamate. Fahmi Huwaidi adds to them regarding what he calls "the democratic reading". So that most of the contemporaries ended up accepting many Western ideas in politics and governance after rationalizing them, so to speak, speaking some of them On "Islamic democracy," speaking about the concept of shura as a genuine Islamic concept, it is the theoretical basis for current efforts to build democracy, as Yusuf al- Qaradawi issued a fatwa in 1993 accepting political pluralism, partisan competition, and democracy, which is the fatwa on which the figures of Islamic parties, especially those described as moderation, were based Like the Al-Wasat Party and a strong Egypt, which some considered an apparent contradiction to Hassan Al-Banna's vision in this regard.³

By assessing the previous, it can be said that although the Islamic parties did not explicitly call the "Islamic State" closer or away from the idea of the caliphate as the Wasat Party, they were influenced by previous thinkers who dealt with this clearly and tightly, even if the coherence and apparent dimension of the intellectual proposition appeared from.⁴

He proposed the idea of an "Islamic state", a coherence that dates back to nearly two decades of crystallizing his ideological rhetoric after announcing the separation of its leadership from the Brotherhood in 1996 AD, where the party and its officials believe that "Islam is a religion and a state" and that the "Islam project is a complete law." However, the problem is in their view Related to "translating it into contemporary reality," stressing the necessity of "renewing the Islamic political project and not recalling history because it was human endeavor linked to the time in which it was" as they put it.⁵

While it is evident the blurring and modernity of the idea of the Strong Egypt Party regarding the concept of the "Islamic State" due to considerations of the novelty of its intellectual proposition and the lack of clarity of the boundaries of the

differentiation, from the opinion of the Muslim Brotherhood, from whom he split in the first half of 2011 on the one hand, and it's evident influence.⁶

His writings with the ideas of "Hassan Al-Banna", such as his article published on the first of May 2011 on his official website, which he started with words of Imam Al-Banna are (thus, Brotherhood, God wanted us to inherit this legacy burdened with consequences and for the light of your vocation to shine in the folds of this darkness and that God prepares you to raise his sword and reveal his law).

And the establishment of his state again, and may God grant us victory to those who support him, for God is strong and mighty." Speaking about reform in Imam Al-Banna's thought, he indicates that the considerations of dissent from the Muslim Brotherhood are related to the difference over the practice rather than the criticism of his ideological proposition.⁷

The researcher concludes in this regard by recalling the idea of Imam al-Mawardi, may God have mercy on him regarding the state in Islam. The state is with him, and I have the first generation thinkers but have many foundations, the first of which is the principle of "ruling by what God has revealed" or the principle of "governance," the principle of "equality," the canon of "justice" The focus of "shura," the principle of "obedience." Still, as for "the caliphate," some view it as "a public authority in matters of religion and the world on behalf of the Messenger, may God bless him and grant him peace," or according to the standard Islamic description, "politics of the world and guarding religion" which is an intellectual proposition It is clear that Islamic parties seek in their politics and ideology.

3-The Political map of political parties after January 2011:

The movement of the Egyptian street in January 2011, described as the "January 25 Revolution", had a significant role in bringing about radical, momentary changes in some and profoundly in the other in the Egyptian political scene, which led to many changes in the characteristics and the change of the actors themselves, or a change in the vision and behavior of some of them in the political arena, in an attempt to understand the nature of the current moment at that time and what was raised by the slogans.

Perhaps the most prominent changes witnessed in the political arena were the emergence of many new political parties, some of which were created as a result of the reactions of the Egyptian street in January 2011.

Some of them were established in the corridors of civil society institutions or organizations described as "Islamic." Others were created in the galleries of businessmen companies after the emergence of small nationalist and nationalist parties.⁸

One of the features of that stage was the emergence of parties that were described as Islamic, at least on the media level or for considerations of their intellectual reference, and represented an extension, to one degree or another, of older activist groups practiced in what is known as "political Islam," and new parties were established that attached themselves the civil status. In addition to the parties that have continued at the Mubarak regime, they sought to accommodate this movement's variables at the time.

It is worth referring to partisan life in Egypt that originated at the beginning of the twentieth century, specifically in the year 1907, which announced the emergence of the National Party, the first of the Egyptian parties by the leader Mustafa Kamal,

The emergence of the "revolution of July 1952", which had promised to enter a new journey of political action, with the emergence of a single political organization at the expense of the presence of other parties, and the arrival of the era of Sadat, who restored pluralism in the mid-1970s.

The study reviews essential Islamic political parties present in the Egyptian political arena after many agreed to call it the "January Revolution", which was previously referred to in more detail:

- **Freedom and Justice Party:**

After a date that lasted more than 80 years, the Muslim Brotherhood managed to obtain the legitimacy deed by agreeing to establish the Freedom and Justice Party on June 6, 2011, to be the political arm of the group,

which represents an important step towards integrating the group into the political process in a legitimate manner, before the political scene exploded, as many agreed

After calling it the "June 30 Revolution" to end the rule of the Brotherhood, and then dissolve the Freedom and Justice Party and ban parties based on religion.

