Managing Political crisis and its impact on Tourism: the Case of January 25th revolution in Egypt

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Abstract

This study aims at examining the impact of January 25th revolution on the image of Egypt as a tourist destination. It further seeks for suggesting a managerial framework for dealing with such types of political crisis. Eight in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with key personnel from the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism, particularly from the Egyptian Tourist Authority (ETA). Six major findings were elaborated out of these prolonged interviews. Among these findings are the media coverage has a direct negative impact on the image of Egypt; absence of a specialized department for crisis management in the ETA; absence of team work culture and immigration of the trained personnel from the Egyptian Tourism Private sector. Out of these key findings, the research has elicited some recommendations that can propose a managerial framework for dealing with crisis of political nature.

Key words: political crisis, crisis management, ETA, teamwork culture.

1. Introduction

The debate on managing crisis and its impact on the tourism industry in Egypt have always been confined to the political incidents represented mainly in the terrorist attacks that have been targeting tourists in Egypt since the early nineties from the past century. However, the topic of this paper will shift the focus to another type of internal political movements represented in political events of special nature like the Jan 25th revolution in Egypt.

The framework for dealing with such a kind of political crisis was non-existent in Egypt. This was due to the unfamiliarity of destination managers, marketers and policy planners with the nature of such political crisis, and hence the mechanics of dealing with such political movements of unlimited and unexpected scope.

Accordingly, this paper is mainly suggesting the possibility of devising a managerial framework for dealing with such types of political crisis. The function of this framework will be two-fold. First, to suggest the steps and procedures that should be undertaken by destination policy planners in order to mitigate its unwanted impacts on tourism. Second, to set a contingency plan for any future recurrence of events of similar type and nature.

It has been argued that peace, calm and safety are requisites to attract tourists to any destination. In this concern, Scott (1988) effectively stressed the potential for long-term damage when he states:

" ... whereas a natural disaster creates havoc and passes, a political crisis may last for days, months, or even years", totally destroying the fragile concept of image for a developing tourism industry (Scott,1988:58).

This statement is especially true for occurrences that receive global media coverage like the political upheaval caused by the Egyptian revolution. China as a tourist destination also represents another example of political unrest. This was represented in China's 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. The entire world witnessed government brutality against pro-democracy student protesters. As a result, the negative images of China translated into declining hotel occupancy rates and lost tourism revenues. China's eager efforts to attract international visitors came to a halt for several years. Although a 55% increase in foreign visitation was recorded in 1991 and 48% in 1992, (Hall and O'Sullivan 1996). The televised images may have lasted for a brief time but their impact was very powerful.

Sonmez (1998), in the same concern advocated that the effects of political disruption and violence on the industry need to be regarded as a crisis in need of management. He added that tourism is quite adept at utilizing proven marketing principles. Nonetheless, when it suffers a serious setback due to negative occurrences, it can no longer rely on traditional marketing efforts. The industry must conduct "recovery marketing"—or marketing integrated fully with crisis management activities. He also believed that destination image in particular, is one aspect of tourism which demands crisis management and recovery marketing strategies because it is often the first casualty of violence.

As a matter of fact, terrorism as a phenomenon began to hit Egypt high at the beginning of the nineties in the past century, it aimed at crippling the Egyptian government economy by hitting one of its main hard currency generators; that is the tourism sector. Accordingly, it targets tourists at the major tourist sites in Upper Egypt, as well as the renowned tourist recreational sites in South Sinai and Hurghada on the Red Sea.

The outbreak of the political unrest in the destination and the subsequent political incidents have made the international travel trade reluctant to send their customers to Egypt amid its unstable political condition. According to this argument, the current study is mainly aiming at:

1. Examining the impact of the Egyptian revolution on the tourist flows to the country since its eruption on the 25th January 2011;

- 2. Investigating the managerial framework adopted by the policy planners and destination managers at the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism as a response to this political upheaval;
- 3. Suggesting a managerial framework for dealing with such types of political crisis that can be adopted by other tourist destinations facing similar incidents of political unrest.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Analyzing Crisis: the difference between political unrest and terrorism

A project conducted by the European Commission (2007) to analyze the difference between terrorism, political violence and organized crime stated that a terrorist incident according to the EU's Framework decision is an offence, which may seriously damage a country or an international organization. These offences must be committed with the aim of intimidating people and seriously altering or destroying the political, economic or social structures of a country (murder, bodily injuries, hostage taking, extortion, fabrication of weapons, committing attacks, threatening to commit any of the above, etc.). The above offences may be committed by one or more individuals against one or more countries. The Framework Decision defines a terrorist group as a structured organization consisting of more than two persons, established over a period of time and acting in concert.

On the other hand, the political unrest resulted from the frequent protests culminated in the 25th January revolution broke in Egypt in 2011 is not considered to be a criminal act like terrorism. On the contrary, it represents an organized coup d'état of some political movements, as well as Egyptian political activists, who have certain claims of bread, freedom, dignity and social justice. Hence, one cannot consider their movement as a criminal act, particularly, when these revolts were tagged as "Peaceful". It means that those civilians did not attempt to use any form of violence while claiming their very basic rights from the former government. However, the reaction of the former government which was characterized with violence and brutality turned the incident from a peaceful revolution into a political unrest which ended in harsh injuries and causalities from both sides.

In this concern, Uzonyi (2016) argues that governments can react to these threats through several different strategies. They can attempt to placate the opposition by making concessions to their demand e.g. the government can increase access to political participation or to resources for these groups. Governments in Canada, India and the former Czechoslovakia have each offered various forms and levels of concessions to groups pushing for secession in their countries. For e.g. each of these countries provided greater linguistic rights to minority groups. On the contrary, the government can respond to threats to their power through violence (Kriesi, 1995; Tarrow, 1994). Employing violence allows the ruling elites to maintain power without making concessions to the dissidents. At the extreme, elites may attempt to eradicate the opposition and its supporters, thus ending the threat to their power. Carey, (2010) supports the same argument when he states that whenever a government feels threatened, for example during times of internal unrest, it is expected to use force to strengthen its position and to defend the status quo (Boudreau, 2005; Poe, 2004; Regan and Henderson, 2002).

