Do Egyptians Believe the Unbelievable? Media Exposure and Belief that January 25 Revolution was a Conspiracy. | ||||
المجلة العلمية لبحوث الإذاعة والتلفزيون | ||||
Article 11, Volume 2016, Issue 5, January 2016, Page 27-62 PDF (813 K) | ||||
Document Type: المقالة الأصلية | ||||
DOI: 10.21608/ejsrt.2016.90086 | ||||
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Author | ||||
Seham Mohamed Abdel Khalek | ||||
Assistant professor, Menofia University, Faculty of Art , Mass Communication Department | ||||
Abstract | ||||
On 25 January 2011, demonstrators took to the streets, calling for freedom, justice and a voice in managing Egypt's resources. Today, after four years of protests, conspiracy theories have been proliferated by various media outlets that January revolution was a plot .This study investigated the roles of regime support, threat perception, authoritarianism and media exposure and their interactions in the belief that January revolution was a conspiracy. Indications pointed to the role of selective exposure in shifting people's attitudes toward January revolution. This study further found that exposure to attitude-incongruent information failed to reduce belief in conspiracy theories for those who support the regime, threatened individuals and authoritarians .While the three variables served as a strong predictor of conspiracy belief, an interaction with selective exposure promoted this belief. As hypothesized, those who highly support the current regime would be more likely to believe that January revolution was a conspiracy, and they were. Threat perception and authoritarianism were also strong predictors of conspiracy belief. This is consistent with past findings that conspiracy belief serve political, social and psychological needs .( Swami ,2012 ) . The study also showed that regular exposure to monopolistic conspiracy discourses on Sada el Balad and /or El Faraeen as well as other pro-regime media outlets was related to conspiracy belief . This result is consistent with Warner and Neville-Shepard’s (2014) findings that exposure to one-sided conspiracy messages increased belief in conspiracy theories. Moreover , an interaction between regime support and exposure to media outlets supporting the current regime amplified the differences between those who support the regime and those who do not .Those with high levels of regime support were more receptive to conspiracy messages proliferated by pro-regime media outlets , than those with low levels of regime support , so a relative selective exposure effect may be at work . This result gives support to studies who argue that selective exposure leads to polarization (e.g., Holbert et al., 2010; Sunstein , 2007; Stroud ,2010) . It may also at part explain the highly polarized environment in Egypt. A similar interaction was found between threat perception, authoritarianism and exposure to pro-regime media outlets .Threat perception and authoritarianism increased belief in conspiracy theories more prominently in the condition in which participants regularly view conspiracy messages . A three-way interaction showed that threat perception increased belief in conspiracy theories among authoritarians who highly support the regime and who chose to view conspiracy messages. Results are consistent with Lavine and his colleagues' (2005) findings that in the presence of threat, high but not low authoritarians became significantly more interested in exposure to attitude-congruent information. The interaction between regime support / threat perception / authoritarianism and exposure to pro-regime media outlets showed the complex role of these variables in both affecting and promoting conspiracy belief. As for consuming different perspectives, those who highly support the regime and regularly view debunking information on anti-regime media outlets, such as Muslim Brotherhood and Aljazeera channels, showed attitude reinforcement. The interaction between exposure and conspiracy belief was positive and significant. This tendency conforms to the selective exposure thesis: People do not necessarily avoid alternative perspectives; they may be exposed to information that contradicts their position and yet strive to reinforce their attitudes because they filter incongruent information (Baum and Groeling, 2008; Taber and Lodge, 2006). However, regular use of anti -regime media outlets showed different relationships with conspiracy belief for those who oppose the regime. While exposure to Aljazeera channels reduced belief in conspiracy theories, there was no such interaction with Muslim Brotherhood channels. Different indications could be attributed to the respondents' political predispositions. Respondents included in this study were all of liberal predispositions .Most of those who oppose the regime in Egypt may also oppose the Muslim Brotherhood regime, so as Zaller (1992) argued, they may question the credibility of the source. Although programs presented on Muslim Brotherhood and Aljazeera channels repeatedly dismiss the notion of a conspiracy , it is not surprising, that exposure to these channels was positively and significantly related to conspiracy belief among threatened individuals . When confronted with dissonant information of the events of September 11, 2001, widely reported by the mainstream and dissenting media outlets, threatened citizens showed support for the official story, even to the point of fabricating arguments to support their beliefs (Manwell,2010 ). Typically, high authoritarians who were exposed to diverse messages, experienced attitude confirmation and dismissed dissonant information. Strategies to counter-argue dissonant information serves to protect individual's current beliefs. (Lavine et al., 2005) | ||||
Keywords | ||||
Egyptians; Media Exposure; January 25 Revolution; Selective exposure; Regime support; conspiracy belief | ||||
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