The number of founding members of the party reached about 9 thousand people, which is 4 thousand more than the number of the political parties' law after the so-called "January 2011 revolution".⁹

The party's program witnessed several amendments to what the Brotherhood proposed in 2007, and it sparked criticism as the Brotherhood deleted the controversial paragraphs, the most important of which was the role of clerics in political and legislative life, as the party's scope for the need for clerical oversight over the process of issuing parliamentary legislation. It was in 2007 when it was likened to Wilayat al-Faqih in Iran, and the paragraph that recognized the importance of the existence of religious functions for the state, which implicitly meant the exclusion of Copts and non-Muslims from leadership positions in the state, especially the role of head of state, was deleted.¹⁰

Likewise, the party did not oppose the nomination or election of women for government positions but instead chose not to delve into the issue of their political rights.

Freedom and Justice Party had won an overwhelming majority in the 2012 House of Representatives elections in the list and individual, within the framework of the Democratic Alliance that the party led, as it won 235 seats out of the total 508 seats in the House of Representatives with a percentage of 46.5% before the House of Representatives was dissolved by a court ruling. The invalidation of the law that occurred was held for the elections in June 2012.

Within the framework of the Democratic Alliance, the party ran in the Shura Council elections, where it won 106 seats out of a total of 180 seats, by 59%, in addition to the election of Dr.Saad Al-Katatni, the party's leader as Speaker of the People's Assembly, as well as Dr. Ahmed Fahmy as Chairman of the Shura Council.¹¹

At the end of this topic, it can be said that from the point of view of the Islamic parties 'view of the Egyptian state, according to their program, there are ideas that have a clearer, more specific and coherent vision, such as the Center Party, and more ambiguous ones, such as the Strong Egypt Party, and a more militant third such as justice and freedom, they publicly announced, although they did not object to the

concept of The state, however, called for those affirming the Arab identity, freedom of expression, integrity of elections, separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, social justice, combating poverty and corruption, and economic planning with a significant social dimension, to clarify the gap between the ideology and ideology of those parties, which was the way out in Its programs emphasize the "human being", its building and its development, which the researcher sees, although it is a way out of the areas of intellectual clash in the form of the state and its philosophy, but it clearly showed the extent of their influence with the "philosophy of the Muslim Brotherhood" in reform as will be shown later, in addition to this major party, there were small parties that believe in the same ideology and playing its helping role, one way or another as “The Nour Party known by media as Alnour Alsalafi party”, “Al-Wasat party”, “The "Strong Egypt" party”.

The Second topic: The Reasons of Islamic parties involvement in the scene after 2011

Firstly, the causes Islamic involvement in power after January 2011

In this regard, it is necessary to shed light on the most important considerations that were driving the Islamic advance after January 2011, including Political reasons related to the general context, such as the fluidity of the scene, internal political reasons related to the desire to possess the background fully, political reasons related to political Islam in itself. Such as the desire to achieve the desired and lost dream, the caliphate, global political reasons for the favorable global context.

During the post-January 2011 period, the country witnessed several security dilemmas, the most important and dangerous of which was the insecurity that the Egyptian state suffered from for quite some time, as well as calls by the so-called "revolutionary forces" for reform and restructuring of the security establishment in Egypt.

And what is known as the demand for accountability for the perpetrators? In killing protesters during the January Revolution, in addition to the political vacuum that the state suffered from as a result of the collapse of state institutions and the temporary replacement of the military council until the holding of the presidential elections

Moreover, the legislative vacuum is following the dissolution of the parliament, not to mention the security weakness that was left due to the withdrawal of police institutions and the loss of confidence in them following the January events. The state was experiencing changes in its various sectors, so this current exploited the deteriorating condition of the state to fill the political, security, and legislative void through the continuous mobilization process through the various means that will be discussed above to control all state institutions to Islamize the political system in preparation for achieving the greater goal, which is Announcing the rule of the Islamic Caliphate according to the thought and belief of those currents.¹²

The third topic: The intensified conflict between Islamic trends and state institutions after January 2011

1- the judiciary:

The judiciary in Egypt enjoys a degree of reverence from the powers and political parties active in political life in Egypt, and despite the challenges that the judiciary faced before and after January 2011, everyone applauded the need for judicial independence, which is evident from the vision of the vital and central Egyptian parties previously referred to in the previous position, as well as in their cautious behavior towards that institution.

During the intensification of the conflict between the judicial institution and the Muslim Brotherhood, and its call for other Islamic forces to demonstrate in front of the High Court of Justice, in what was then called the Purification of the Judiciary Friday, to demand the purification of the judiciary and the judicial institution and the development of a new law for the judicial authority to reduce the retirement age to 60 years instead of 70 years in force in Egypt , In response to the ruling issued to release former President Mubarak in the case known in the media to kill demonstrators due to the expiration of the legal period for his detention pending the case, but the reaction came from the forces called civilian and some details described as moderate Islamic, rejecting the Brotherhood's calls to participate in demonstrations against the judiciary.¹³

In a statement by the Strong Egypt Party, it called for the start of an expanded dialogue on a transitional justice law to hold the corrupt and criminals accountable, whether criminal or politically, during the Mubarak era and beyond.¹⁴

A new law for the judiciary was set up to lower the retirement age to 60 years instead of 70 years in force in Egypt, in response to the ruling issued to release former President Mubarak in the case known in the media to kill demonstrators due to the expiration of the legal period for his detention pending the suit. Still, the reaction came from He accepted the so-called civil forces and some of the details described as moderate Islamic, rejecting the Brotherhood's calls to participate in demonstrations against the judiciary. In a statement by the Strong Egypt Party, it called for the start of an expanded dialogue on a transitional justice law to hold the corrupt and criminals accountable, criminal or politically, in the Mubarak era and beyond.