In an educated endeavour to analyse the outraged youth movement in the Arab world, Munther (2012) states

"Which comes first, the chicken or the egg? This dilemma has become the nightmare of the rulers in the Arab world who are faced with the choice of abdication, prison or death. The Arab world is undergoing major transformations where even the best of rulers are still at the stage of denial since they cannot figure out which comes first; political reform, or their extraction from office by a mass civil upheaval that transforms itself into a powerful average man's revolution ushering in a new regime... The youth who constitute more than 60% of the Arab population have been an ignored quantity for decades and in a state of unrest for the last couple of years. The Western powers, led by the United States, have invested heavily in the values of democracy and pluralism without understanding the moral and ethical implications in the Third World in general and the Arab world in particular" (18.1:5).

In the Egyptian scenario, the government did not anticipate or comprehend the scale of the opposition forces represented mostly by the youth and different political activists. They thought that it was some uncalculated movements of youngsters who are driven by other forces to oppose the government in a hopeless attempt to threaten the regime, which could repress these movements immediately through the extensive use of power. This underestimation on the part of the Egyptian government had worsen these revolts and turned it into an arena of casualties and bloodshed, which in turn had aggravated the entire Egyptians from different sects and escalated the violence and turned it into an outraged revolution. Instead of this repressive scenario, the government and the political elites in Egypt could have acted quite the opposite by channelling a debate with the different political activists and listened to their claims and hence be in a much better position to decide the best course of action to be taken in such very sensitive and vulnerable circumstances.

The demands of the Egyptians were legal. They demanded to live a decent life with better income, better education and better health service, and above all being able to express themselves and criticise what they see

wrong in the political system of the country without oppression or marginalisation. The normal Egyptian citizen had been facing dire economic conditions, which were going from bad to worse for the last decade. Xinyu (2011:10) supports this when he states:

"The ultimate cause for civil unrest across the Middle East was a high unemployment rate that left many young people without jobs. Those young people became fed up with all talk-no-action politicians who did nothing to improve people's lives; so they demanded change".

Furthermore, many socioeconomic factors which, when sustained over decades and affecting a significant size of the population, could have contributed as an undertone to Egypt's civil discord. These factors, including issues in health and human services, education and employment, and a growing income gap, have long been topics of interest for political economists, especially as they relate to basic human rights such as freedom of the press, from arbitrary arrests and torture, pervasive poverty, faulty educational systems and rising levels of unemployment among the educated (Ishak, 2012).

Moreover, Egyptian citizens' inability to express themselves and the "police state phenomenon" intensified the political grievances of the public and the youth. Though the discontent from unemployment and poor socio-economic status continued to increase, the population's ability to express itself remained suppressed; depriving them from letting some steam out. This was due to the blurry line dividing the written law and the execution of political force by the governing power. In many Arab nations, freedoms of expression, organization, and belief are met with police brutality, societal expulsion, gratuitous jail sentences, and kidnapping (Al-Momani, 2011). In fact, the youth who led the January 25th revolution in Egypt were mostly from the middle class strata of the society. Their major demands were to live in a more liberal political atmosphere which allows freedom of speech, involvement in the political life and above all social justice. Hence, it became evident that the younger generation of middle-class Egyptians cherishes civil liberties and values, whereas the larger segment of society of the economically disadvantaged is seeking adequate shelter and basic human needs. A value system of civil liberties and rights ought to be accompanied by a human development plan in order to sustain and ensure the granting of those rights (Barakat, 2013).

On the other hand, terrorism has different causes and motivations from the political unrest. Many scholars have attempted to define terrorism in order to analyse its causes and hence be able to mitigate its serious repercussions. An orthodox definition of Terrorism as a phenomenon stated that it is a premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 1997). While the definition adopted by the US Department of State gives slightly different meanings to the term, highlighting the terrorist's "unlawful use of force or violence", explicitly including both people and property as potential targets, and crediting terrorism with furthering social, religious, or ideological goals, pursued through coercion or intimidation

(Hoffman, 1998, p:38). Kydd and Walter (2006) argue that effective counterstrategies cannot be designed without first understanding the strategic logic that drives terrorist violence. Terrorism works not simply because it instills fear in target populations, but because it causes governments and individuals to respond in ways that aid the terrorists' cause.

The terrorist incidents took a regular shape and movement in Egypt as early as 1993, when terrorist teams fired on trains carrying tourists near the perpetually nervous university town of Assiyut in Upper Egypt (Thomson, 1994). In December of the same year, three terrorists burst out of a coffee shop in Old Cairo and fired on a passing busload of tourists, wounding eight passengers and eight Egyptians who came to their defense. The Gama'a Allslamiya, a radical organization, has distributed flyers in the following months warning all foreigners to leave or face the consequences. The danger to tourists is no greater in Egypt than in many other places. However, as one Miami hotelier explained that city's sharp drop in tourism in late 1993:

"Most folks like to vacation where they can sleep with both eyes closed, and, thanks to exaggerated news reports, they just don't feel that comfortable here these days" (Thomson, 1994:62).

However, the highest terrorist attack that hit Egypt hard was recorded in November, 1997, where 66 people, most of them foreigners, were killed in Egypt's popular southern tourist destination of Luxor when six gunmen fired on sightseers at a famous ancient temple there (Gauch, 1997). The attack took place at the 3,400-year-old temple of Queen Hatshepsut near the tombs of the pharaohs in the Valley of the Kings on Luxor's west bank, 315 miles south of Cairo. The west bank has hundreds of tombs of kings, queens, and noblemen, including that of the boy-king Tutankhamen and Queen Nefertari. Security sources said 11 attackers stole an empty tour bus, drove it to the temple, and fired on two tour groups there. The attack was a well-organized effort that required good planning and adequate weaponry. Its greatest effect may be on Egypt's thriving tourist industry (Gauch, 1997). Then came the 9/11 attacks on World Trade twin towers in the USA and subsequent military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq the number of visitors in Egypt had declined in 2001 and 2002. However, in 2003, international arrivals exceeded six million (Richter and Steiner, 2008).

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Nonetheless, the attacks had regained its severity in the spring of 2006 where a number of terrorists setting off three explosions along Dahab's beachside promenade in South Sinai. The attack had resulted in the killing of 18 people, including four foreigners. Two days later, two suicide bombers attacked an international peacekeeping base and an Egyptian police vehicle in the northern Sinai Peninsula but killed only themselves (Macleod and Lindsay, 2006).

Nevertheless, the impact of both phenomenon of terrorism and political unrest -although completely different in nature- is nearly similar. This impact is represented in a sharp drop in the demand of tourists and tour operators from the principal tourist generating countries to Egypt. This drop has positively impacted on the entire incoming revenues gained from the tourism activity in the country which in turn had a detrimental impact on the overall economic standard in the destination. In this respect, Hull and O'Sullivan (1996) stated that:

"Perceptions of political instability and safety are a prerequisite for tourist visitation. lent protests, social unrest, civil war, terrorist actions, the perceived violations of rights, or even the mere threat of these activities can all serve to cause tourists to alter travel behavior". (Hall and O'Sullivan, 1996: 11).

