On The Relevance Of Judgment And Praxis In The Humanities | ||||
| ديوجين الفلسفة | ||||
| Volume 1, Issue 1, June 2021, Page 1-10 PDF (539.78 K) | ||||
| Document Type: المقالة الأصلية | ||||
| DOI: 10.21608/dugin.2021.242284 | ||||
 View on SCiNiTO | ||||
| Author | ||||
| JURE ZOVKO | ||||
| Abstract | ||||
| Kant maintains in hisCritique of Judgmentthat the task of Humanities is to contribute to the cultivation of our mind (Critique of Judgment, § 60). Kant’s proposition hasremained without any reception in contemporary philosophical discourse. One of the main reasons is certainly the dominant “chorismos” between the mind and the world, or, asDonald Davidson said,“the dualism of the objective and the subjective”, respectively, in other words,“dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content” (Davidson, D.Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective.Oxford: Clarendon Press 2001:43). As the unavoidable consequence of such views, two “myths” have been firmly established in contemporary philosophy: “The Myth of the Subjective” (D. Davidson) and the“Myth of the Given” (Wilfrid Sellars). Davidson, an advocate of externalism, is one of the most consistent opponents of “The Myth of the Subjective”. Criticizing the “Myth of the Given”, Wilfrid Sellarsclaims that it offers no clear description of the factual state of affairs, as supporters of empiricism and logical positivism claim. Sellars rejects the view that the cognitive process is constituted as a pure empirical description: “The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says” (Sellars, Wilfrid Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. With an Introduction by Richard Rorty and a Study Guide by Robert Brandom.Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997: 76). | ||||
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