The Strong Egypt Party statement stated, "It was not possible to rule for Mubarak's release suddenly, and the discrimination in the age of referral to the pension or the difference in wages among state employees was not surprising until the Judicial Authority Law was suddenly introduced in the Shura Council under the slogan of a cover to preserve the revolution, and the party announced its rejection of uniqueness. The Shura Council to issue the Judicial Authority Law without presenting it is to discuss it with the judges."¹⁵

Following the announcement of the President of the Cairo Criminal Court, Counselor Ahmed Refaat, of life imprisonment for former President Mubarak and his Minister of Interior Habib Al-Adly and innocence of his six assistants and the two sons of former President Mubarak Gamal and Alaa, angry reactions came from the political forces and parties and the so-called revolutionary, where they accused the ruling of being politicized and aimed at conservatism On the survival of the body of the previous regime.¹⁶

Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, the party's leader, who was known as a strong Egypt before the party was established, responded by inviting all of its members to participate in the calls to go to Tahrir Square and all fields of the republic.

In what he called the case of killing protesters, known in the media as the "Battle of the Camels," Abdel Moneim Abul-Fotouh - the party's founders' agent and current

President - commented on the background of the judicial ruling in the case that the Egyptian judicial system is incapable of retribution.¹⁷

The legislative and executive bodies did not support him. He demanded the necessity of holding accountable all those who failed to collect evidence, directing his criticism of other state agencies for their failure to assist the judiciary in expressing an implicit criticism of the judiciary institution.

Despite this, the Strong Egypt Party always affirms in more than one place, a public meeting, and a media above the Egyptian judiciary's integrity, stressing the necessity of what it calls "self-cleansing of the judiciary." The party demands what it calls "revolutionary rulings" that curtail what it calls "revolutionary killers" and restore the rights of "martyrs" who were killed?

They were injured during the events of January 2011, known in the media as the "January Revolution", instead of the acquittal rulings that were issued as a result of the verdict according to "routine law", as the party put it.

The party asserts that it rejects the judiciary's word purification, as it abandons its respect for the Egyptian court.

However, the party participated in what was known as the "Friday of purification of the judiciary" on April 19, 2013, which the Muslim Brotherhood and several political forces called for in Tahrir Square to demand the purification of the judiciary institution, as they described it.¹⁸

The party also attacked a member of the judiciary - Counselor Ahmed Al-Zand, Chairman of the Judges Club - regarding the warning he presented to the Shura Council regarding the Judicial Authority Law, which the Council is discussing, considering this law "as if it did not exist." Essam Shibl, a member of the Supreme Committee of Al-Wasat Party, confirmed that The party refused to warn the ulnar, ensuring that this is an interference in the jurisdiction of the legislative authority, as well as that the only legitimate representative of Egypt's judges is the Supreme Judicial Council, indicating that the judge must abide by what the Shura Council approves of your legislation as an example of the people through elections.

In what is known as the cases of killing protesters, the Al-Wasat Party criticized the ruling on Mubarak, Al-Adli and his aides in the case of the killing of demonstrators, and the party called for a retrial again, considering that this ruling is one of the stages

of the counter- revolution that undermines the gains of the revolution, according to the party's words.

Issam Sultan, the party's deputy leader, demanded that a law be issued to complain to a superior court to try those accused of killing protesters in the wake of Mubarak's trial.

The Assistant Secretary-General of the party, Dr. Hussein Zayed, explained that when the "revolution" occurred, the Mubarak and People's Assembly and Shura regimes were toppled. Therefore, the first steps to reform the judiciary are for judges to recognize that they are human beings like us, and the judicial authority investigates the corruption incidents of some of its members, as he put it.

On the other hand, several young judges in the Young Judges Committee and members of the Public Prosecution Office of the Attorney General Talaat Abdullah, under the leadership of Counselor Hassan Yassin, Assistant Attorney General and Head of the Technical Office of the Public Prosecutor, lost them as subject to the influence of the Wasat Party, especially in light of the many unjustified visits in their view of Issam Sultan, deputy head of the Wasat Party for the Public Prosecutor's Office, which did not happen with other leaders of other political parties, which is what the Young Judges attributed to the relationship that links Counselor Hassan Yassin Al-Jazwi with the Wasat Party through his brother Hussein Yassin Al-Jazwi, who was appointed Secretary-General of the Wasat Party for the Fayoum Governorate.¹⁹

2- The Police authority" The Postponed situation”:

The security vision in Egypt led to the so-called revolution of January 25, 2011, which justified the transformation of the security functions of the state into a goal in itself in many cases, in addition to saving spending with more excellent resources on internal security at the expense of other services such as education, health, and others, in addition to the adoption of individuals belonging to it. To the Egyptian security apparatus - the police - for repression and violations of law and human rights, is leading to the explosion of the situation on January 25, which coincides with the day of the Egyptian Police Day.