In this concern, Neumayer (2004) maintains that tourists only willing to travel to foreign places in mass numbers if their journey and their stay are safe and shielded from events that threaten an enjoyable holiday experience. Faced violent events in a country, potential tourists might fear for their lives or physical integrality, might simply anticipate becoming involved in stressful situations, or be unable to visit the places they wanted to visit according to schedule. Tourists might therefore choose an alternative destination with similar characteristics but in a more stable condition. If the violence becomes more widespread and prolonged, official authorities in the countries where tourists originate will start issuing advice against traveling to the affected destination. Tour operators will start eliminating tours to the country due to insufficient bookings, fear of liability suits, and the like and promote other destinations instead. For these and similar reasons, one expects political violence to have detrimental impacts on tourism.

This is exactly what Egypt as a tourist destination had been experiencing since the eruption of the January 25th revolution. This study, accordingly, is aiming at examining these conditions and analyzing the impact of such political incident on the tourist behavior towards the image of Egypt as a tourist destination. Moreover, the reaction of the official tourist Authorities in Egypt to combat the repercussions of such political movements is also discussed. The following section will delineate the methodological approach employed in this study.

3. Methodological Framework

3.1 Qualitative data methods

The current study followed the normative qualitative data techniques. First, it formulated the major **research question** of the study that was the impact of January 25th revolution on the main tourist flows to the country. This was followed by selecting a theoretical framework for this data. The study then selected a grounded theory approach. The reason for selecting grounded theory as a theoretical background to the data collected in this study is due to the fact that constructivist grounded theory celebrates firsthand knowledge of empirical worlds. Further, constructivism assumes the relativism of multiple social realities recognizes the mutual creation of knowledge by the viewer and the viewed and aims toward interpretive understanding of subjects' meanings (Guba &Lincoln, 1994; Schwandt, 1994).

According to Corbin and Strauss (1990), there are some basic canons of grounded theory that should be understood, as they provide the scientific rationale for why grounded theory is especially relevant for research themes' development and the framework for determining best practices for conducting the research. These tenets are:

- Data collection and analysis are interrelated and concurrent, rather than linear processes; analysis begins as soon as the first bit of data is collected (Charmaz, 2003). Accordingly, as emergent themes are identified in ongoing data analysis, all potentially relevant issues should be incorporated into the next set of interviews and observations.
- Concepts are the basic units of analysis. Thus, data collected from subjects are given conceptual labels.
- Specificity of the concept is achieved by understanding the qualifiers of the concept (e.g., what factors impact the concept, such as age or gender).
- Concepts that pertain to the same phenomenon are grouped to form categories. Categories are further developed through repeated sampling (e.g., further interviews), examined in relation to one another and integrated into a theoretical framework.
- Analysis is achieved through constant comparison of similarities and differences in the data searching for both supportive and disconfirming evidence (Paton, 2002). Throughout the research process, hypotheses are revised based on the ongoing assessment of both qualifying and disqualifying evidence derived from interviews, observations and documents, until they can be fully supported by all of the data, facilitating a robust analysis.

• Sufficient data must be collected to reach "conceptual saturation," the complete elaboration of the properties, dimensions and variation that constitute each category or theme (Corbin and Strauss, 2007).

Accordingly, the usefulness of employing grounded theory in this research inquiry is to interview key informants from the Egyptian tourism public sector by interpreting their viewpoints and orientations which will be reflected through their interviews and hence be able to gain an in-depth knowledge into how they interpret or understand the complex dynamics of the international tourism trends and how this is reflected in their planning of the tourist image of Egypt, particularly during the time of crisis.

The key officials interviewed in this study are selected sample of the ETA staff who possess experience and knowledge of how the Egyptian Authority coped and dealt with the different crises that faced the destination since the eruption of the January 25th revolution in Egypt. Statements and viewpoints raised by these officials during the course of the interviews were further developed with other key informants working in different sectors and departments in the ETA. The reason for this was to ensure the validity of the information given by these respondents and further ensuring the factuality of the incidents and events that occurred during the crisis management phase adopted by the ETA.

After selecting the theoretical base of this study, **Purposive sampling** technique was employed. The concept of purposeful sampling is used in qualitative research to select individuals/sites for study because they can purposefully inform an understanding of the research problem and central phenomenon in the study (Creswell, 2013).

Moreover, **Purposive sampling** strategies are designed to enhance understandings of selected individuals or groups' experience(s) or for developing theories and concepts. This is usually done by selecting "information rich" cases, that are individuals, groups, organizations, or behaviours that provide the greatest insight into the research question (Devers& Frankel, 2000). In the context of this study, key informants in the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism (MOT), particularly from the Egyptian Tourist Authority (ETA) were selected. This later Authority is the main entity responsible for promoting the tourist image of Egypt in its international, as well as domestic tourist markets.

Key informants were carefully selected from this authority, namely;

- the head of the international tourism sector;
- the ex head of the international tourism sector,
- the head of the domestic tourism sector;
- the director of the Egyptian national tourist offices in the generating tourist markets to Egypt,
- the director of the tourist generating countries to Egypt in Africa,
- the director of domestic tourism;
- The responsible for domestic tourism(Alexandria & Northern Coast area);
- The head of the planning sector in the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism (MOT).

A total of eight in-depth interviews were conducted with the above key officials. The duration of the interviews lasted from 30 to 45 minutes. The interviews were taking place between September and December 2016. All the interviews were tape recorded after gaining the respondents consent except one interview where the respondent refused his conversation to be recorded. The interviews were transcribed verbatim afterwards to be able to extract the most common themes mentioned by the different respondents.

Thematic analysis was then performed to allow themes and associated sub-themes to emerge from the data (Burnett et al., 2008). These themes consisted of aspects pertaining to the implementation of the crisis management strategies and the interviewees' perceptions of them. Constant comparison and refinement were carried out in order to make sure that all related themes were cross analysed to facilitate the emergence of key findings. The major key findings emerged from the respondents interviews in this study were not only the major incidents that occurred during the period studied in this research i.e. after the eruption of Jan 25th revolution in 2011 till this date. Rather it is the perceptions of the key informants in this study to these incidents and how each one of them have interpreted or viewed these incidents according to his/her personal experience.

