Immunity of Lightweight DES Algorithm (DESL) Against Linear Cryptanalysis Attack | ||||
| Menoufia Journal of Electronic Engineering Research | ||||
| Article 16, Volume 28, ICEEM2019-Special Issue, 2019, Page 381-387 | ||||
| Document Type: Original Article | ||||
| DOI: 10.21608/mjeer.2019.67380 | ||||
 View on SCiNiTO | ||||
| Authors | ||||
Bassam Aboshsha* 1; Mohamed Dessouky2; Rabie Ramadan3; Ayman EL-SAYED 2
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| 1Computer Engineering Dept. Higher Institute of Engineering, Elshorouk Academy Cairo, Egypt | ||||
| 2Computer Science and Engineering Dept. Menoufia University, Menouf 32952, Egypt | ||||
| 3Computer Engineering Dept. Cairo University, and University of Hail , KSA Giza+03, Egypt | ||||
| Abstract | ||||
| Lightweight DES Algorithm (DESL) was introduced by Axel Poschmann et.al as a strong, compact and efficient encryption algorithm suitable for constraint resource like WSNs, RFID and IOT devices. This paper discusses the security of the DESL against Linear Cryptanalysis which is a known plaintext attack in which a large number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs are used to determine the value of key bits. Linear cryptanalysis works on the principle of finding “high probability occurrences of linear expressions involving plaintext bits, ciphertext bits, and subkey bits”. Furthermore, we show that DESL is more resistant against the linear cryptanalysis attack than classical DES. | ||||
| Keywords | ||||
| Cryptography; DESL; Linear cryptanalysis; RFID | ||||
| References | ||||
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