However, the two parties of Al-Wasat and Strong Egypt did not speak clearly, as previously indicated in a previous section of this study, about their position on the

police, in particular, wanting to move away from these files, and postpone them to the current moment that will lead to the changes in the Egyptian political scene, or when those files were opened before others.

During the post-January 2011 period, the country witnessed several security dilemmas, the most important and most dangerous of which was the insecurity that the Egyptian state suffered from for quite some time, as well as calls by the so-called "revolutionary forces" for reform and restructuring of the security establishment in Egypt and what is known as the demand for accountability for the perpetrators, In the killing of demonstrators during the January revolution.²⁰

However, the two parties of Al-Wasat and Strong Egypt did not speak clearly, as previously indicated in a previous section of this study, about their position on the police, in particular, wanting to move away from these files, and postpone them to the current moment that will lead to the changes in the Egyptian political scene, or when those files were opened before others.²¹²²²³

During the post-January 2011 period, the country witnessed several security dilemmas, the most important and most dangerous of which was the insecurity that the Egyptian state suffered from for quite some time, as well as calls by the so-called "revolutionary forces" for reform and restructuring of the security establishment in Egypt and what is known as the demand for "accountability for the perpetrators, In the killing of demonstrators during the January revolution.

In what is known as the first events of Mohamed Mahmoud on November 19, 2011, and the second, the Strong Egypt Party demanded the then president, Mohamed Morsi, to dismiss the Minister of the Interior and the interior leaders. They participated directly or indirectly in those events, calling on President Morsi to assume his responsibility for Mohamed Mahmud's second proceedings, as the party put it, and denounced the party.²⁴

In a statement that the Public Prosecutor continued in his position despite his responsibility for the delay and failure to investigate the background of the events and security attacks on the demonstrators, as well as the continuation of the Minister of Interior at the time, Major General Ahmed Jamal El-Din, who was in charge of the Director of Public Security

He also called on the main party to assume its responsibility to purify the Ministry of Interior and other security agencies and hold the Minister of Interior and Interior Commanders accountable for those accused and perpetrators of attacking the demonstrators.

The Strong Egypt Party has organized some special workshops to present the party's vision regarding structuring the interior and seeking international experts and specialists' help to reach desired results that can be applied.²⁵

Hence, the party launched an initiative aimed at restructuring the interior by applying the principle of purifying the interior of all leaders involved in killing demonstrators, attacks on revolutionaries, accountability, and monitoring, and adopting the direction of change and not reform, as well as the civil police apparatus, which means eradicating any military character in it, as described by the party in its initiative.

This initiative included the organizational structure of the Ministry of Interior, which, according to the proposal, consists of 4 aspects : organizational, which provides for economic security, utility police, administrative affairs, criminal research, social safety, guards, insurance, national security, and central security, as well as the human, economic and legislative aspect.

In light of the collapse of the security establishment, the party believes, in its opinion, the necessity of accepting new batches at the Police College from the first graduates of Faculties of Law and Physical Education, and paying attention to wage levels and subjecting the ministry to all forms of oversight according to the description of its initiative.

The Strong Egypt Party proposes that the Minister of Interior be a civilian and creating a position of Director of the Ministry to be a service officer. The party also called for immediate measures to purge the security services of leaders and elements involved in crimes against the people.

The events of the kidnapping of Egyptian soldiers in Sinai in May 2013 came to confirm the party's need to assume political responsibility and its rejection of the failure to extend Egyptian security and military control over the entire territory of Sinai due to the Cam- David agreement for fear of security chaos on the country's borders and leaving our soldiers vulnerable to killing and kidnapping and to protect Egyptian national security.

The party believes that security will not be achieved without political reform, restoring the nation's unity, and achieving economic development that provides prosperity to the people.

The Al-Wasat Party attributed the responsibility for the bloody events that the country witnessed during the transitional phase after the departure of former President Mubarak to the Military Council, as it is the de facto ruler of the country, according to Al-Azab.

It also considered that the responsibility rests with the government - the Ministry of Interior - for its failure to perform security role, so what is happening in the country indicates insecurity. Since the revolution, according to the description of the party.

The Wasat Party has organized several seminars on the relationship between a street man and a security man and how to reach an ideal picture of the relationship between the two parties under the title "Security between the citizen and the policeman."

Abu Al-Ela Madi, party leader, also stated that the new police law, which the Minister of Interior announced, is a regulation of the police law and not as it is said to be a return, especially in light of the return of the emergency law.²⁶

The party demanded, in many of the incidents that citizens are exposed to and that lead to injury or death, to open an investigation into the circumstances of these accidents and to take legal and criminal measures if it is proven that members of the police force are involved in these incidents as described by the party. The party affirms its welcome to peaceful protest demonstrations. Still, it firmly rejects any Acts of violence to not aggravate political matters in light of the country's insecurity in the wake of Mubarak's departure, according to the party's belief.²⁷

3- The Army "The Critical Situation"

The Egyptian military institution topped the political scene directly during the transitional phase, after what is known as the revolution of January 25, 2011, following the departure of Mubarak and the transfer of all its powers to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which bears the responsibility in dealing with an angry street, raising the slogan of living freedom, social justice, and suffering multiple crises at all levels.