3.2 Questionnaire Design

The questionnaire form used consisted of 10 questions. These questions were directed to officials in the upper and middle management in the following organisations:

- Egyptian Ministry of Tourism (MOT),
- The Egyptian Tourist Authority (ETA), and
- Key experts in the Egyptian tourism sector

The questionnaire survey consisted of a total of ten closed-ended questions and open-ended questions. This was done in order to allow more room to the respondents to express their personal opinions. The methodological framework applied is shown in the following table:-

Table 1. The main components of the fieldwork questionnaire design

Research problem	Sample population	Questions used	Method	
Evaluating the main	Key officials from the	1. What was the direct impact of Jan 25 th revolution on the general	Qualitative	
contingency plan(s)	Egyptian Tourist State	tourist flows to the destination?	in-depth	
adopted by the ETA to deal	supply sector namely	2. How did you react to these flows?	interviews.	
with the consequences of	the Egyptian Tourist	3. How different this political crisis was from any other crisis formerly		
Jan 25 th revolution in	Authority	faced the destination?		
Egypt.	(ETA)	4. Did you have any contingency plan to combat the consequences of		
		this crisis?		
		5. How did you direct/redirect your promotional plan to suit the new		
		political conditions hitting the country?		
		6. Did you get any form of help and/or advice from any other tourist		
		entity inside or outside the destination?		
		7. Did the international operators co-operate with you to face this		
		crisis? If yes, what did they exactly do?		
		8. Did the international media coverage help you to deal with this		
		crisis? If yes, in what ways?		
		9. What did you do in t he aftermath of the Jan 25 th revolt? In other		
		words, how did you plan your promotional strategy to adapt to this new		
		political situation in the country?		
		10. What lessons did you learn from this major political incident?		

3.3 Conduct of the interviews

The current investigation used semi-structured open ended interviews. The reason for selecting this type of interviews was that it poses broad questions to the subject that can then be followed up through probes for further clarification. The flow of questions is funnel shaped, beginning with the most general to first gain an unbiased key informant perspective, then to broad domains and finally to specific probes within a domain. The topic guide is the vehicle through which the inquirer can achieve a balance between listening to the participant's story and questioning to elicit information about their experience with the major strategies used before, during and after the crisis that faced Egypt as a tourist destination since the eruption of January 25th revolution. The semi-structured guide enables the inquirer to move around the guide using "emergent probing," and pursue avenues of discussion not in the guide or probe into topics that the subject brings up out of sequence from the guide. Additionally, the guide can be, and is often, adapted between interviews as new themes or issues unfold from the interviews (Brod et al., 2009). Thematic analysis was also used to elicit key findings of the current study. For example, themes were constantly compared with each other and cross analysed between the different respondents so as to see the similarities and differences between the key informants experiences and viewpoints about the performance of the Egyptian tourism public sector when dealing with the different setbacks faced by the destination since the eruption of January 25th revolution in Egypt in 2011 until present.

The following section delineates the different key findings elicited from the key informants in the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism on the impact of the January 25th revolution and its subsequent incidents on the projection of the overall image of Egypt in its international tourist generating markets.

4. Findings and Discussion

The different key officials interviewed have come up with the following key findings:

Finding One: The media coverage had a direct negative impact on the image of Egypt as a tourist destination. When the researcher asked the key officials in the Egyptian Tourist Authority (ETA) on the main reasons behind the crisis that faces the tourist image of Egypt, the ex head of the ETA said:

'The international media coverage had a direct negative influence on the exposure of the image of Egypt in the international tourist market.... The major influence on the tourist to select Egypt as his/her vacation destination is the media. The media in fact broadcasts news on the political developments that happen in Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Sudan''.

What the respondent revealed in the above excerpt is that the international media coverage of the political instability in the middle East region in general and Egypt in particular is the main reason behind the negative perception of the tourist image of Egypt as a safe and secure destination.

This point was further emphasized by the current head of the international tourism sector in the ETA when she mentions:

"We cannot display our promotional messages on Egypt in its international tourist markets and everyday you have a negative image broadcasted on Egypt in the international media. Accordingly this image has to be corrected by which we show to the whole world that the image of Egypt is not that dark".

The key official once more accentuates the role of the international media in the negative projection of the image of Egypt in general which consequently had a negative impact on its tourist image in its major tourist generating markets. This negative projection acts as a hindrance to any promotional effort done for the tourist

image of Egypt abroad. Accordingly, the crisis occurred when this negative projection by the international media made the conventional promotional tools of the image of Egypt abroad quite a challenging task.

On the other hand, the responsible for the Egyptian NTOs abroad in the ETA revealed another negative aspect of the media coverage when he admits:

"There are some crises for example; the Egyptian media played a negative role in it. For instance, the crisis of the Russian flight that fell in Egypt. There was high deficiency in terms of the supply of correct and accurate information on the incident. This deficiency in turn had a very negative impact on the exposure of the image of Egypt as a tourist destination abroad. What I mean is that the source of information itself had to be unified in order not to get different information from different sources and we don't know which one of them is correct or more accurate. This is one thing. The other thing is that the information itself should be anticipatory in nature, by which there was no correct definite information which in turn created a state of panic among people and of course had a detrimental impact on the image of Egypt as a tourist destination".

The same point was also highlighted by the director of domestic tourism when she says:

"Actually this happens all over the world and we need to overcome it. There must be a unified media source in order not to have contradictions in the news they release. The media has to cooperate and produce one concrete source of information like what occurs in Europe".

The respondents in the above quotations reflect that the events that followed the January 25th revolution in Egypt and were the main cause of the political instability in the destination were negatively exposed and exaggerated by the international as well as Egyptian media itself. It means that the information was contradictory in nature, which causes a state of panic among the potential, as well as actual tourists who were visiting Egypt. The head of Egyptian NTOs in the preceding quote gave a perfect example of how the media could turn a country's image during the crisis into a negative image like what happened in the Russian plane crash in Egypt. It has been stated that after the crash, the Egyptian foreign minister complained that Western governments had not sufficiently helped Egypt in its war on terrorism and had not shared relevant intelligence with Cairo regarding the Russian airplane that crashed in the Sinai Peninsula killing all 224 people on board. The crash caused another blow to Egypt's battered tourism sector, which is yet to fully recover from years of political turmoil. The Russians comprise nearly a third of all tourists who visited Egypt in 2014. Due to this incident, the Russian government had suspended all flights to Egypt, joining the UK, which had specifically banned all flights to Sharm el-Sheikh. Ireland has also suspended flights to the Red Sea resort, while the Belgian, French and Dutch governments told their citizens not to travel there. Empty charter planes have been flying to Sharm el-Sheikh to bring home stranded Russian and British tourists. Nevertheless, these flights have banned the passengers from checking in any luggage reflecting an apparent concern about security and luggage-screening procedures at the airport (Kennedy and Nour, 2015).

