Peirce’s Principle of Deductive Inference | ||||
| International Journal of Advanced Humanities Research | ||||
| Volume 4, Issue 1, June 2024, Page 128-137 PDF (876.25 K) | ||||
| Document Type: Original Article | ||||
| DOI: 10.21608/ijahr.2025.362946.1057 | ||||
 View on SCiNiTO | ||||
| Author | ||||
ahmed essam  
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| Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, Suez University, P.O.Box: 43221, Suez, Egypt | ||||
| Abstract | ||||
| Charles S. Peirce’s leading principle serves as the logical rule that is followed to move from premises to conclusion, and without which no deductive inference could be formed. The leading principle does not add further information to the premises applied to it, they only determine the status of premises to ensure moving successfully to the conclusion. Therefore, the principle that organizes and governs the process of deductive inference itself. Peirce has distinguished two types of leading principles: the formal or logical principle, and the material or actual principle. The material (actual) leading principle resembles formal implication, whereas logical (formal) leading principle is a proposition of material implication. Peirce’s concept of the leading principle, though significantly refined since his time, was a great advance over the concepts similar to it in his day. However, the lack of specificity is considered the main defect in Peirce’s treatment of his concept of the leading principle | ||||
| Keywords | ||||
| Charles S. Peirce’s; leading principle; deductive inference | ||||
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