During the transitional period, the army leadership had to face interaction with different parties, forces, and political parties described as revolutionary, which have different visions for the future of the country, and then criticism demands for what was called in the media at the time "the Military Council in some issues were raised during the stage until the rise of former President Morsi to the presidency, there were some thorny issues, but the military institution remains in a unique position on the part of the political forces that are described as revolutionary on the basis that they are the protective shield of the homeland and the backbone of the Egyptian state."²⁸

- **Military trials for civilians:**

The Strong Egypt Party expressed its solidarity with the voices calling for the abolition of military trials for civilians, as Abdel Moneim Abu Al-Fotouh, the party's president, said his rejection of any military attempt of civilians before a military court, describing it as a disgrace to the system, especially under the era of a civilian president - Muhammad Morsi - according to the description of the party, and emphasized that the civilian is not prosecuted Before a military court and stressed the bias for freedoms, and confirming this trend, the party participated in the "No to Military Trials" conference on Qorsaya Island, which is on trial about 26 people before a military court for refusing to give up their land to the armed forces.

The party's leader stressed that he is against calling some of the forces to the army to return to political life and not being thrust into it again by any political party, even to settle scores with the Brotherhood or others, as described by the party leader, against the background of the political polarization that political life witnessed²⁹

After abolishing the constitutional declaration Al-Sader Rafi on November 22, 2012, through which Morsi fortified the Shura Council and the Constituent Assembly of the constitution, he dismissed the Attorney General and appointed Talaat Abdullah as his new deputy general.³⁰

During the political crisis that Egypt witnessed before Morsi's ouster on July 3, 2013, Abu Al-Fotouh made it clear that he did not want the army to have a political role again, whether outwardly or hidden, explaining that the part of the military is higher and purer than having its political role in protecting the homeland and standing behind its political leadership To protect the country from any external danger, Which is what made Abu Al Fotouh call for early presidential Elections as a better solution than the army's intervention or the fall of the country.

As for the Wasat Party, during the first months of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces assuming power during the transitional period after the departure of Mubarak in February 2011, the Wasat Party expressed support for the positions of the Military Council, representing the patriotism of the members of the Military Council. Isslam Sultan, the party's vice president, expressed that the council Al-Askari works with great concern for the homeland, social justice, and the transfer of power to the people.³¹

But soon the party demanded the necessity of promulgating a law of treachery and activating it, and new election law, in addition to its demand for what it called the "military council," meaning the "Supreme Council of the Armed Forces," which runs the country with the necessity and necessity to hand over power to a civilian authority no later than February 2012.

By dropping and ending the state of emergency in the country, the need to confront the insecurity, and deterioration of the economic conditions in a more severe manner, stressing at the same time that the state of stability will prevail in the country if the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces quickly responds to these demands.

Abu Al-Ela also criticized Madi, the head of the party, for choosing Dr. Kamal Al-Ganzouri to take over the government in November 2011, explaining that he is one of the Mubarak men regimes. From here, the party refused to take over the formation of the Egyptian government.

Madi suggested forming a rescue government that would have the powers or forming a council consisting of 19 individuals as is the number of the Supreme Council of Forces the armed forces who manage the authority during the transitional period.

Madi also indicated that the armed forces assuming power is the biggest mistake in light of the lack of any progress on any level, especially social justice, specifically the minimum wage, as he put it.³²

Regarding the right to vote for the military, the police members intend. The party announced its refusal to include the army and the police in the electoral process. It demanded the Constitutional Court to violate the law after it was approved on May 2013 because of danger to the unity and cohesion of the military institution, according to its description.³³

The party refused to extend the state of emergency after the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces decided to extend the state of emergency to May 31, 2012, which contradicts the constitutional declaration issued by the rumored "Military Council" on March 30, 2011, in Article 59, which states: "The President of the Republic shall announce after taking the opinion of the Council. The ministers' state of emergency in the manner outlined in the law and all cases the declaration of a state of emergency shall be for a specified period not exceeding six months, and it is not permissible to extend it except after the people's referendum and its approval to do so.

As for the military trials of civilians, the party's leader, Abu Al-Ela Madi, asserted that the new constitution prohibits civilians from being tried before military courts and military courts except for crimes that harm the armed forces.³⁴

The fourth topic: Islamic trends "habituation to hidden behavior" and calls to overthrow former President Morsi

The continuation of political polarization in the Egyptian street, as well as the emergence of new political variables in the political road, including the Tamarod movement, which was described as popular, to promote the need for early presidential elections and to Invite all political forces, parties, and movements to former President Morsi to agree to early elections due to the Muslim Brotherhood's failure. The administration of Egypt, which caused the deterioration of the Egyptian state, led some politicians to the Egyptian state's downfall. Immediately, Mohamed Morsi will continue in the presidency.³⁵

Then calls were launched in the Egyptian streets and in the independent media were launched in the Egyptian streets and in the independent media to reject the rule of President Mohamed Morsi and the need to hold early presidential elections, and the activism of the rebellion movement in the Egyptian street made it collect millions of votes in a short period rejecting the rule of Mohamed Morsi and calling him for early presidential elections.