The researcher then delved deep into the contents of this negative image and how the January 25th revolution in Egypt and the political instability that ensued in the country had a main role to play in this issue. The ex-head of the ETA admits that it is not the January 25th revolution that causes the real tourism crisis in the country. Rather it is the terrorist incidents and the political instability that ensued. This important view will be more discussed in the following key finding of the study.

Finding Two: Terrorism is the main cause of the crisis in the Egyptian Tourism sector.

The ex-head of the international tourism sector in the ETA said in this concern:

"What really makes the tourists not encouraged to come and visit Egypt are the terrorist attacks and the political situation inside the country, and the political instability in the Middle East region in general, not the Jauary 25th revolution".

The ex high official reveals that the political instability in the Middle East region in general and in Egypt in particular was the real cause of the sharp drop of the international tourist movement to Egypt and not the January 25th revolution per se. he also added in another instance:

"The main reason of our crisis now is the media. If you opened the news at any channel, you will find a big slogan of Terrorism. This is one thing. The other thing is every day there is an incident. Either a political crisis like the crisis of Kurdistan in Iraq which might lead to a war, or there is actually a political clash in Yemen which might extend between Iran and Israel or Turkey and Kurdistan for e.g. Hence, all these incidents represent fears for our major generating countries to all tourist destinations in the Middle East and not only Egypt".

Once more, the key official asserts that the political instability in the Middle East region in general and in Egypt in particular is the major cause for the crisis facing the Egyptian tourism sector up to this moment. The political incidents all over the Middle East region projected by the international media depicts the whole region and Egypt included as a turbulent area threatened by terrorists with all its negative repercussions of assaults and casualties spread all over the region. Consequently, the media acts as a scaremonger to people all over the world by exposing the region as a warfare area. This in turn acts as a major hindrance for tourists to come and visit Egypt among these unstable conditions.

The current head of the International Tourism sector in the ETA further elaborated this point:

"If we are going to talk about the Egyptian revolution, I can tell you that the revolution per se had no negative influence on the image of Egypt as a tourist destination. Quite the opposite, the whole world supported the revolution as a political movement by the Egyptian citizens who are looking for a better life. Accordingly, the world was not against the revolution at all, and as a result the revolution didn't impact negatively on the image of Egypt. As a proof to this, immediately after the revolution when the streets began to calm down, the curve of the incoming tourism to Egypt started accordingly to regain its momentum. Therefore, people are claiming that the crisis in the tourism sector is due to the revolution and its consequences, but I say no, it is not due to the revolution, it is mainly -from my own viewpoint- due to the security factor. This factor was the major factor of the general decline in the total number of tourists coming to Egypt".

The key informant again accentuates what the previous respondents said that the real cause of the overall decline in the general performance of the Egyptian tourism sector is the political instability and the lack of security generally in the country due to the terrorist incidents and not due to the January 25th revolution. She also added:

"I can say that the security factor is the first factor the potential tourist is looking for before deciding his holiday destination. Unfortunately, the different terrorist incidents that occurred in Egypt in the last 3 to 4 years either in Rafah in North Sinai, Arish or on our borders with Libya, I can say that these incidents are the major weak points for the overall image of Egypt".

The political instability in Egypt as a result of the terrorists incidents that hit the country in the last 3 to 4 years were the major cause of the high drop in the total numbers of tourists not the Egyptian revolution as some people claim. This is the personal viewpoint of the head of the International Tourism sector in the ETA conveyed in the above excerpt from her prolonged conversation.

To validate what the respondents have revealed about the sharp drop of the overall incoming tourism to the destination since the eruption of the January 25th revolution in Egypt. The following statistics show the yearly performance of Egyptian tourism in the period from 2005 to 2015, as declared by the Ministry of Tourism.

Table 1: Main indicators (Tourists, Tourist Nights, Revenues) 2005-2015

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Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Tourists (millions)	8.6	9.1	11.1	12.8	12.5	14.7	9.8	11.5	9.5	9.9	9.3
Tourist Nights(millions)	85	89.3	111.5	129.2	126.5	147.4	114.2	137.8	94.4	97.3	84.1
Revenues (Billion) \$	6.8	7.6	9.5	11	10.8	12.5	8.8	9.9	5.9	7.5	6.1

Source: Passports, Emigration and Nationality Administration (Ministry of Interior).

As shown in the above table, the total tourist numbers, tourist nights and tourist revenues were increasing from the year 2005 till 2009 at a steady speed then it reached its peak in 2010. In this year, the total tourist numbers reached an unprecedented rate of 14.7 million tourists, tourist nights 147.4 million and tourist revenues 12.5 billion dollars. These rates have plummeted drastically in 2011(the year of the Egyptian revolution) to reach 9.8 million tourists, 114.2 million tourist nights, and 8.8 billion dollars. From 2011 till 2015, these numbers have been fluctuating to reach the lowest of 9.3 million, 84.1 million and 6.1 billion dollars of tourist arrivals, tourist nights and tourist revenues respectively.

According to the above respondents, the major reason for such drop in the overall incoming tourism to Egypt was due to the frequent terrorist attacks that hit the destination in the aftermath of the Egyptian revolution. In fact, terrorism in its organized form has been hitting Egypt since the beginning of the nineties from the last century. However, it was on a much smaller scale and magnitude than the recent attacks done after the subsequent revolution of the 30th June 2013 that overthrows the elected Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi. These recent incidents were out of the control of the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism as it was targeting the whole state of Egypt and its political system and not the Tourism Sector per se. Therefore, the crisis management criteria adopted by the tourism sector were more or less the same criteria used in any crisis faced the country in the past. Their philosophy of dealing with the crisis is still reactive rather than proactive. As a result, their moves or steps are not pre-calculated or anticipated and cannot precisely measure the scale of the incident and hence, become unable to select the appropriate methodology or system to measure its impact. This is reflected and analyzed by the head of the Domestic Tourism Sector in the ETA in the following key finding:

Finding Three: Absence of specialized department for crisis management in the ETA.