Hence the positions of the political parties, the parties described as civil welcomed these calls to confirm the Muslim Brotherhood's failure to rule Egypt and the intensification of economic crises during his reign, which puts the country's future in danger. On the other hand, the parties described as Islamic and affiliated with the

Muslim Brotherhood rejected these calls, considering them. The legitimacy of President Morsi is a red line. Some supporters of President Morsi launched a counter-insurgency movement that they called "stripping." Still, it was not with the same momentum and widespread popularity that the Tamarod movement had received in the Egyptian street.³⁶

The Strong Egypt Party's position welcomed the demonstrations against Morsi on June 30, announcing that they would join these demonstrations to force the president to hold early presidential elections, considering that the solution to the political crisis that Egypt is going through lies in early polls.

The party affirmed that President Morsi pledged to form a presidential team, and his team included several political figures. Still, the issuance of the constitutional declaration that the presidential team did not know of anything led to the withdrawal of 6 members from it, and then the political crisis erupted in the country between President Morsi and his loyalists on one side and the opposition on the other side.³⁷

The party also stated that the popular mandate for any authority depends on fulfilling their conditions for Morsi to be handed over to the presidency amid commitments to solve many of the problems facing the Egyptian citizen. Still, it failed to achieve minimum solutions to these problems.³⁸

The Al-Wasat Party criticized the emergence of the Tamarod movement, which declared that it is not legal and does not represent the masses of the Egyptian people. New rejectionists join the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi.

The Wasat Party called for an urgent national dialogue that includes all political forces and parties to avoid a possible clash between the Islamists and their supporters and the political opposition of popular and political forces and parties. Still, the reactions came against the Al Wasat Party's call for dialogue with Mohamed Morsi, as the details and parties announced that they would continue to mobilize until June 30, 2013, to put pressure on The system to hold early presidential elections.³⁹

The transitional period since January 2011 has revealed the considerable fluidity in the Egyptian political arena, and the presence of significant areas of influence in the political process and in the Egyptian street for each of the state institutions, especially the military establishment, as well as what is described as the Islamic trend with its different approaches, despite the state of liquidity witnessed by the

street However, some of the perpetual actors in the Egyptian political map have not been affected by this state of liquidity for long periods, and therefore the two parties of Al-Wasat and the Strong Egypt are not considered to be the prominent influencers in the Egyptian political arena, as are the Egyptian political parties with their different stripes, despite the efforts of each of them to present themselves as parties that move away On what is known as the Islamic trend represented mainly by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist, and giving themselves as centrist parties that are characterized by civil at times and moderate Islamic reference at other times, but they failed to sever the link from the parent group on several occasions, the most important of which is the program, which was evident in the Al Wasat Party than in the Masr Party.⁴⁰

Although the Al-Wasat Party seeks to distance itself from the group, it is stable in terms of distance, connection with the group, and coordination. As for the stability of its relationship with it according to what the researcher sees and presented previously. As for the Strong Egypt Party, the party sought to present itself as a third alternative to the situation described by the polarization that the Egyptian street witnessed during the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, but it was unable to present a coherent alternative or related proposition, on the one hand, the group and the difference in his actual behavior and distance in practice from the group are only attributed to this confirmation.⁴¹

The incidents of the 30th of June also witnessed radical changes in the political scene in Egypt, as they resulted in a religious-political project that had been planned for decades and led to the disintegration of those currents and resulted in the escalation of violence and the emergence of terrorist campaigns against the Egyptian state and its security institutions.

Egypt, to defend its national security from these threats, many martyrs and many resources were drained for the reconstruction process that was wasted in that period. In that period, positions varied between Islamic currents; some of them took place hostile to the state, such as the Freedom and Justice Party, which refused. These conditions are still escalating from their operations in protest against the entitlements during that period. There are Islamic currents accustomed to hidden behavior, such as the Wasat and the Light parties, and others that relatively supported the Strong Egypt Party's early elections. The status quo that ended that issue will be met with all attempts to restore its balance once again.⁴²

Fifthly: The impact of international , regional , domestic context on brotherhood :

To understand current political situation, it is crucial to examine how and why the Muslim Brotherhood—a leading political actor just over a year ago—met its demise so suddenly and forcefully. Though it had to operate in a hostile political environment, the Brotherhood ultimately fell because of its own political, ideological, and organizational failures.

The organization's inclusion in the political system did not lead to its democratization and moderation, as some observers had predicted it would. Instead, the lack of political consensus in Egyptian society combined with the Brotherhood's unwillingness to undergo a process of ideological and organizational transformation undermined the group's democratic potential.

The Brotherhood's leadership was made untenable by its inability to placate the powerful old state or win over crucial elites and other political actors.

Ideological hollowness and opportunism undercut the Brotherhood's claims to a legitimate "Islamic democratic project," and the organization's structural deficits led it to be widely distrusted.

The Brotherhood's failure to transform electoral victories into sustainable political control effectively eliminated the possibility of Islamist domination. While its fall did not signify the end of political Islam in Egypt, it did mark the end of the utopian idea held by some that "Islam is the solution."

Three Main faults :

1- Politically, the Brotherhood misread the international situation. It moved toward political domination too quickly, making a series of tactical mistakes in the process. It failed to either appease or successfully confront institutional power bases, and, believing its electoral victory to be an irreversible popular mandate, it was reluctant to make the concessions necessary to avoid alienating crucial secular elites. The Brotherhood waged an unwinnable battle, driven more by ideological zeal and delusions of grandeur than by a realistic assessment of the political environment.

2- Ideologically, the Brotherhood was shallow and opportunistic. It proved too willing to sacrifice elements of its ideology for short-term political victories.

Furthermore, fundamentally antidemocratic components of Brotherhood dogma and the disconnect between the group's professed ideology and the policy positions it assumed highlighted its incompatibility with modern democratic politics.

3- Organizationally, the Brotherhood was incapable of adaptation. Its rigid, hierarchical structure prevented it from successfully reacting to rapid societal changes. The Brotherhood's attempts to promote organizational unity, while successful at muting the impact of intragroup differences, contributed to the exodus of fresh talent and ideas. Its organizational introversion and conspiratorial mind-set also undermined its ability to build a broad network of support.⁴³

Above all , brotherhood failure to absorb other revolutionary factors not only that but also can say brotherhood failed to react effectively towards external and internal challenges

The sixth topic: The Future of Political Islam and the Brotherhood in Egypt: Limited Alternatives.

The transitional period since January 2011 has revealed the considerable fluidity in the Egyptian political arena, and the presence of significant areas of influence in the political process and in the Egyptian street for each of the state institutions, especially the military establishment, as well as what is described as the Islamic trend with its different approaches, despite the state of liquidity witnessed by the street. However, some of the perpetual actors in the Egyptian political map have not been affected by this state of liquidity for long periods, and therefore the two parties of Al-Wasat and the Strong Egypt are not considered to be the leading influencers in the Egyptian political arena, as are the Egyptian political parties with their different stripes, despite the efforts of each of them to present themselves as parties that move away. On what is known as the Islamic trend represented mainly by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist, and giving themselves as centrist parties that are characterized by civil at times and moderate Islamic reference at other times, but they failed to sever the link from the parent group on several occasions, the most important of which is the program, which was evident in the Al Wasat Party than in the Masr Party. Although the Al-Wasat Party seeks to distance itself from the group, it is stable in terms of distance, connection with the group, and coordination.⁴⁴

As for the stability of its relationship with it according to what the researcher sees and its previous presentation, as for the level of the Strong Egypt Party, the party sought to present itself as a third alternative to the situation that was described by the polarization that the Egyptian street witnessed during the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. Still, it was unable to present a coherent alternative or related proposal. On the one hand, the group and that the difference in actual behavior and distance in practice from the group is attributed to this confirmation.⁴⁵

From the incidents of January 2011 and the circumstances of June 2013, it becomes clear that the future of Islamic currents in the coming Egyptian political scene is fragile because these groups have exposed the citizen and lost the broad base that they enjoyed in light of the self and personal interests that their leaders were seeking away from the national part of the state.

Therefore, the possibility of their presence on the political scene in light of these circumstances is relatively limited. Despite the relatively available alternatives for these groups' breakthroughs, they do not in any way include political reconciliation and political rise again.⁴⁶

List of References:

¹ Batoul Hussein, The Concept of the State and Its Pillars in Contemporary Islamic Political Thought, Journal of Political Science, College of Politics, University of Baghdad, Issue (43), pp. 150, 151.

² Ibid p266

³ Ibid, p 276

⁴ Malouf Jammeh, Islamists, State Issues and Democracy, The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, February p 225

⁵ Abi Al-Hassan Ali bin Muhammad bin Habib Al-Mawardi, (Achieved by Ahmed Mubarak Al-Baghdadi), Sultani Rulings and Religious Mandates, (Kuwait: Dar Ibn Qutayba Library, First Edition, 1989 AD), p134

⁶ Houria Tawfiq Mujahid, Political Thought from Plato to Muhammad Abdo, (Cairo, Anglo-Egyptian Library, sixth edition, 2013), p. 255.

⁷⁷ Islam: Religion, history and civilization. San Francisco: HarperCollins publishing

⁸ The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website (eds.), Pursuing Muslim brotherhood , <http://www.ikhwanweb.com>

⁹ KHALIL AL-ANANI, Egypt's Freedom & Justice Party: to Be or Not to Be Independent, June 2011, available for; <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/44324>

¹⁰ Strong Egypt Party (Misr al-Qawia), available at; <https://timep.org/parliamentary-elections-monitor/strong-egypt-party/> .

¹¹ Islam: Religion, ibid

¹² Qutb, S. 1953. Social justice in Islam. (Revised Edition). (translated and revised by John Hardie and Hamid Algar). New York: Islamic Publications International. 2000

¹³ Strong Egypt Party (Misr al-Qawia), available at; <https://timep.org/parliamentary-elections->

[monitor/strong-egypt-party/](#)

¹⁴ Carlos Garcia; Hennie J Kotze; Electoral Support for Islamic Parties in the Middle East and North Africa, September 2007, Party Politics 13(5), available at; <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068807080088>

¹⁵ Abdullah Al-Arian, The Strong Egypt Party, the Constitutional Decree, and Gaza: An Interview with Abdel Moneim Abul Futuh, 2012, available at; <https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/27512>

¹⁶ Ahmed Salah Zaki, The January 25 Revolution: Washington and 18 Days of Rage, 2016, available at; https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2016/01/160125_egypt_us_25_january_revolution