The head of the Domestic Tourism Sector in the ETA has revealed this important finding when he says:

"Due to the absence of a specialized unit in crisis management in the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism and due to the absence of people who are trained to deal with crisis, this has led to exacerbate the crisis. This means that today, the crisis management in Egypt is about to be concerned with

managing the crisis only when it occurs. But the crisis management according to the professional and scientific criteria that is applied worldwide became a science that overrides the borders of managing a crisis. Meaning that it became today a science that predicts the crisis before it occurs. This is today the most important point. It means that through some alerts or special warning signs that say there is a crisis on the making'.

Being a Ph.D. holder in Crisis Management, the above key official scientifically analysed what it takes to deal with a crisis on a scientific, as well as professional levels. He suggests that there must be a trained team to deal with the crisis before it occurs, i.e. to be proactive rather than reactive, hence be in a much better position to mitigate its negative repercussions. In this respect, the director of the domestic tourism sector added:

"There was actually a department in the Ministry of Tourism called crisis management and we also depend on the PR Company. However, I also see that we need to work more on the crisis management team in the Ministry of Tourism. Because whenever any crisis occurred, we should not stop and we need to work on it".

The respondent in the above quote seems somehow hesitant about the role of the crisis management department in the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism. She didn't deny the existence of such department but at the same time was quite vague about the real role this department performs. She didn't provide any framework for this department or how it works in order to deal with the different crisis faced Egypt since the eruption of the January 25th revolution. The absence or non existence of a known strategy for this department was highlighted by the head of the planning sector in the Ministry of Tourism:

'I have to say that this was due to the absence of a specialized department for crisis management. Among the major tasks for the specialists in these departments who we call them crisis analysts is to analyse the current incidents, and pinpointing the phenomena, which can make them, assert that there is a crisis coming in a certain direction. In our case, what was present before the January 25th revolution in Egypt was a very high state of congestion that didn't occur before in the country since 15 or 20 years ago. There were some incidents that acted as indicators that there is some big incident will occur at some point. We couldn't predict exactly how this incident would occur or under what name for example is it a revolt, a ban or a revolution. Nobody knows at the time the actual magnitude of the incident. Accordingly, the Ministry of Tourism should have been alerted by these indicators and started to act accordingly by putting a contingency plan to confront this crisis''.

The respondent above confirmed the absence of a crisis management department that acts on a scientific level to combat the different crisis that hit the Tourism sector in Egypt lately. He highlighted a very important point that there were some signs or alerts that something with a high magnitude is going to happen. Nevertheless, no real steps or strategies were undertaken so as to deal with this big incident when it occurs. In this respect Laws et al. (2007) argue that in the field of Tourism only few studies have applied established crisis models. However, one of the most extensive disaster management frameworks in tourism was developed by Faulkner (2001, p.44) who provides a six phase process:

- 1. Pre-event phase: disaster contingency plans, scenarios or probability assessments play a major role in the disaster management strategy.
- 2. Prodromol phase: the disaster is imminent, and warning systems and command centres are established. In this second phase, contingency plan actions are initiated.
- 3. Emergency phase: disaster effects are felt and actions are necessary to protect people or property in the tourism destination.
- 4. Intermediate phase: short-term and immediate needs of people have to be addressed by emergency and rescue teams. A clear media communication strategy is crucial in this phase.
- 5. Long-term (recovery) phase: the damaged infrastructure has to be rebuilt, and environmentally damaged areas have to be reconstructed.
- 6. Resolution phase: this phase corresponds to Fink's (1986) resolution stage where routine is restored or a new improved state occurs.

According to the above model of crisis management, both the pre-event and promodol phase which precede the crisis do not exist in Egypt as far as the above respondents views are concerned. In these two phases contingency plans have to be operated as warning signs are giving indicators that an impending crisis is about to occur. However, the subsequent recovery phases are somehow executed by the Egyptian tourism sector. They are represented by the head of the international tourism sector when she explained to the researcher how the promotional strategy of the tourism sector has changed in order to cope with the impact of the crisis.

"The first thing we concentrate on after any crisis is we start to deal with an international PR company. The first thing we do is that we bring international media men to Egypt. These people should be renowned and posses a high rate of readability and credibility. We do everything to show them that Egypt is safe and secure; everything is fine and people are walking safely in the

streets and live a normal life. Hence, when these media people return to their countries, they write what they saw in Egypt in their newspapers, and this I think is better than a million advert in any media. This is one thing. The other thing is that I also bring the international tour operators who stopped their travel programmes to Egypt in order to show them that the tourist sites which they stopped dealing with in Egypt are safe and there is nothing wrong with it. Normally, when this operator sees that everything is back to normal in Egypt, he began to resume his travel programmes to Egypt'.

The director of Alexandria and North Western coast tourist offices also commented on the promotional effort done by the ETA to combat the crisis:

"This political crisis had a great influence on the Egyptian tourism sector. It has led us to conduct international tourism events in Egypt that can be broadcasted by the international tourism media. In these events we used our media agent in order to convey the image of Egypt. The aim of these events was to explain the political situation in the country as well as highlighting that the important tourism sites in Egypt are still safe and secured".

The head of the domestic tourism sector in the ETA also commented on the crisis management procedures undertaken by the ETA:

"Any crisis go through three main stages; the first stage is the pre crisis, the second is during the crisis, and the third is the post crisis stage. Each of these three stages has a different way of treatment. Among these ways is how to move in the first stage and how to use the appropriate tools to deal with the crisis in the second stage in order to mitigate its negative impact and in the third stage, I start to put the steps to regain my momentum and to learn the lessons".

The high officials in the preceding quotations explained to the researcher that the ETA has executed the intermediate phase of the crisis management as referred to by Faulkner (2001) earlier in the six phase crisis management process. However, the key respondents' illustration to the managerial steps undertaken by the ETA is still missing the educated, as well as professional capacity. In this respect Iosim and Popescu (2015) suggest that in the communication process, it must be taken into account the relationship of seller/buyer and perceptions of the tourist about the whole leisure stay, meaning on the product and tourism services offered, perceptions that can be: positive, negative and neutral. Strategic communication is characterized through a vision in order to describe the clarity of the purpose and the direction of communication; it refers to the way of integration of the communication in the business sphere and assumes a cause and effect relationship between the communication activities and achievement of the company's goals. The communication strategies in tourism, according to the relationship with the public are divided into:

- Internal communication strategies: have as objective the increasing of the performance of each employee by providing the necessary information, achieve the activity, understanding the organization, understanding of the direction in which it is headed, understanding the standards that must be reported; External communication strategies: it aims at the management of the complex, communication process of the organization with the external environment in order to communicate and to issue the messages to each other. Iosim and Popescu (2015) added that communication strategy is composed from the following manipulation techniques:
- Strategy of corporation identity is based on presenting physical elements of the company: name, prints, interior and exterior arrangements, brochures, letterheads, business cards, press releases, flyers, buildings, clothing of the employees, company cars, etc.;
- Strategy of image of the company (the company image means all perceptions of the public or of some public category about the company in question);
- Strategy of product/brand.