¹⁷ Tawfiq Muhammad Al-Shawi, Jurisprudence of Shura and Consultation, (Al-Mansoura; Dar Al-Wafa Press, second edition, 1992), p. 95

¹⁸ Kamal Al-Helbawi, Hassan Al-Banna between Hopes and Pains, Al-Shorouk Newspaper, September 2011, available at the link for information; <https://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=19092011&id=d4ef7872-8a1b-48e6-be78-ad6d584b9d45>

¹⁹ Esposito, J. 1998. Islam: the straight path. New York: Oxford Press 1999

²⁰ Kriesberg, L. 2003. Constructive conflicts: From escalation to resolution (2nd edition . oxford Rowman & Littlefield p22

²¹ Sherine Atallah, The nervousness of Ibn Khaldun, Master Thesis, (Mohamed Boudiaf University, 2017-2018), pp. 16, 17.

²² bid, p 24, 25.

²³ ibid, p 266, 267.

²⁴ KHALIL AL-ANANI, Egypt's Freedom & Justice Party: to Be or Not to Be Independent, June 2011, available for; <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/44324>

²⁵ Khan, M. A. 2002. American Muslims: Bridging faith and freedom. Beltsville: Amana Publications p 12

²⁶ Youssef Al-Salem, Political and partisan pluralism from an Islamic perspective; The first section, January 2018, available at: <https://www.kurdiu.org/ar/b/62298>

²⁷ Policy Studies, available at: <https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/ResearchAndStudies/Pages/Egyptian-Political-Parties-and-Parliamentary-Elections-2011-2012.aspx>

²⁸ Amr Abdel Rahman, "Strong Egypt" demands the rapid extension of the Egyptian army's control over Sinai, 2013, available at; <https://www.dostor.org/202588>

²⁹ Kepel, G. 2002. Jihad: The trail of political Islam: Massachusetts: Harvard university press

³⁰ Ahmed El-Sheikh, Electoral Competition Rising Among Islamists in Upper Egypt, 2011, available at; https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2011/12/111230_egypt_menya_elections_islamic_parties

³¹ Ismail Gomaa, The Armed Forces Saved the Revolution and the State from Collapse, Al-Ahram Daily, available AT; <https://gate.ahram.org.eg/daily/News/51437/135/356188/%D9%85A7%D8%B1.aspx>

³² Anas Zaki, A Cautious Welcome to Egypt's New Prime Minister, 2012, available at; <https://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2012/7/25/%D8%AA%D8%B>

³³ Al-Misri, A. 1368. Reliance of the traveler: A classic manual of Islamic sacred law translated and edited by Nuh Ha Mim Keller). Beltsville: Amana Publications, 1994

³⁴ The Constitutional Declaration in Egypt 2011, available at; <https://www.marefa.org/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%11>

³⁵ Ali Al-Salami, **Problems of Parliament and the Constitution**, (Cairo; Sama Publishing and Printing, 2015), p. 418

³⁶ Opponents of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi insist on holding early presidential elections, June 2013, available at: <https://www.france24.com/ar/20130627->

³⁷ Abul Fotouh: Morsi's position on crises proved his impotence. His resignation is preferred, available at the link; <https://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=26062013&id=ce9ee494-5102-4762-b15d-80d910cb7211>

³⁸ Egypt Referendum 2011, Supreme Judicial Committee, available at;

<https://referendum2011.elections.eg/84-slideshow/155-result.html>

³⁹ The Egyptian Iftaa" exposes the Brotherhood's methods of promoting their terrorist agenda, 2019, available at; <https://al-ain.com/article/ifta-muslimbrotherhood-terrorism>

⁴⁰ Ahmed Abd Rabou, Egyptian Parties and the Egyptian Parliament Elections 2011-2012, The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, available at: <https://www.dohainstitute.org/ar/ResearchAndStudies/Pages/Egyptian-Political-Parties-and-Parliamentary-Elections-2011-2012.aspx>

⁴¹ Abdel Rahman Saad, why did Morsi advance in Upper Egypt and Shafik in the Delta?, Available at; <https://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2012/6/20/%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%AA%D8%A7>

⁴² El-Hodaiby, M. M. 2004. 'Islamic fundamentalism does not foster violence in Middle East', in W. Dudley (ed.), The Middle East: Opposing Viewpoints Farmington Hill, MI: Greenhaven Press
And for further reading look at , Eric Targer, Nancy Youssef , the rise and fall of Egypt Muslim brotherhood , Washington institute May 2016

⁴³ Ghabdian, N. 2000. 'Political Islam and violence', New Political Science. Vol. 22, p 44

⁴⁴ Khalil al-Anani, Upended Path: The Rise and Fall of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Autumn 2015), pp. 530, available at; <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43698286>

⁴⁵ The "Strong Egypt" initiative: Withdrawal of Morsi's declaration except for the dismissal of "Mahmoud" and retrials, Al-Shorouk newspaper, 2012, available at: https://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?cdate=26112012&id=ced34897-ff35-4971-924d-e36df404fe6b&fb_comment_id=132930156860240_211585

⁴⁶ Ramadan, T. 2004. Western Muslims and the future of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press