Additionally, Iosim and Popescu (2015) advocated that the efficient communication strategy in tourism should follow the following points:

- Access to the information and staff development;
- Understanding of the own role in implementing the strategy and the impact, that it will have at one point on the employee;
- Understanding the impact of the strategy on customers;
- Teamwork maintaining a permanent efficient communication;
- Communication plan;
- Choice of suitable communication channel, according to the message and audience;
- Feedback.

From the above consequential steps on the communication strategy that should follow the crisis particularly in the Tourism sector, it appears that the high officials in the ETA were giving a general hand on summary of what they did in the aftermath of the crisis in the Egyptian Tourism sector. Their accounts were devoid of any scientific criteria or professional framework of the crisis management procedures that should ensue.

The general performance of the ETA immediately after the outbreak of the January 25th revolution was

criticized by David Beirmen (2011), a senior lecturer in Tourism at the University of Technology, Sydney, Australia when he states:

"The inept management of the tourism impact of the Egyptian uprising on tourism during the uprising period by the Egyptian Tourism Authority (ETA) is a prime example of a national tourism authority having lost reputational capital by failing to engage in the most basic crisis management practices during that confused three-week period, which engulfed Egypt during late January and early February 2011. The ETA and the Egyptian tourism industry have made a massive effort to restore the image of Egypt to travel consumers and the trade since the overthrow of Mubarak, however, my own research, based on interviews with Australian tour operator CEOs who specialize in Egypt, demonstrates that the ETA's abysmal performance (their words not mine) during the crisis resulted in a loss of credibility for any subsequent positive messages the ETA have tried to communicate. What makes the ETA's performance especially disappointing is that the private sector of the Egyptian tourism industry responded with admirable professionalism during the uprising".

From this analysis of the Egyptian Tourism sector performance immediately after the crisis of January 25th revolution it seems that the ETA is lacking communication and integration of efforts with the Egyptian private tourism sector. This lack of communication made the two sectors to work in isolated islands by which they appear as two separate and distant entities with no liaison or communication as the above account reveals. This lack of interaction that is based on scientific criteria, research and professionalism might stem from the fact that both sectors have different philosophies of management. This important observation is elaborated further in the following finding.

Finding Four: The performance of the personnel in the ETA lacks education and professionalism

A very important finding or viewpoint that was revealed by the key personnel in the ETA was that the know-how is still missing among the personnel in the Egyptian tourism public sector in general and the ETA personnel in particular. This point is explained by the head of the domestic tourism sector in the following quotation:

"I can see now that we are at the beginning of the right path but we need to work in an educated and professional manner. Meaning that we need to get out of the bureaucratic governmental regime in management as it wastes effort and time. We also need to combine between education and professionalism. I can see that without science, there will never be any progress. This is the base of progress in any country. Even in the tourism sector we need to work in an educated and scientific manner".

The respondent reflects above that the efforts undertaken by the personnel in the ETA still need to be based on scientific criteria, as well as professionalism. Although they are working hard to correct the image of Egypt in its tourist generating markets but still the know-how is absent, even when it exists it is done as individual efforts rather than a collective professional attitude. This point is further clarified by the director of the Egyptian NTOs:

"The problem was not the low number of personnel. The issue was how you deal with the travel trade in the tourist country of origin. I mean the professional relationship between you and the travel trade is highly important. The know-how is very important more than the number of personnel. In this context, in 2011 after the Jan 25th revoution, one of the Dutch news agencies was calling me in Brussels and asking me about the impact of the revolution on the image of Egypt as a tourist destination. I told him with confidence that the negative impact is not only on Egypt but it is on the Netherland, as well because they have a vested interest like us in keeping the Dutch travel movement to the destination. When, the interviewer from the news agency listened to my opinion, he was convinced and began to see Egypt from a different perspective. Hence, the one who is appointed to be the director of the Egyptian NTO abroad should have a good political as well as professional base".

Individuality versus collectivism is the main theme of the above excerpt. It is the know-how and the collective work ethic that is still nonexistent in the Egyptian tourism public sector managerial apparatus. This is due to the fact that the team work culture is still absent in the personnel attitude and mentality of the Egyptian public tourism sector. This point is further explained in the following finding.

Finding Five: Absence of team work culture in the Egyptian tourism public sector

The director of the Egyptian NTOs said about this point:

"We do not have this team work culture because we still do not possess general framework for our political system. When these people in the high political positions are selected they should have a certain vision that comprehends the team work culture. Regarding the crisis management team who is working collectively in a professional manner, I can tell you that the ups and downs that occurred in Egypt were beyond the parameters of the Egyptian tourism sector per se. it was a country image not just a destination image".

The respondent above does not deny the absence of the team work culture but to be fair he does not want to attribute it only to the Egyptian tourism public sector rather he claims that it is a culture of the whole destination

that should be educated on the ethics of the team work starting from the political system of the country. Accordingly, the children at school have to be educated on how to work together and to be always part of a team instead of working individually is an effective starting point to change the culture of individuality in Egypt. The respondents also confessed that what aggravates the problem of professionalism in the Egyptian tourism sector is the immigration of the professional personnel as they couldn't cope financially with the repercussions of the crisis. This important finding is further discussed in the following section.

Finding Six: Immigration of the trained personnel in the Egyptian Tourism private Sector

More than one respondent stated that among the major setbacks of the crisis in the Tourism sector in Egypt is the immigration of the professional personnel from the different private tourist establishments in the destination. This is revealed in the following excerpts:

The director of the NTOs said about this point:

'I think one of the negative impacts of the crisis we are facing is the redundancy of the qualified, trained personnel particularly in the hotel sector or the entire tourism sector in general. These redundant employees have one of two choices. Either to change the career and work on a different thing in Egypt, or to keep his career and experience and select another country to work in'.

The head of the international Tourism sector in the ETA also mentioned this issue:

"Another thing is the immigration of the trained personnel in Egypt from the tourist hotels and tourism companies. Due to the hard economic situation inside these tourist establishments, managers were forced to get rid of these trained personnel because they cannot afford to give them high salaries amid this crisis. As they are highly professional and trained, hence, are earning the highest salaries in the sector. As a result, the high chefs in the hotels have left, the room service personnel have left and accordingly the overall service presented now to tourists has been downgraded".

Accordingly, if the public tourism sector in Egypt is generally suffering from lack of personnel with high education and professionalism, this same shortcoming has been transferred to the private sector which is losing its trained personnel as a result of the economic hardship associated with the sharp drop of the overall incoming tourism to Egypt in the aftermath of the January 25th revolution, as well as the different terrorist attacks that hit the country later on.

In this respect, it has been argued that among the financial consequences of staff turnover are separation, replacement and training costs as well as low productivity performance levels (Hinkin and Tracey, 2000). Such costs are more heavily felt by firms operating seasonally, as they have to recruit, train and employ different staff every season (Sigala, 2006). Accordingly, the Egyptian tourism private sector will become unable to recruit and train new staff after the immigration of the old trained staff if the tourism sector performance remains below the expected levels of tourism movement. This will in turn affect the quality of service offered which will consequently set off the quality tourist who always favoured Egypt as a tourist destination.

5. Conclusion and recommendations

This study has been trying to explain how the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism represented in the Egyptian Tourist Authority(ETA) has set managerial steps and procedures to combat the negative shortcomings resulted from the political instability in Egypt due to the eruption of January 25th revolution. Although the ETA has made an enormous effort to lessen the impact of the revolution and the subsequent terrorist attacks that ensued, these efforts were missing a scientific and professional backdrop. During the interviews conducted with the key officials in the ETA, they came up with some major points, which are considered to be the main reasons for the crisis that are facing the Egyptian Tourism sector. These points are:

- The media coverage had a direct negative impact on the image of Egypt as a tourist destination.
- Terrorism is the main cause of the crisis in the Egyptian Tourism sector.
- Absence of specialized department for crisis management in the ETA.
- The performance of the personnel in the ETA lacks education and professionalism.
- Absence of team work culture in the Egyptian tourism public sector.
- Immigration of the trained personnel in the Egyptian Tourism private Sector.

According to the above findings, some recommendations were elicited that can enhance the performance of the Egyptian Tourism sector particularly during the crisis:

- 1. There must be a unified source to deal with the media during the crisis. This source should be comprised of trained media men from the Egyptian tourism sector who posses expertise and know-how to deal with such situations.
- 2. A devised contingency plan should be devised by the ETA consisted of step by step objectives with key specific terms and implementable methodologies. These methodologies should specify the different types of crisis and stipulate several policies to deal with them in a scientific manner.
- 3. There must be a specialized department for crisis management in the ETA. This department should encompass the heads of the different sectors in the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism and headed by the

Minister of Tourism. The main function of this department is to implement the different policies stipulated in the contingency plans and to propose different scenarios to deal with the impending crisis that are expected to hit the Egyptian Tourism sector.

- 4. There must be regular and ongoing training courses for all the staff in the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism on how to deal with crisis. These courses should be conducted by crisis management experts and University professors in order to provide the Tourism sector with the scientific, as well as professional base of how to manage these crises with different scales and magnitude.
- 5. The team work culture should be embedded in the managerial philosophy of the public tourism sector key personnel. This culture if cultivated within the employees should enhance their performance and allow them to have collective responsibility and cooperation.
- 6. The ETA should work on diversifying the tourist product of the destination by developing other tourist products rather than the traditional cultural/recreational mix so as to extend the tourism season throughout the year and hence be able to keep its professional personnel amongst job positions and thus enhance empowerment; peer-to-peer relationship building that can in turn enhance staff emotional bonding with the sector and its management team; and cooperation between diverse personalities and experts that in turn provide more opportunities and possibilities for organisational and individual learning and development.
- 7. Mega tourist events should be organized and held in Egypt after the crisis. Key celebrities, media men and opinion leaders should be present at these events so as to announce to the whole world that Egypt is a safe and secure destination and is competent to deal with its crisis in a professional manner.
- 8. Scientific conferences and educational tourism workshops should be held extensively during and after the crisis. These conferences should define and analyse the phenomenon of Terrorism and educate the students at universities on how to deal with such events and correct the country image of Egypt abroad.

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إدارة الأزمات السياسية و تأثيرها في السياحة: دراسة حالة ثورة 25 يناير في مصر رانيا مصطفى عبد الرحمن

يهدف هذا البحث إلى اختبار تأثير ثورة 25 يناير في الصورة السياحية لمصر بالخارج. كما يحاول البحث اقتراح إطار عمل مهني لمعالجة الأزمات ذات الطابع السياسي. اعتمد البحث على الدراسة الكيفية حيث قامت الباحثة بعقد ثمانية مقابلات متعمقة و مطولة مع مدراء و رؤساء قطاعات بوزارة السياحة المصرية تحديدا في هيئة تتشيط السياحة.استعانت الباحثة بمفهوم العينة العمدية عند اختيار عينة البحث، حيث يعتمد هذا المفهوم على اختيار أشخاص أو أماكن لأنها تتعمد معرفة شرح مفصل لمشكلة البحث و كذلك الظاهرة الأساسية التي يعالجها موضوع الدراسة. أسفرت هذه المقابلات عن ست نتائج رئيسية : التغطية الإعلامية سواء المحلية أو الدولية لها تأثير سلبي مباشر في صورة مصر السياحية بالخارج، العمليات الإرهابية في صورتها المنظمة تعتبر في نظر المسئولين السبب الأساسي في حدوث الأزمة في قطاع السياحية المصرية، لا توجد في وزارة السياحة شعبة متخصصة لإدارة الأزمات، أداء العاملين المحترفين في القطاع ينقصه الاحترافية، غياب ثقافة فريق العمل في القطاع السياحي الحكومي في مصر و هجرة العاملين المحترفين في القطاع السياحي الخاص المصري مما أدى إلى تفاقم الأزمة في قطاع السياحة. و بناء على هذه النتائج، قامت الباحثة باستخراج بعض التوصيات و التي تقترح في مجملها إطار عمل إداري للتعامل مع الأزمات ذات الطابع السياسي. يهدف إطار العمل أيضا إلى تحسين الأداء الوظيفي للعاملين بالقطاع السياحي الحكومي في مصر و كذلك أي مقصد سياحي أخر يمر بئرامات سياحية مشابهة للأزمة المصرية.

الكلمات الدالة: الأزمات السياسية، إدارة الأزمات، هيئة تنشيط السياحة، ثقافة فريق العمل.